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Rationally,	 it	 would	 be	 expected	 that	 the	 discovery	 of	 substantial	 and	 lucrative	 natural	
resources	would	 provide	 a	 pre-industrial	 state	with	 the	 opportunity	 to	 achieve	 industrial	
take-off.	 However,	 resource	 curse	 theory	 has	 challenged	 this	 assumption.	 Instead,	 oil-
dependent	 states	 are	 not	 able	 to	 diversify	 their	 economies	 away	 from	 their	 reliance	 on	
natural	 resource	 revenues.	 The	 Sultanate	 of	 Oman	 has	 proved	 to	 be	 no	 exception.	 The	
discovery	 of	 oil	 in	Oman	 in	 1962	 provided	 its	 government	with	 the	means	 to	 establish	 a	
massive	 socio-economic	 development	 programme with	 the	 aim	 to	 eventually	 reduce	 the	
country’s	dependency	on	oil.	Decades	 later,	oil	 export	 revenues	 still	 represent	more	 than	
80%	of	government	revenues.	The	main	objective	of	this	research	is	to	try	to	understand	the	
root	cause	of	Oman’s	inability	to	create	a	diversified	economy,	despite	the	fact	that	it	was	
among	 the	 first	 countries	 in	 the	 region	 to	 adopt	 an	 economic	 diversification	 strategy. To	
explore	 the	 main	 reasons	 behind	 the	 unsuccessful	 economic	 diversification	 attempts	 in	
Oman,	this	study	analyses	in-depth	the	four	aspects	of	the	‘resource	curse’	identified	in	the	
literature:	 economic	 factors;	 human	 resource	 development;	 institutional	 quality;	 and	
political/social	factors.	The	thesis	 is	based	on	a	single	case	study,	that	of	Oman,	using	two	
methods	 of	 data	 collection:	 semi-structured	 interviews	 and	 focus	 group	 discussions.	 The	
participants’	insights	are	triangulated	with	official	documents	and	reports	from	international	
organisations.	 The	 analysis	 demonstrates	 that	 studying	 each	 of	 the	 four	 aspects	 of	 the	
resource	 curse	 separately	 does	 not	 provide	 sufficient	 explanation	 for	 the	 failure	 of	
diversification.	 As	 a	 result,	 this	 thesis	 argues	 that	 the	 interaction	 of	 these	 four	 factors	
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
  







1939, when the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia exported its first oil shipment, was a turning point 
in the history of the Arabian Peninsula. The new source of revenues encouraged other states 
and tribes in the region to sign exploration contracts with western oil companies. However, 
the unstable political situation and the absence of strong governments in the other parts of 
Arabia curtailed oil operations and limited the activities of the companies, which resulted in 
political interference and sometimes military interventions by the USA and the UK to protect 
the interests of their companies (Morton, 2007). By 1971, the region had been shaped and 
stabilized, and a number of new states were created. The new regimes gradually managed to 
use oil revenues to secure their authority through direct and indirect redistribution of the oil 
wealth.   
 
Many researchers argue that the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries, namely 
Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, suffer from limited economic 
diversification (e.g. Beblawi, 2010; Davidson, 2013; Krane, 2014). These distortions result in 
weak economic efficiency, which, in turn, undermines the outcomes of any efforts towards 
diversification or industrialization. Furthermore, El-Katiri (2013) warns that the increase in 
domestic energy demand in the Gulf States will see them lose their status as major energy 
suppliers to the world. The sharp increase in the domestic demand for energy is mainly driven 
by the cheap energy prices because of government subsidies. In addition, oil and gas reserves 
will deplete more rapidly because of governments’ attempts to meet domestic demand while 
preserving the current export levels. These practices will eventually have negative impacts on 
their socio-economic development and political stability. 
 
Moreover, Mitchell and Stevens (2008) posit that the state should not consider the 
revenues acquired from their natural resources as part of their gross domestic product (GDP), 
as that approach will lead eventually to the diminishing of its wealth rather than creating a 
sustainable economy. Thus, as the world squeezes more economic growth from each barrel of 
oil, the GCC countries are moving in the opposite direction. As Beblawi puts it:  
  3 
The Gulf States’ drama is that it [oil extraction] is not simply another economic 
activity added to the other existing productive sources within a viable and modern 
economy, as it is with the Netherlands or, for that matter, Canada, Australia, and 
the Scandinavian countries. In the Gulf, the oil sector dominates the economy; it is 
almost the unique source of wealth (Beblawi, 2010:188).  
 
Thus, oil and gas revenues were an essential factor in the Gulf States’ formation, 
development and modernization over the past few decades. However, the survival of the 
monarchies in the Gulf States will come under severe pressure due to current and future 
challenges, such as: the expected growth in population; the increase in energy demand; the 
lack of economic diversification; and the capacity to continue direct and indirect wealth 
distribution (Davidson, 2013; Krane, 2014).  
 
Against this background, the main objective of this research is to try to understand the 
root cause of Oman’s inability to create a diversified economy, despite the fact that it was 
among the first countries in the region to adopt an economic diversification strategy. In this 
context, the rest of the chapter presents the research questions, followed by a brief 
background that focuses on Oman’s strategic plans towards economic diversification. The 
research theoretical foundation, methodology, contribution, and thesis outline are also 
discussed in the later sections of the chapter.    
	
1.2 Research	Questions	
Resource curse theory highlights the distortions created by rentier economies, and appears to 
provide a comprehensive explanation for Oman’s failure to diversify the economy. However, 
the theory cannot, in isolation, explain which of the factors—economic, lack of human 
development, institutional quality, and political and social factors—is the most important. 
Therefore, this thesis applies resource curse theory to a detailed case study of Oman’s 
economy from 1970 to 2016 in order to investigate: What factors impeded the economic 
diversification policies in Oman? Accordingly, the research focuses on answering the 
following sub questions:    
• How severe is the effect of the economic factors (Dutch disease,1 oil price instability, 
private sector performance, and government intervention in business activities) on 
Oman’s ability to achieve economic diversification? 
                                                
1 The term was first used by The Economist magazine published on 26 November 1977 in reference to the gas 
boom in The Netherlands and its effects on the economy (Kiev, 2014). 
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• To what extent has the Omani government succeeded in human development and 
achieving high levels of institutional quality?  
• How has this affected Oman’s ability to achieve economic diversification? 




The Sultanate of Oman2 is a country of around 300,000 sq. km on the south-eastern coast of 
the Arabian Peninsula. It has a relatively small population of some 4 million inhabitants. 
Prior to the discovery of oil in Oman, and until 1954, the country was divided into two 
political systems that ruled different parts of the country. The interior side of the country was 
under the Imamate regime, while the south and the north coast, including the current capital, 
Muscat, was ruled by a monarchy, with the Sultan as its head. In 1955, the government 
signed the first oil exploration contract with the Iraq Petroleum Company and in 1967, Oman 
exported its first oil shipment (Morton, 2007). Many scholars argue that oil was the pivotal 
factor in the formation and modernization of Oman (Beblawi, 2010; Davidson, 2013; Levins, 
2013; Oskarsson & Ottosen, 2010).  
 
In July 1970, Sultan Qaboos Al-Said carried out a bloodless coup to depose his father. 
He seized power in a country that experienced civil wars and revolutions. Oil revenues 
helped the Sultan unify the country and gain the loyalty of the main tribes (Takriti, 2013). 
According to Elmallakh (1972:418): 
The new Sultan, Qaboos, has signalled a striking commitment to the development 
process. The most crucial aspect of this approach is the underlying issue of unity. 
Domestically, economic reform is utilized to assist in this thrust as, for example, in 
the elimination of internal customs and duties. The institutionalization of specific 
government departments—economy, social affairs, labour, education, health, 
foreign affairs—should facilitate national implementation of essential 
infrastructure projects.  
 
As a result, Oman, like its neighbours, witnessed rapid and prosperous economic, and 
social development. However, unlike some of its neighbours, such as Qatar, Saudi Arabia, 
and the UAE, Oman has more modest oil reserves (estimated at 5.5bn barrels) (NCSI, 
2016d), which are expected to be sustainable for only another 15 to 20 years with the current 
                                                
2 The thesis also uses Oman and Sultanate to refer to the Sultanate of Oman. 
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oil extraction technology. Furthermore, oil production in Oman is costlier in comparison to 
the rest of the Gulf States (Lefebvre, 2010). For that reason, the priority of the government’s 
plans has been to reduce Oman’s dependency on oil by encouraging the development of the 
non-oil sector. The pressure to achieve this intensified after the oil crises in 1986 and 1990 
(Rigsbee, 1999), and after the financial crisis in late 2007 and 2008 when oil revenues across 
the entire region were under pressure.  
 
However, the first major challenge that faced the new regime in 1970 was the ongoing 
revolution in the south of Oman. The revolution had been fomented by the Popular Front for 
the Liberation of Oman (PFLO), which followed a hard-line understanding of Marxism and 
was supported by the Marxist-Leninist People's Democratic Republic of [southern] Yemen. 
In 1974, the PFLO changed its name to The Popular Front for the Liberation of Oman and the 
Arab Gulf (PFLOAG), implying that it intended to eventually push further into the Arabian 
Peninsula. With military support from the UK, Iran, and Jordan, the Sultan’s armed forces 
managed to push the rebels back to the Yemeni borders. However, the Sultan’s policy also 
contained a political element that granted the rebels a considerable degree of autonomy and 
offered them an amnesty. As a result, by the end of 1975, the Omani government was able to 
declare an end to the rebellion (Cordesman, 1997). 
 
Having freed its territory from the PFLOAG’s rebels, the government was able to 
start focusing on the state-building process (Cordesman, 1997). The political elite recognized 
the need to establish a development strategy that would ease the economy’s dependency on 
oil revenue. In 1970, oil revenues contributed more than 95% of the country’s GDP and most 
government expenditure was allocated to the defence budget (Halliday, 1978). As the main 
source of income, oil rents were used to fund development projects such as schools, hospitals 
and local governance across the state. In order to support this strategy, in 1976 the 
government announced the first in a continuing series of five-year development plans 
(FYDPs) that would form its mandate in each period. The first FYDP focused on economic 
and social reforms through three main objectives (Mohammed, 2012): 
• Economic diversification; 
• Human resource development; and 
• Urban development. 
Oman achieved strong growth rate in terms of its GDP, initially because of the rapid 
increase in income generated from oil and gas exports. Many researchers observe the 
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conundrum in the oil rich states of attaining high GDP growth rates but failing to create 
sustainable development. For example, Davis (2011) concludes that GDP growth is positively 
associated with minerals and oil exports, while Nunn (2007) argues that minerals, oil, and 
diamonds production in Africa has had a positive effect on the per capita growth rate. 
However, other researchers argue that a positive relationship between resource abundance 
and GDP growth rate usually results in the failure to reduce the finite resource dependency. 
Ding and Field (2005) find a negative relationship between resource abundance and the 
human capital development. Using a more nuanced analysis, Brunnschweiler and Bulte 
(2008) distinguish between resource dependence and resource abundance. The authors argue 
that a country with an abundance of resources does not necessarily equate with resource 
dependency. Norway and Canada are examples of states with resource abundance but have 
very diversified economies. However, Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008) argue, if the country 
is resource dependent, then it can be difficult to develop a diversified economy because the 
situation is often associated with social and political complications such as poverty, 
inequality, and poor human development outcomes.  
 
1.3.1 Economic	Diversification	Strategies		
Prior to 1970, there were only three governmental institutions in Oman, The Ministry of 
Finance, The Ministry of Interior Affairs, and The Ministry of Foreign Affairs. However, 
after the regime changed in 1970, the government structure grew to include new institutions 
bringing the number to nine and by 1976 further government bodies were established to 
facilitate growth in every aspect of the country (MOSS, 2014:39). In 1976, the first economic 
strategy was announced in the form of the first FYDP. The main idea behind the FYDP 
strategy was to create periodic plans as frameworks for development in the country.  
 
The first FYDP (1976-1981) and the second FYDP (1981-1986) did not achieve many 
of their main goals, as oil export revenues continued to dominate government revenues, there 
was rising unemployment and weak industrial growth. In 1986, the Omani government 
devalued its currency against the US dollar by 10% because of the negative impacts of the 
rapid decrease in oil prices from USD35/b in 1981 to under USD10/b by the end of 1986. 
The low oil prices also forced the government to adopt austerity measures such as reducing 
the capital expenditure, which negatively affected small businesses and industries (Johnson, 
2014). According to Atkinson and Hamilton (2003), if the state cannot manage its natural 
resources in a rational manner, then it ends up using a high percentage of the natural resource 
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revenue to pursue its routine business. As a result, it is not able to invest its income in 
productive projects, which, in turn, may restrain the state from implementing a long-term 
domestic savings strategy. This results in low or even negative rates of genuine savings, 
which is eventually translated into slow economic growth. Dunning (2005:451) argues that 
the failure to use natural resource revenues is because the: 
Political elites in oil-rich countries that are in control of many resource-dependent 
states face an important trade-off: while they might like to promote the 
diversification of the economy, thereby reducing fiscal volatility and potentially 
improving aggregate economic performance, diversification may create societal 
bases of power outside of the control of political elites. These independent bases of 
power may then facilitate future challenges to the political power of state 
incumbents, especially during the economic downturns and fiscal crises that 
typically characterise resource-reliant countries. Thus, while diversification may be 
economically rewarding, it can also be politically costly. 
 
Nevertheless, the Omani government was aware of the challenges facing it. In 1990, 
the Sultan ordered the Council of Ministers to study what had been achieved to date 
regarding the economic and social reforms. The review indicated that oil was still the main 
source of income and that there had been very limited development in the economic and 
social structure. Then, in 1994, the government decided to seek an independent evaluation of 
the previous FYDPs. Accordingly, with the help of the World Bank, a comprehensive report 
was drafted, which highlighted the strength and weaknesses of the previous FYDPs. It also 
highlighted the risks associated with oil price fluctuations and the increased number of young 
Omanis joining the workforce (The WB, 1994). In terms of the oil price fluctuations, in 1986 
oil prices collapsed from USD27/b to USD13/b. As a consequence, the economy contracted 
by 12.5%. Further oil price collapses were associated with contractions of the economy: in 
1988 the economy contracted by 2.8%, in 1991 the contraction was 2.9%, and in 1998 the 
contraction was 11.1% (MONE, 2000). 
 
The World Bank Report led, in 1995, to the government announcing a new long-term 
strategy called ‘Oman Vision 2020’ (hereafter Vision 2020), which aimed to prepare Oman 
for a post-oil era by creating the framework for sustainable development. The main features 
of that strategy were: 
• Economic diversification; 
• Increasing the private sector’s share in the economy; 
• Globalisation of the Omani economy; and 
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• Human capital development to be able to compete in the national/international labour 
market (MONE, 1995).   
Importantly, Vision 2020 was not only an economic development strategy but was also meant 
to work in conjunction with social and human development targets.  
 
However, in 2010, the Omani government reviewed the outcomes of Vision 2020 to 
date and concluded that there had been very limited success in achieving the key goals of the 
strategy. The review concluded that economic activities were still heavily dependent on 
revenues from the oil sector. Furthermore, economic diversification was found not to be 
improving, as policy implementations and government efforts did not provide the necessary 
support to drive growth in all sectors (AlHarithy, 2013). In 2011, Oman seemed to be on the 
verge of what has been termed the ‘Arab Spring’, with high unemployment levels, social 
inequality, and limited public participation in the decision-making processes among the main 
factors. The degree of social dissatisfaction encouraged young Omanis to protest in the 
streets (Davidson, 2013). This is clear evidence that something was wrong either with the 
economic and social reform strategies or the implementation process. 	
	
1.4 Theoretical	Perspective	
In terms of the theoretical underpinnings of the study, it is apparent that several different 
theories have been developed. By focusing on the viability and sustainability of economic 
growth in oil-rich countries (Ahmadov, 2011; Boschini et al., 2007; Collier, 2008; Robinson 
et al., 2006; Rosser, 2006), theories, such as resource curse theory and rentier state theory, 
alongside other conceptual definitions for the phenomenon of weak economic performance in 
resource rich states, such as the paradox of plenty and point resource dependency, have been 
developed. In the context of the viability and sustainability of economic growth in oil-rich 
countries most studies attempt to ascertain whether the massive revenue flows from a one-
point recourse is a curse or a blessing (Charyyev, 2015; Gelb, 1988; Gylfason, 2010; Stevens, 
2003). This study uses resource curse theory as its theoretical underpinning.  
 
Moreover, most studies (Basedau & Lay, 2009; Daniele, 2011; Larsen, 2006; 
Robinson et al., 2006) that discuss the resource curse theory are based on the use of 
quantitative methods in a cross-section analysis and concentrate on the effects of the resource 
abundance on the macroeconomic level. Additionally, most scholars use resource curse 
theory as a diagnostic tool by which to identify the consequences of the natural resource 
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dependency, rather than to recognise which of the symptoms obstruct the state’s ability to 
implement the required reform to achieve economic diversification. In contrast, this thesis 
uses resource curse theory to analyse the impact of oil dependency on the Omani 
government’s efforts to diversify the economy. The comprehensive examination expands the 
scope of the analysis to include human resource development, the political and social 
environment and institutional quality alongside the economic factors.  
	
1.5 Methodology		
Understanding the obstacles to economic diversification in Oman requires a comprehensive 
explanation and interpretation of the data which, in my view, is difficult to achieve using 
quantitative methodology alone because the nature of the interaction between the different 
elements is too difficult to quantify. For example, it is easy to calculate the GDP growth rate 
in a given period, and it is also easy to determine which sector contributed most to GDP 
growth. However, any deeper understanding of the social and political impacts associated 
with the resource curse in a country by using quantitative methodology is difficult as this 
endeavour requires an analysis of the social and political context. Therefore, in my view, the 
qualitative method is more suitable for this research.  
 
According to Sandelowski and Barroso (2003), qualitative research is the umbrella 
that covers the best strategy to conduct any enquiry aiming to study how humans understand, 
experience, and reproduce the social world. Qualitative research contains a rich and detailed 
description of the phenomena, which allows the researcher to conduct an in-depth 
interpretation. In terms of this research, the qualitative method allows the researcher to 
understand the participants’ views on which of the four factors—economic, human resource 
development, political and social, and institutional quality—has a bigger impact on the 
diversification efforts. The flexibility of a qualitative methodology allows the researcher to 
understand the participants’ views based on their experience of Oman’s economic structure. 
 
The qualitative methodology adopted in the research uses two methods of data 
collection and triangulates the findings with relevant data from statistical reports, tables, 
demand forecasts and figures from diverse sources, including the National Centre for 
Statistical Information (NCSI), reports and online resources of UNCTAD, the International 
Monetary Fund (IMF), the Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA), 
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the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD), the World Bank 
(WB), and the National Archive-UK (TNA). 
 
The first data collection method was a series of semi-structured interviews conducted 
with 41 members of the Omani political and business elite from the state council, government 
institutions, the business community, universities, NGOs, and the media. To increase the size 
and representativeness of the interview sample, the selection of interviewees was based on 
two parallel snowball networks in which one interviewee nominated another and so on. The 
participants were selected according to various criteria including their involvement in top-
level decision-making process in Oman. The researcher sought to collect data related to the 
factors proposed by the resource curse theory. Accordingly, the semi-structured interview 
participants were asked set of questions classified into four main themes: economic factors, 
human resource development, institutional quality, and political and social factors.  This was 
then linked to the impact of those factors on Oman’s economy diversification efforts. In 
addition, a questionnaire containing 11 yes/no questions reflecting the main themes of the 
semi-structured interview questions was collected (see Appendix 2). The questionnaire 
provided the researcher with the means to quantify the agreement or disagreement of the 
participants on each theme. 
 
The second method was to hold two focus group discussions, conducted separately 
with top level decision makers from the state council, government institutions, the business 
community, universities, and the media. The participants in each group were encouraged to 
discuss similar themes to the semi-structured interviews, but without detailed guiding 
questions (see Appendix 3). The focus group discussions were fruitful as they provided in-
depth insights from the participants who engaged in a transparent discussion which provided 
the researcher a better understanding and different perspectives. 
 
The fieldwork, which was conducted in 2016, received Durham University ethical 
approval. As expected, due to the sensitivity of the topic in Oman and the authoritarian 
political culture, the participants in the semi-structured interviews and focus group 
discussions all requested their identities be anonymized, which was granted. 
 
1.6 Research	Significance	and	Contributions		
This thesis makes a number of contribution to knowledge. From a political and social view, 
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Oman has been studied by a very limited number of scholars including Al-Farsi (2010) and 
Rabi (2011) who analyse the political structure and democracy in Oman from the perspective 
of its religion. Limbert (2010) studies Omani society from an anthropological view. Allen 
and Rigsbee II (2014), Peterson (2004, 2009), Townsend (1977) and Valeri (2009) focus on 
the political economy of Oman and state building, while Takriti (2013) provides archival 
analyses on the revolution in the south of Oman. Indeed, according to Hunt (2014:6), “A 
ProQuest search, reveals 482 scholarly journals published with the word “Oman” in the title 
in the last decade, only twenty-two of which pertain to politics. The majority of articles drew 
from the geological, anthro-historic, and medical fields. Even global databases have 
statistical blind spots”. This statement helps understand the need for further research on the 
political economy of Oman in general and its post-oil economy in particular.  
 
Furthermore, in relation to resource curse theory, most research targeting the oil-
producing countries is based on cross-country quantitative GDP growth analysis in which 
Oman is included along with other states. The results of such studies have contradictory 
findings. For example, Karl (1997) concludes that Oman managed to avoid the resource 
curse, while Sach and Warner (1997) argue that Oman has been negatively affected by the 
resource curse. 
 
Beyond Oman, however, the body of literature that studies the relationship between 
resource abundance and development is extensive, including: Bannon and Collier (2003); 
Gelb (1988); Gelb, Eifert, and Tallroth (2002); Isham, Woolcock, Pritchett, and Busby 
(2002); Leite and Weidmann (1999); Lotz (2008); Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003); 
Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001); and Skancke (2003). Their consensus is that the existence and 
domination of a particular type of natural resource is linked to an increase in the negative 
factors within a country, such as civil war, slow growth rates in the non-resource economy 
and lower levels of democratisation. In contrast, scholars such as Rostow (1990) posit the 
idea that resource abundance can result in industrial take-off. This was the case in Australia, 
the UK and the US, where the natural resource income created a transition towards 
development. However, other researchers conclude the opposite. For example, Wheeler 
(1984) finds that in Sub-Saharan Africa, the growth rate of resource-rich countries was 
slower than in countries that were not rich in minerals in the 1970s. The contradictory 
findings regarding the limits of development under the umbrella of resource abundance 
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demonstrates the need for further study into the Omani case in order to determine the reasons 
behind the limited success in the efforts to diversify its economy. 
 
Therefore, this thesis seeks to start filling a wide gap in the literature about the 
resource dependency in a single case (Oman). Accordingly, the thesis contributions are: 
• The main contribution is providing a new analysis of the resource curse impact on a 
single case study.  
• The thesis provides a new dimension to the theory as it argues that resource 
dependency must not be categorised as purely a curse or a blessing. 
• Another contribution is its inclusion of different factors as most studies only test one 
factor for the reasons behind limited economic diversification. 
• The methodology also contributes to the literature, as no study uses a qualitative 
methodology to test the resource curse impact in a single case study. 
• Although this thesis analyses the resource curse impact in Oman, the similarities 
between the Sultanate and other GCC countries could inform the possible causes 
behind the limited successful economic diversification in those countries. 
• The research examines, for the first time, the relationship between the different 
factors—economic, institutional quality, political and social factors, and human 
resource development.  
• The thesis posits a new argument that foreign direct investment (FDI) decision-
making is related more to political and social factors than to institutional or economic 
factors. 
• The thesis proposes a new conception of the Dutch Disease, termed ‘the GCC 
disease’, which better fits the economic outcomes in the GCC states. 
• This thesis overcomes the debate regarding the economic performance measures as it 
considers economic diversification as the equivalent of successful or positive 
economic performance measure. 
• The thesis provides, for the first time, an analysis of the roots of crony capitalism in 
Oman and its impact on economic diversification. 
 
1.7 Thesis	Structure		
In order to answer the research questions, the thesis is organised into nine chapters including 
this introductory chapter. Chapter 2 provides an overview of the Omani economy, politics, 
  13 
and institutions. The first section presents a background to the Omani economy and 
highlights its structure, the government revenues, the private sector’s involvement in the 
economy, the strategies implemented by the government to achieve sustainable economic 
development, the economic challenges, and the Dutch disease symptoms in the Omani 
economy. The second section highlights human resource development by providing an 
overview of the demographic structure and the issues related to the limited Omani 
participation in the private sector. The third section gives an overview of the institutions in 
Oman and provides the perspective of the international agencies on institutional quality. 
 
Chapter 3 presents a critical review of the literature on resource curse theory. It is divided 
into three main sections. The first section provides an overview of the literature related to the 
resource curse. It starts by identifying resource curse characteristics, such as Dutch disease, 
with economic growth, institutional weakness, corruption, and regime type. It also provides 
an overview of the literature on how states can avoid the resource curse trap. The second 
section discusses the literature that analyses the resource curse impact on the GCC states, 
including Oman. The third section highlights the research gaps in the literature. 
 
Chapter 4 discusses the theoretical and conceptual framework. The chapter is divided into 
two main sections. The first section identifies the main differences between resource 
dependency and resource abundance and identifies economic diversification measures. The 
second section addresses the resource curse channels—economic factors, institutional quality, 
human resource development, and political and social channels—in the Omani context. 
 
Chapter 5 details the procedures and methods followed in the research including the rationale 
behind the case selection. Furthermore, it justifies the analysis techniques used, including the 
collection and sampling methods. The chapter also addresses the limitations and difficulties 
related to the fieldwork process. 
 
Chapters 6, 7 and 8 present the findings. Chapter 6 analyses the semi-structured and focus 
group discussion data in relation to the economic factors. It starts with an analysis of the 
economic structure and includes a discussion of the issues related to the limited economic 
diversification. The chapter also analyses the Dutch disease symptoms and their applicability 
to the Omani economy. Furthermore, the chapter identifies oil price instability, government 
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involvement in economic activities, private sector performance, and the clandestine trade as 
elements of the economic factors that block diversification efforts. 
 
Chapter 7 analyses the lack of human resource development as the second channel of the 
resource curse theory. The chapter covers issues related to human resource development in 
Oman, such as education quality, education policies and sustainability, the labour market 
structure, and the impact of the rentier mentality. Furthermore, the thesis identifies the 
importance of research and development (R&D) to achieve sustainable economic 
development. Therefore, the last section of the chapter highlights the R&D environment in 
Oman and its impact on the limited economic diversification. 
 
Chapter 8 focuses on the institutional quality and the political and social factors that impact 
on the state’s ability to achieve economic diversification. The chapter is divided into three 
main sections. The first section analyses institutional quality in Oman and includes economic 
diversification strategies’ management, implementation, and consistency. The section also 
highlights the chronic problems which hinder institutional reform in Oman, such as the 
overlapping of responsibilities among different government institutions and the lack of 
accountability and governance. The second section discusses the social factors by looking at 
rentier mentality, nepotism,3 the bureaucracy, and individuals’ performance. The third section 
assesses the political factors associated with crony capitalism, rent-seeking and corruption. It 
also traces the roots of crony capitalism in Oman and identifies its impact. The section also 
discusses FDI inflows being a matter of political decisions rather than business ones and 
therefore the issues related to limited FDI in Oman. 
 
Finally, Chapter 9 provides the key findings of the research and connects the impact of each 
channel of the resource curse and economic diversification in Oman. It also highlights the 
interconnection between those factors and the impact of each factor on the others. The 
chapter also highlights the research significance and contributions. The last section elaborates 
on the thesis’ research limitations and provides a roadmap for future studies.  
                                                
3 The concept of ‘nepotism’ refers to ‘who you know not what you know is what matters’ is broadly equivalent 
to wasta which is defined by Barnett et al. as the “special influence by members of the same group or tribe” 
(2013:5). However, according to Barnett et al. (2013:5) the practice of wasta within most Middle Eastern 
societies is not seen as a nepotism or corruption. In contrast, this thesis using the term nepotism which is defined 
by Transparency International (2016) as a “form of favouritism based on acquaintances and familiar 
relationships whereby someone in an official position exploits his or her power and authority to provide a job or 
favour to a family member or friend, even though he or she may not be qualified or deserving”, which according 
to Omani law is considered be to a form of corruption.  















Chapter 2 Overview of the Omani Economy, Politics, and 
Institutions 
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2.1 Introduction	
This thesis investigates the main obstacles towards achieving economic diversification in 
Oman by testing the factors highlighted by resource curse theory as blockages: economic 
factors, institutional quality, human resource development, and political and social factors. It 
does so because, as this chapter demonstrates, growth in the Omani GDP has been function of 
two interrelated factors: the growth in oil production in Oman and the upward trend in 
international oil prices. Furthermore, the Omani economy is still dependent on oil export 
revenues despite the efforts of the government to diversify the economy. Many scholars (e.g. 
Alhajri, 2010; Auty, 2001b; Larsen, 2006; Torvik, 2009) argue that limited diversification 
and weak economic performance can be attributed to the effects of the Dutch disease or to the 
absence of linkages between the hydrocarbon sector and other economic sectors. However, as 
is discussed in Chapter Three, resource curse theory suggests that diversification efforts are 
not only limited by economic factors, but also by social and political factors, institutional 
quality and human resource development. This chapter is structured around these four 
channels (factors) of the resource curse theory.  
 
The first section provides an overview of the Omani economy. It highlights the 
historical development of the Omani economy, the role of oil and gas activities, the 
government’s revenue structure, the private sector’s role in the economy, the strategic 
development plans, the Dutch disease symptoms and the challenges facing diversification 
from an economic perspective. The second section covers human resource development, the 
relationship between the labour market and the education system, the government’s strategies 
towards localising the labour market (Omanisation) and the human resource development 
challenges in Oman. The last section discusses Oman’s governance, the development of 
legislation to counter-corruption, the market structure and the role of the crony capitalism in 
Oman. 
 
However, it is first necessary to give a brief overview of the political, social and 
economic developments in Oman since 1970, which were enabled by the flow of oil revenues 
and the change in the political system implemented by Sultan Qaboos. Lagging its 
neighbours, it was only in 1964 that oil, in commercial quantities, was discovered in Oman. 
In 1967, Oman exported its first oil shipment, which was around 60,000 barrels at the 
prevailing low price of around USD1.8/b (MOCI, 1980:9-12). Until 1970, little was done to 
utilise the oil revenues to enhance living standards or to invest in infrastructure development. 
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In 1970, Sultan Qaboos took power from his father and started a very ambitious political, 
economic, and social reform programme. The development programme focused on 
infrastructure development alongside upgrading the provision of healthcare and education. 
For example, the number of the hospitals jumped from three in 1970 to 62 in 2010. In 1970, 
there were only three schools providing education for 900 students and by 2016 there were 
993 schools with more than 500,000 students (NCSI, 2016b). 
  
According to the Ministry of Commerce and Industry (1980:20-22), agriculture and 
fisheries were the main economic sectors in the pre-oil era. However, as the oil revenues 
started to flow, the economy underwent a structural change. The importance of agriculture 
and fisheries shrank from 35% of GDP in 1967, to 11.5% in 1970, 2% in 1980 and 1.5% in 
2008 (NCSI, 2009). The non-tradable sector comprising services, such as banking, financial 
facilities, and real estate grew: the service sector grew from 7.7% of GDP in 1970 to 19.8% 
in 1975 (MOCI, 1980:156-157). This shift can be attributed to two main reasons: the 
expansion of the government administrative services, and structural change as the workforce 
moved from the traditional economic activities to the new service related economic activities 
(MOCI, 1980:157-159). In addition, as a result of the political situation in Oman pre-1970 
and the attractiveness of wages received from being employed in the newly oil-exporting 
regional countries compared with the earnings in the domestic traditional sectors, many in the 
national workforce immigrated to the neighbouring countries. However, after 1970 the new 
regime encouraged the expatriate Omani workforce to return to their country. Consequently, 
new work opportunities were created in sectors other than the traditional sectors of 
agriculture and fisheries. Overall, the establishment of the modern style government provided 
better education opportunities alongside better job prospects. As a result living standards 
improved dramatically; for example, the average household income was OMR133 in 1972, 
OMR770 in 1975 (MOCI, 1980:156-159), and raised to OMR1,459 in 2014 (NCSI, 2014:27). 
 
The first step towards the establishment of modern political system was taken in 
August 1970 with the appointment of a prime minister and the establishment of five 
ministries: the Ministry of Interior, the Ministry of Education, the Ministry of Trade and 
commerce, the Ministry of Justice, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Then, in 1971 the 
Ministry of the Economy was created, which included responsibility for trade, 
manufacturing, agriculture and fisheries, seaport management and customs, along with the 
economic planning department. In 1976, the government announced its first five-year 
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development plan (FYDP) to support further economic reform. The period from 1970 until 
1975 can be considered a transitional period toward a modern state. During that period, the 
government administrative and institutional bodies were established, while the political, 
legal, social and economic structure of the state also developed (AlHajri, 2010:35-37). 
 
2.2 Overview	of	the	Omani	Economy	
The Omani economy has been highly dependent on oil exports for the past five decades. For 
example, oil revenues share in the GDP in 1981 was 43.4%. Although this share fell to 24.7% 
in 2008 as result of the oil price fall but it increased again in 2010 to 46.1% and was 34.1% in 
2015 (NCSI, 2016d). In addition, many other economic activities are related directly or 
indirectly to the oil sector. Furthermore, the expansion of the industrial sector was closely 
related to the oil sector, in the form of energy-intensive industries, the gas-related industries 
and refineries. As a result, in total the hydrocarbon sector contributed around 75% on average 
of government revenues between 1990-2015 (MONE, 2002; NCSI, 2016c; Treichel & 
Mansur, 1999). Moreover, government activities in the economy play a huge role through 
ownership of assets, use of subsidies, high welfare spending and employment opportunities.  
 
Figure 2-1 compiled by the author sets oil prices alongside Omani GDP from 1969 till 
2015. The figure demonstrates a strong correlation between the GDP growth rates and the oil 
prices as high oil prices result in high GDP growth rate, but when the oil price falls it results 
in a lower GDP growth rate, or indeed a contraction. In other words, the GDP growth rates 
are inextricably linked to the oil price. Furthermore, this indicates the still marginal 
contribution of the non-hydrocarbon sectors in the economy. Thus, if the government wants 
to target the hydrocarbon sector as the core of diversification, a critical question is raised 
regarding how effective the policy could be, as the related projects are also exposed to oil 
price fluctuations. 
 
Since 1976, the government has developed a series of FYDPs in which, one of the 
most repeated pillars was enhancing private sector capabilities in order to change the 
economic structure so as to achieve self-sustaining development that was not dependent on 
oil revenues. However, the development strategies have not been successful in their overall 
goals as the government budget suffered from a semi-chronic deficit. The disappointing 
outcomes were partially the result of the oil price fluctuations and the excessive expenditure 
on infrastructure. Moreover, as a result of the absence of any reliable alternative source of 
  19 
revenues when the oil price falls, the government starts to cut back on its capital and current 
spending. Although this measure helps the government reduce the deficit, the impact on the 
economy is massive because the private sector is highly dependent on the government 
expenditure. Thus, if there is a contraction in government expenditure, a contraction in 
private sector activities follows (Alhajri, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 2-1: Omani GDP and Oil Prices (GDP left axis, oil price right axis) 
Source: compiled by the author with data obtained from The World Bank (2016) 
 
As a result of the absence of a normal developed economic structure, the government 
becomes the main driver of economic activity, which results in sharp growth in the economic 
sectors that benefit from government expenditure. For example, construction sector growth is 
driven by government spending. In addition, household expenditure is also directly reliant on 
government expenditure through employment and welfare spending and indirectly through 
government contracts with the private sector. Thus, oil revenues have enhanced standards of 
livings, which in turn have created a positive impact on the trade sector. However, a number 
of researchers argue that this situation indicate a structural problem in the economy as 
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words, austerity measures have a strong direct impact on standards of living and therefore the 
trade sector.  
Thus, there is a strong rationale from undertaking economic diversification. However, 
when oil prices are strong, and from 1970 to 2015 oil prices when adjusted for inflation 
increased threefold (see Figure 2-2), this reduces the pressure to diversify as it makes sense to 
specialise in hydrocarbon industries. Vision 2020 accepted this logic, which impacted on the 
implementation of the plans associated with the strategy. The unpredicted massive income 
from oil exports encouraged the government to invest more in the expensive enhanced oil 
recovery techniques which resulted not only on maintaining the oil production levels but kept 
the output levels higher than the original plan. In turn, this resulted in the creation of a large 




Figure 2-2: Inflation-adjusted Monthly Crude Oil Price (USD/barrel), 1970-2015. 
Source: Macrotrends, (2017) 
 
2.2.1 Government	Revenues		
Government revenues are highly dependent on oil and gas exports. For example, in 2007 the 
oil and gas contribution to total government revenues was 75.8%, but, despite the aims of 
Vision 2020, by 2012 the dependency had risen to 85.4% on the back of higher oil prices (see 
Figure 2-3). These levels highlight the necessity of economic diversification in Oman as the 
state is highly vulnerable to international oil price shocks. Furthermore, the diversification 
efforts, which have enhanced related industries that are also sensitive to the international oil 
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price, merely maintains the state’s vulnerability to oil price shocks. In addition, sensitivity to 
the international oil price can affect the government’s ability to implement its overall 
economic diversification and social development strategies. In order to diversify government 
revenues away from oil, a comprehensive taxation system could be implemented. As in other 
GCC countries,4 the non- hydrocarbon activities corporate income tax rate in Oman is very 
low at 12%; this is based on the belief that low taxes encourage the international companies 
to invest in the country (MOF, 2016a). Furthermore, because of inefficiencies in the tax 
collection system and tax evasion, only 4,000 out of 300,000 registered companies pay their 
taxes (Alawfi, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 2-3: Breakdown of Government Revenues, 2007 to 2012 
Source: AlMaha, (2013:3) 
 
2.2.2 Oil	Exports	as	a	Share	of	Total	Exports		
Despite the government’s efforts to diversify exports, oil and gas still represent a high, albeit 
declining, percentage of total exports (see Figure 2-4). In 1980 about 97% of the total exports 
were crude petroleum while in 2010 the percentage had fallen to 80%. It is important to 
highlight that between 2000 and 2010 the government had started to invest heavily in gas 
related industries which accounted for 19% of total exports in 2010. Figure 2-5 highlights 
that in 2015 the crude petroleum accounted for 73% of total exports, while hydrocarbon-
related exports accounted for a further 13% of total exports, bringing the sectors’ share to a 
very high 86%. 
 
                                                
4 There is no corporate or personal income tax in Bahrain and the UAE at the federal level, the corporate tax rate 
in Kuwait is 15%, in Qatar is 10%, and in Saudi Arabia is 20% (KPMG, 2016). 
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Figure 2-4: Hydrocarbon Exports as a % Total Exports, 1970-2015  
Source: The Atlas of Economic Complexity, (2015) 
 
 
Figure 2-5: Exports Composition of Oman, 2015  
Source: The Atlas of Economic Complexity, (2015) 
 
2.2.3 The	Oil	Sector’s	Links	with	Other	Sectors	
The relationship between the hydrocarbon sector and the other economic activities should be 
one of the main pillars of the economic diversification strategy in oil dependant countries 
(Elbadawi & Gelb, 2010). The linkages between those sectors are very important. For 
example, the establishment of a fertiliser factory which uses gas as feed stock should have a 
spillover effect in the agriculture sector. However, by exporting the final product, the 
economy does not benefit from the linkage effect. Vision 2020 planned that the non-oil 
sector’s share of GDP would increase to 91% by 2020 (MONE, 1995). This was to be 
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resources. The role of the private sector as the driver of the economy was seen a method by 
which to overcome the issues of the depletion of resources and the weak linkages between the 
economic sectors.  
 
2.2.4 The	Private	Sector	as	an	Active	Player	in	the	Economy	
This section highlights the role of the private sector in Oman, and the issues associated with 
it. According to Halaoui et al. (2017), the state led economic model of the GCC states is not 
sustainable. Furthermore, the state-led model in the GCC states is not undermined by oil 
dependency. Therefore, the transformation of the economic model to one based on private 
sector participation is viewed as part of the solution to overcome the oil dependency. 
According to official data in 1995, when Vision 2020 was launched, excluding oil, the 
construction and real estate sectors were the most active sectors (see Table 2-1). By 2015, the 
construction sector, which is largely driven by government expenditure, was already larger 
than planned by the Vision 2020, highlighting how government expenditure can distort the 
plan. Moreover, although the manufacturing sector is experiencing growth rates which reflect 
progress towards the Vision 2020 targets, the key components of the sector petrochemicals 
and refining are part of the downstream hydrocarbon sector. In addition, the growth rate in 
sectors such as finance and insurance were above the projected growth rate in Vision 2020. 
However, other economic sectors such as mining, fishing and agriculture and trade and 
tourism experienced lower growth rates than planned, despite government incentives to 
encourage growth. 
 
Table 2-1: Actual (a) and Vision 2020 (f) Sector Share Targets  
 
Sectors and their 
Share of GDP (%)  
Years 
1970a 1975 1980a 1985a 1990a 1995a 2000a 2005a 2010a 2015a 2020f 
Oil & gas  68.4 67.2 60.5 49.0 46.4 38.2 49.9 49.2 46.1 34.1 19.0 
Mining & quarrying 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.4 0.5 2.0 
Agriculture & 
fishing 
15.8 2.8 2.1 2.3 2.6 2.9 2.2 1.6 1.4 1.6 5.1 
Manufacturing 0.2 0.3 0.6 2.2 2.9 4.6 5.8 8.6 10.6 9.7 15.0 
Electricity & water 0.1 0.2 0.5 0.8 0.9 0.9 1.0 1.7 1.2 1.9 2.0 
Constructions 8.1 9.8 5.2 6.2 2.3 2.6 2.1 3.8 5.8 7.7 7.0 
Services 7.5 19.7 31.1 39.3 44.6 50.5 38.7 34.9 34.5 44.5 49.9 
Sources: Compiled by author with data obtained from NCSI, (various issues) and MONE, (1995)  
 
In many cases, the limited development of the private sector could be attributed to the 
lack of availability of funds and the financial institutions unwillingness to provide the small 
and medium companies with the required loans. This is usually described as the ‘crowding 
out effect’ in which the government’s economic activities acquire the biggest chunk of the 
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available funds. However, this was not the case in Oman as the government created financial 
incentives for the private sector to encourage its development. These included (TDC, 
1991:112): 
• Custom tax exemption for up to 10 years on imported machinery and equipment and 
spare parts, as well as the raw material if it is not available locally. 
• Corporate tax exemption for up to 10 years from the establishment of the company. 
This exemption would be applied to national companies or foreign investments 
equally. 
• The foreign investment ownership ceiling was to be raised to 70%. 
• Providing Omani companies with export credit guarantees. 
• Providing the necessary land for the projects and the government would be 
responsible for providing the required infrastructure. 
• Giving local companies priority in government contracts. 
• The establishment of different financial agencies which were to be responsible for 
providing soft loans with a competitive interest rate.  
Indeed, MONE (2006:78) posits that the limited growth in the private sector in Oman could 
be a result of the following challenges: 
• The complexity of the administrative and required procedures to establish companies. 
• The oligopolistic activities made it very difficult for the small and medium enterprises 
to enter the market. 
• The lack of transparency and the limited availability of reliable information as a result 
of the dominant monopolies. 
• The limited development of the required logistic infrastructure such as ports, airports 
and energy resources. 
• The dominance of the rentier mentality which encouraged the investors to invest only 
in high and fast returns investments. As a result there were no risk-takers. 
• The limited availability of highly skilled nationals. 
• The limited activities related to the research and development. 
• The narrow demand for goods and services in the market associated with the 
competition from the imported goods.  
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2.2.5 The	Strategic	Development	Plans	
The changing political and economic environments from 1970 resulted in the government 
initiating a massive infrastructure development programme that focused mainly on building 
the educational and health-care institutions and connecting the major cities with roads, albeit 
without a strategic plan. However, in 1975 strategic long-term development planning was 
initiated under the auspice of the Development Council. At this stage, the proven oil reserves 
were expected to be depleted in less than ten years which made it vital to establish an 
economic planning strategy. The long-term strategy, which was repeated in most of the later 
FYDPs, was based on the following long-term aims and goals (MONE, 1996:7-9): 
• Developing new sources of national income to replace existing oil revenues.  
• Enhancing the proportion of investment directed towards income generating projects, 
with particular emphasis on industry, mining, agriculture, and fisheries.  
• Concentrating on the development and upgrading of local human resources.  
• Geographically distributing investment for the benefit of all areas, with a particular 
focus on the less developed regions, to eliminate disparities in the standards of living.  
• Supporting and developing the present population centres and safeguarding them from 
the dangers of mass migration to the more densely populated urban areas.  
• Completing the basic infrastructure. 
• Recognising the importance of water resources as a vital element in the growth of 
economic activities and environmental conservation. 
• Supporting the development of local commercial activity and the growth of vibrant 
and competitive markets, through the necessary support structures, regarding transport 
and storage, and the removal of commercial obstacles.  
• Completing the basis for establishing a national economy based on private sector 
activity in a competitive market with loan provisions for vital projects in accordance 
with resources available to the state.  
• Increase the efficiency of the state’s administrative capability.  
 
In this context, the first FYPD had two main objectives. The first was to invest the oil 
revenues in projects that could generate income for the government to replace the depleting 
oil resource. The second was to balance the regional distribution of the projects to maintain 
the geographical distribution of the population. Furthermore, the government intended to 
enhance the private sector in order to make it the prime driver of the economy. This meant 
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that the private sector should be efficient and free from any monopolistic practices or any 
direct involvement from the government (MOCI, 1980). 
 
However, there was a fundamental problem in the evaluation and the follow-up of 
each FYDP. According to the legal framework, the institutions that were responsible for the 
economic planning should establish an evaluation process in coordination with the other 
stakeholders. However, there was no critical evaluation of the challenges or any suggestions 
as how to overcome those challenges. Furthermore, there were no suggestions on how to 
achieve an optimal implementation of the plan or the timeframe for the implementation. For 
example, the third FYDP started in January 1986 with predicted oil prices of USD23.65/b; 
however, by July 1986 the oil prices had fallen to USD8.2/b (MONE, 1991), making the plan 
unfeasible. This forced the government to re-evaluate the plan and postpone many of the 
development projects. However, the subsequent evaluation of the third plan ignored the 
massive impact of the low oil prices on the plan’s achievements, and only highlighted the 
positive policies and activities used to overcome the financial problem. Furthermore, no 
suggestions or policy changes were forthcoming to deal with similar situations in the future. 
In addition, the first and second FYDPs witnessed the evolution of three core problems that 
faced the planners when developing each subsequent plan. These were: the deficit in the state 
general budget; the slow growth of economic diversification; and the high growth in 
expatriate workers. The next section discusses these challenges. 
 
2.2.6 Economic	Challenges	
The oil revenues had a positive impact on nominal GDP growth in Oman. The GDP per 
capita in 1970 was USD354, in 1995 it was USD6,297 and by 2012 USD21,533 (MOCI, 
1980; NCSI, 2012), which reflected positively on the living standards of the citizens. 
However, according to UN’s Economic and Social Commission for Western Asia (ESCWA) 
report (Hertog & Hodson, 2012:25-28) the major economic challenges facing the Omani 
economy were: 
• The state’s dependency on hydrocarbon exports. 
• The relatively small private sector. 
• The main economic activities are related directly or indirectly to the hydrocarbon 
sector. 
• The relatively small added value in the industrial sector. 
• The private sector was dependant on the cheap foreign workforce. 
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According to the AlHarithy (2013) the utilisation of the oil and gas revenues was very 
poor and did not result in the diversification of the economy and the development of other 
products and industries. This is mainly attributed to the absence of linkages between the 
hydrocarbon sector and the other economic sectors and the limited contribution of the 
hydrocarbon sector to the promotion of non-hydrocarbon sectors (Al-Saqri, 2010:190). 
Additionally, the high cost of the extraction of oil and gas in Oman due to the complex nature 
of the geographical reserves was partially responsible for the large volume of investment 
directed to this sector. As a result, the government started to use an expensive technology to 
maximise the extraction processes from the oilfields in order to increase the overall oil 
production. Nevertheless, there was no noticeable technology transfer or domestic added 
value from the technologies, unlike in other oil producing countries, such as Norway 
(Holden, 2013). Also, the high cost of oil production made the economy more vulnerable to 
the international oil prices falls, such as in 1986. 
 
In relation to the challenge of providing employment opportunities for young Omani 
graduates, 50% of the population is under 20 and 82% are under 35 (De Bel-Air, 2015:6). In 
a demonstration of the pervasive rentier mentality, most Omani graduates prefer to be 
employed in the public sector to the extent that many are willing to wait up to four years to 
find such an opportunity (Owens, 2016). However, it is anticipated that in the near future the 
public sector would be unable to absorb the 30,000 graduates entering the labour market each 
year. Furthermore, the undeveloped nature of the private sector limited employment 
opportunities. In addition, the lack of qualifications and skills, because of the poor quality of 
education and vocational training, meant the Omani graduates do not meet the requirements 
of the private sector (Ennis & Al-Jamali, 2014).  
 
2.2.7 Dutch	Disease	Symptoms	in	the	Omani	Economy	
One structural economic issue is highlighted by the Dutch disease theory. According to Al-
Saqri (2010:106), the limited growth rate in the non-oil economic sectors is attributed to the 
Dutch disease, despite attempts by the government to address this issue. Dutch disease 
symptoms include an increase in the prices of the locally-produced goods and services 
because of competition for resources with the oil sector. However, this may not be a direct 
impact of the Dutch disease as the availability of relatively lower-cost expatriate workforce 
could result in lowering the cost of production. In a rentier state the government needs to 
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provide work opportunities with relatively high wages for the nationals, which means most 
locals prefer to work in the government sector rather than in the private sector where pay is 
lower. Thus, the Omani employee can be considered to be overpriced in the private sector. 
 
Throughout the FYDPs, the industrial and hydrocarbon sector had an average 66% of 
the total government investment in comparison with the social affairs sectors such as 
education and health which had only 5.3% of the total investment (MONE, 2002). This 
reflects the Dutch disease symptom of the concentration of investment in the hydrocarbon 
sector to the detriment of the other economic sectors which results in them decreasing in their 
share of GDP. 
 
The agriculture and fisheries sector is an example of a sector that has been impacted 
by the Dutch disease. In 1970 the sector accounted for 15.8% of GDP, by 1995 it was only 
2.9%, and by 2008 it was only 1.5% of GDP, despite the massive subsidies. Its share of GDP 
had increased to 1.6% in 2015, although according to Vision 2020 this should increase to 
5.1% in 2020 (NCSI, 2016d). Its small size can be attributed to several reasons. Employment 
in the sector is considered to be part-time as most Omanis who work in it are also working in 
the public or private sector. A second reason is the lack of effectiveness of subsidies provided 
to the sector. Furthermore, there has been no real development or knowledge enhancement 
with traditional methods of fishing and agriculture accounting for the bulk of the output. 
 
Another symptom of Dutch disease is the sharp escalation in the import bill as the 
appreciation of the real effective exchange rate made it difficult for domestic manufacturers 
to compete with cheaper imports from Asia. A further issue is the weakness of institutional 
quality which resulted in delays in investment projects in the non-oil economic sectors. 
Furthermore, the employment crowding out effect from the private sector to the public sector 
resulted in the replacement of Omanis with expatriates in the private sector. This made it very 
difficult to expand the citizens’ participation in the private sector.  
 
2.3 Human	Resource	Development	
The relationship between human resource development and economic performance has been 
studied by many researchers (e.g. Al-Hamadi et al., 2007; Pineda & Rodríguez, 2010; 
Sajwani, 1997) who stress the importance of human resource development in achieving 
economic diversification. Human resource development is strongly related to other factors of 
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economic diversification, such as economic structure, the political structure and the social 
structure. Accordingly, this section provides an overview on the human resource 
development situation in Oman.  
 
2.3.1 Demographic	Overview	
The 1993 census recorded that the population was around two million, 52% of which were 
below 14 years’ old, and 45% were between 15 to 64 (De Bel-Air, 2015:6). Thus, around one 
million young Omanis needed an education that would prepare them to enter the labour 
market. In turn, this would trigger a massive demand for extra education institutions, as well 
as health-care institutions. The 2011 census showed similar results. The population in Oman 
was around 3.3 million, 39% of which were non-Omani (MONE, 2011:59). At the time, the 
average population growth rate was around 3.6% annually, with 57% of the Omani 
population below 20 years’ old which meant around 1.1 million citizens would enter the 
workforce within the next two to 18 years (MONE, 2011:63). In 2011, one of the main calls 
from the protestors was to provide more employment opportunities. As a result, the 
government increased employment in the public sector by creating 50,000 new jobs. The 
policy would have a negative impact on the productivity of the public sector, as well as 
encouraging a crowding out effect from the private sector to the public sector. 
 
 
Figure 2-6: Population of Oman (million), 1985-2011  
Source: National Centre for Statistics and Information, Statistical Yearbook, (2012) 
 
In 1970, the education system was rudimentary with only a few people able to obtain 
modern education. However, over time the government provided mass general education for 
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words, providing education without paying much attention to the vertical element, i.e. the 
quality of education. As a result, employers complained that graduates lacked the basic skills 
necessary for a modern private sector. In part, this could be attributed to the fact that the 
vocational training was managed across different government institutions, which made it 
difficult to monitor the quality of the output.  
 
2.3.2 Omanisation	
One of the main pillars in each FYDP, as well as in Vision 2020, was human resource 
development. Although the goal has been partially achieved, there have been significant 
challenges. The number of universities has increased from one to four in order to expand 
higher education opportunities for the growing number of youth. In addition, the universities 
were supposed to fill the skills gap in the labour market, through a very generous subsidies 
scheme for those universities such as the full bid scholarships and an OMR17 million 
financial grant (Aladawi, 2009). However, the quality of the graduates varies and further on-
site training is required in the private sector to enhance the skill levels of the new graduates, 
especially when faced with competition from the expatriate workforce. 
 
To overcome the limited work opportunities for Omanis in the late 1980s the 
government started a programme that aimed to replace the expatriates who held top to middle 
level managerial positions in the public sector (AlHajri, 2010:286). The programme was 
known as Omanisation, which later widened its focus to the private sector. In 1991, at the 
start of the fourth FYDP, complying with Omanisation become a legal requirement for the 
private sector. Different strategies have been implemented to achieve the goals of this 
programme, such as prohibiting the employment of expatriates in certain sectors, 
blacklisting5 of companies who do not fulfil the Omanisation percentage and providing 
generous subsidies to encourage the companies to establish on-site training for Omani 
employees. However, according to Omandaily (2016) this programme has faced many 
challenges, some of which were related to the supply side, such as: 
• The limited supply of well-qualified and skilled nationals and the lack of the 
harmonisation between the education and training systems and the demands of the 
labour market. 
• The limited capacity of the higher education institutions. 
                                                
5 The company will be prohibited from applying for expats working permits. 
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• The absence of professional and specialised training institutions. 
• The absence of a proper career guidance and counselling institutions. 
The other challenges were related to the demand side, such as (Omandaily, 2016): 
• The unfair competition between the national employees and the foreign expatriates as 
many companies prefer to recruit foreign expatriates. 
• Most private sector companies concentrate on profits to the detriment of the social 
and economic consequences of employing expatriates.  
• Foreign expatriates fill most of the managerial and supervisory positions in the private 
sector, and they prefer to recruit employees from their countries. 
• Young Omanis are not committed to the companies in which they work as they tend 
to search for better opportunities, preferably in the public sector. 
• The lack of entrepreneurship among young Omanis. 
• The lack of social tolerance poses an obstacle to accepting employment opportunities 
in certain economic activities.  
 
As for Omani employment in the private sector (see Table 2-2) around 50% is at the 
lower end of the pay scale. The employees in this group are those with low skills and a 
minimum education. Furthermore, less than 15% of the supervisory and managerial positions 
in the private sector are held by Omanis. In general, the new university graduate would 
receive a salary between OMR700 to OMR1,000 per month in the public sector. Since 2011 
the government has encouraged the private sector to match those wages in order to absorb 
more nationals. However, the efforts have not been successful as new graduates tend to 
receive between OMR500 and OMR700 per month in the private sector. Furthermore, most 
companies prefer to recruit expatriates for two main reasons. The first one is related to the 
financial cost as recruiting Omanis is more expensive as a result of the wages differential. 
The second reason is related to qualification and skills; expatriates tend to have these, 
whereas Omanis do not. 
 
Table 2-2: National Employment in the Private Sector by Wages. 
Monthly Wage (OMR) Number of employees Percentage 
325-400 62,098 29.4 
400-500 48,763 23.0 
500-600 22,163 10.5 
600-700 15,647 7.4 
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700-800 9,804 4.6 
800-900 6,970 3.3 
900-1000 5,488 2.7 
1000-2000 19,910 9.4 
Over 2000 7,871 3.7 
Did not update their records 12,656 6 
Total 211,370 100.0 
Source: Compiled by author with data obtained from NCSI, (2016a) 
 
Figure 2-7 demonstrates the growth of Omani employment from 2004 to 2012. It can 
be seen there was growth from 2004 to 2010 in both the private and public sectors, with the 
former outperforming the latter. However, in 2011 and 2012 there was a contraction in 
employment in the private sector, while government opportunities expanded significantly. 
This could be attributed to the social unrest in 2011 which saw the government creating 
thousands of jobs and encouraged the crowding-out effect of Omanis from the private sector 
to the public sector. However, the government could have solved the social unrest by 
providing wage subsidies to private companies to encourage them to recruit more Omanis. 
This strategy was followed in other GCC countries, such as Kuwait, where wages in the 
private sector are subsidised to bring them up to the same level if not more than the public 
sector (Hvidt, 2013). 
 
 
Figure 2-7: Growth of Omani Employment, 2004 to 2012  
Source: NCSI, (2013) 
 
Overall, the Omanisation efforts have been successful in the energy sector where 
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around 90% are Omani and in the tourism sector where around 45% are Omani6 (NCSI, 
2009). However, for a number of reasons national employment is still considered to be one of 
the biggest challenges facing the implementation of Vision 2020. The first reason is because 
of the wages differential between the private and public sectors, which means that most 
Omanis prefer to wait for an opportunity in the public sector. Second, the job market has a 
structural distortion as more than 30% of the labour force work is employed in the public 
sector, which is more than 50% higher than the typical levels in the middle and upper-income 
countries. In addition, the massive government investment in the hydrocarbon sector is not 
reflected in the labour market as the sector is capital intensive, not labour intensive. The 
hydrocarbon sector absorbs less than 2.3% of the national workforce, which means other 
economic sectors need to meet the workforce supply. Another option is expanding the base of 
private sector companies, as 86% of Omanis in the private sector are employed, whereas only 
12% have their own business. 
 
2.3.3 Labour	Market	Challenges	
One of the vehicles used by the government to enhance the private sector performance was to 
provide foreign direct investment (FDI) with attractive incentives, including ownership rules, 
tax exemptions and government partnership in certain projects. However, according to 
AlHajri (2010:442), many companies face a problem of finding suitably qualified Omanis to 
fulfil the company’s Omanisation obligation. This is a serious concern as one the most 
important issues that investors consider is if investment environment has a competitive 
advantage. Thus, the lack of nationally qualified employees creates a barrier to FDI inflows. 
 
To overcome the high level of unemployment among the nationals the government 
adopted two main strategies. The first strategy was to encourage private sector companies to 
establish a training scheme for Omanis, which the government would fund. However, only a 
few companies are capable of providing such training. Furthermore, the employee can then 
find work in the public sector or with the oil and gas companies because they provide better 
financial incentives. The second strategy was the implementation of a legal framework that 
prohibited private sector companies from obtaining work permits or contracts with the 
government unless they meet their Omanisation obligations (Al-Lamki, 2000). Again, this 
                                                
6 See Section 7.3 for more details. 
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strategy had negative implications because most companies would only hire Omanis to 
comply with the law but would also hire expatriates to execute the job. 
 
2.3.4 Education	and	the	Labour	Market	
Since 1970, the government has made it clear that education is a priority. However, the 
quality of the primary and early secondary education, as well as vocational and specialised 
training, remains weak. Furthermore, the output of the secondary education system is aimed 
at the selection method for tertiary education rather than preparing those who do not enter 
tertiary education for the job market. In addition, even the students who come through the 
tertiary education system are not equipped to enter the job market as they tend to prefer to 
study disciplines related to the humanities rather than engineering or applied science. Also, 
there is a lack of coordination between the labour market and the education system, which 
needs to enhance the curriculum to include labour market requirements. According to the 
World Bank (UNDP, 2003), this could be achieved by the: 
• Establishment and development of the standards’ measurements. 
• Enhancement of the teachers’ performance through training. 
• Enhancement of the teachers’ incentives and career development. 
• The involvement of the private sector and other stakeholders in the curriculum set up. 
 
2.4 Institutional	Quality	
One of the main observations regarding the institutional development in Oman is that this has 
not kept pace with the state development plans. In this context, Vision 2020 did not 
emphasise institutional reform, instead limiting itself to the creation of newly created 
agencies such as that for investment promotion. Furthermore, institutional development does 
not match the current development challenges, as there is still overlap among the duties of 
many institutions. For example, responsibility for education is divided amongst three 
ministries, the Ministry of Manpower, the Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Higher 
Education. In addition, other institutions, such as Sultan Qaboos University and the 
Education Council in the Royal Court also play a role. Similarly, with private sector 
development and the labour market this had led the segmented policy for nationals in the 
private sector and the public sector as the work force management is handled by different 
ministerial portfolios. The multiplicity of institutions involved has had a negative impact on 
the process and the implementation of the policies as it is not necessarily the institution with 
the clearest mandate that is responsible for policy implementation.  
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However, the problem is not limited to the overlap of responsibilities, but also affects 
coordination. For example, the development of the tourism sector was highlighted in each 
FYDP but the sector still faces structural problems, such as land allocation which is divided 
between three different ministries, the Ministry of Housing, the Ministry of Regional 
Municipalities and the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries. Thus, it can be concluded that 
the structure of ministries and agencies needs a better alignment to be able to overcome the 
challenges facing the country. 
 
2.4.1 Governance 	
In 2011, a series of protests broke out in Oman as part of a wider regional instability. The 
main demands of the protestors were: increasing wages; lowering living costs; providing 
more employment opportunities; reducing corruption; and moving power to an elected 
cabinet. The main driver of the protests was the unemployment situation. The protests started 
with an organised march in the capital Muscat, which was called ‘The Green March’. Further 
protests occurred in four major cities Muscat, Sohar, Sur, and Salalah (Valeri, 2015). The 
Sultan responded to the protests by increasing the minimum wage in the private sector from 
USD364 per month to USD520, creating 50,000 new jobs in the public sector, reshuffled the 
entire cabinet, increased legislative powers to the elected cabinet, gave more power to the 
State Audit Institution (SAI), introduced a new higher education scholarship grant and 
implemented a corruption investigation. The cabinet reshuffle triggered more anger as some 
ministers were considered to be corrupt, which is why the protesters widened their demands 
to include political reform (Johnson, 2014; Valeri, 2015). 
 
The first consolidated law on avoiding conflicts of interest and protecting public 
funds was issued in 1982 (Royal Decree, 82/39). In that piece of legislation, the law 
prohibited government officials from being involved in any commercial transactions that are 
related directly to their duties. However, the law was never effectively implemented as there 
was no questioning of suspicious financial behaviours of certain ministers. In this context, a 
major embezzlement scandal emerged in 1985. The high-level personnel involved were 
simply removed from office without any further punishment. In another case, a minister who 
violated stock market regulations was jailed for less than two of the six years of his original 
sentence. He was released by Royal Pardon. In 2011, a new anti-corruption law, ‘The Law 
for the Protection of Public Funds and Avoidance of Conflicts of Interest’, was promulgated 
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by Royal Decree No. 112 of 2011, in association with the reform of the SAI’s duties that 
included administrative and financial auditing. As a result, a series of court cases started 
against individuals, including government officials, who had been involved in corruption. 
Table 2-3 summarises over 50 of the cases with offenders ranging from ministers through to 
general directors. The total cost of those corruption cases has never been calculated; however, 
a rough estimate indicates they cost the state around USD2bn. The cases included: bribery, 
abuse of position, money laundering, embezzlement, and leaking classified documents. The 
cases included some of the biggest companies operating in the country (Reuters, 2014). 
 
Table 2-3: Corruption Cases Summary, 2011-2015 
  Government Institution Official Title of the Offender No of cases against each employee 
Ministry of 
Finance 
General Director of Taxation (the government 














The Ministerial Adviser 
The Secretary-General 
























Diesel Shipment Manager 
1 
1 




The Undersecretary for Aviation Affairs 
Ports General Director 
1 
1 
Sources: Collected by the author from various media sources. 
	
2.4.2 Consultative	Council	and	State	Council		
In order to overcome the challenges associated with the public sector dominance of the 
economy, growing youth unemployment allied with the high population growth rate, and the 
increased demand for the public services, an effective state governance system is necessary 
or what is termed as ‘good governance’. Good governance can include expanding public 
participation in the political process, the existence of active accountability, an enhanced rule 
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of law and high levels of transparency (UNESCAP, 2009). It is important to highlight the fact 
that pre-1970 there was no structure of modern government in Oman. The first action from 
the new regime in 1970 was to unite the country and to establish socio-economic 
transformation that was necessary to pave the way for the further stages of transformation. 
The gradual transformation process, included the creation of a ministerial cabinet which was 
expanded over the years. Furthermore, increased public participation and empowerment was 
also incremental and started with the creation of advisory bodies such as State Consultative 
Council (al-majlis al-istishari li-dawla) in 1981 to which all 45 members were appointed 
directly by the Sultan. In 1991, the State Consultative Council was replaced by the 
Consultative Council (majlis ash-shura) with an increase in members to 59, who were still 
appointed by the Sultan. Throughout the years their numbers increased in line with the 
population in each district; for example, in the second term, 1994 to 1997, 80 members were 
chosen. In the third term, a restricted electorate system was introduced to allow the election 
of half of the members by the public and the other half to be nominated by the Sultan (TCO, 
2016). 
 
Furthermore, since 1981, the role of the Consultative Council has been enhanced. For 
example, the role was initially restricted to the provision of advice and opinions to the Sultan 
on a range of social and economic issues. However, the Council gained further 
responsibilities, such as reviewing draft legislation related to the social or economic 
development before it became law. Additionally, the Council is now empowered to invite and 
question ministers about different issues in their ministries (TCO, 2016). 
 
In 1997, a second consultative body was established, the State Council (majlis ad-
dawla). Members were directly appointed by the Sultan based on certain criteria, such as 
retired officials, expertise in different fields, businesspeople and tribal leaders. The State 
Council represent the upper chamber in the bicameral representative body (TCO, 2016). As a 
result of the 2011 protests more powers were given to the Councils, including drafting and 
reviewing legislation. Furthermore, in the case of a dispute between the councils and the 
government then both sides have to prepare their arguments, and Sultan then decides 
(Romano, 2014). 
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2.4.3 State	Audit	Institution	
One of the most important governance institutions is the SAI. The role of this institution has 
been gradually transformed. It was established in 1974 as an independent department of the 
Royal Court. In 1980, the State Audit Department was upgraded to a general directorate and 
that was associated with the first state audit law. In 2000, a newly reformed State Audit Law 
was promulgated with the establishment of the current independent SAI equivalent to a 
ministerial level and which reports directly to the Sultan. According to the State Audit Law, 
the Institution is responsible for conducting an audit on all the state public funds in order to 
ascertain if there are any irregularities and to highlight any deficiencies in the financial laws. 
In addition, the SAI is responsible and authorised to investigate most public institutions and 
agencies, including government ministries, government-owned companies, companies in 
which the government shareholding exceeds 51%, pension funds of government entities and 
other bodies that the government has shares in or provides grants to. Furthermore, the SAI is 
responsible for the monitoring of the implementation of the state projects (SAI, 2016). 
 
2.4.4 Governance	Quality		
There is no national governance indicator in Oman to test the quality of governance. 
However, in order to gain a better understanding of the quality of governance in Oman 
internationally recognised indicators can be used. One of these has been developed by the 
World Bank (2017). According to Kaufmann, Kraay, and Mastruzzi these indicators:  
reflect the statistical aggregation of responses on the quality of governance given 
by a large number of citizen and expert survey respondents in industrial and 
developing countries, as reported by some survey institutes, think tanks, non-
government organizations and international organization (Kaufmann et al., 
2011:16).  
In this project, governance is defined as  
The traditions and institutions by which authority is exercised. This includes (1) 
the process by which governments are selected, monitored and replaced, (2) the 
capacity of the government to effectively formulate and implement sound policies, 
and (3) the respect of citizens and the state for the institutions that govern 
economic and social interactions among them (Kaufmann, Kraay & Zoido 1999:3).  
Figure 2-8 compares the percentile rank for high-income non-OECD countries with Oman for 
each indicator. The higher values corresponding to better outcomes. The researcher chose to 
compare Oman with countries that have similar income levels, in order to reduce the impact 
of different income levels on the results.  
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The definition of each of the six indicators is from TWB (2017). 1) Voice and 
accountability: The extent to which a country’s citizens are able to participate in selecting 
their government, as well as freedom of expression, freedom of association, and free media. 
2) Political stability and absence of violence: Perceptions of the likelihood that the 
government will be destabilised or overthrown by unconstitutional or violent means, 
including political violence and terrorism. 3) Government effectiveness: The quality of public 
services, the quality of the civil service and the degree of its independence from political 
pressures, the quality of policy formulation and implementation, and credibility of the 
government’s commitment to such policies. 4) Regulatory quality: The ability of the 
government to formulate and implement sound policies and regulations that permit and 
promote private sector development. 5) The rule of law: The extent to which agents have 
confidence in and abide by the rules of society, and, in particular, the quality of contract 
enforcement, the police, and the courts, as well as the likelihood of crime and violence. 6) 
Control of corruption: The extent to which public power is exercised for private gain, 
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as “capture” of the state by elites 
and private interests.  
 
 
Figure 2-8: Governance Indicators: High Income Non-OCED versus Oman (1996/2015) 
Source: TWB (2017). 
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In each of the governance indicators Oman was below the average of the high income 
non-OECD countries. Moreover, in the voice and accountability indicator it was significantly 
below the average. More positively, in the rule of law and the regulatory quality indicators 
Oman is improving. However, the control of corruption, government effectiveness and 
political stability indicators are all deteriorating. In relation to corruption, a further relevant 
score and ranking is provided by the Corruption Perception Index produced by Transparency 
International. The Corruption Perceptions Index, which started in 1995, is an annual ranking 
of countries “by their perceived levels of corruption, as determined by expert assessments 
and opinion surveys” (Transparency International, 2016). The Corruption Perceptions Index 
defines corruption as “the misuse of public power for private benefit” (Transparency 
International, 2016). Figure 2-9 shows the Corruption Perceptions Index for Oman in which 
the lower numbers reflect lower levels of corruption. It highlights a worsening trend over the 
years. However, that trend is not constantly negative as can be seen between 2007 and 2009 
when there was an improvement in the Index.  
 
Moreover, the Index might not be able to track the oligopolistic and crony capitalism 
practices. The political situation in 1970 forced the government to use oil export revenues to 
gain loyalty by providing direct or indirect financial support to tribal leaders and other 
political elites in the country. In addition, such policy created certain negative practices 
conducted by top government officials such as holding a monopoly on certain products and 
services or the abuse of the office to gain personal benefits. Furthermore, despite the 
continuous public calls for legislation that prohibited monopoly behaviours, it was only 
issued in December 2014 with the promulgation of the Competition Protection and Monopoly 
Prevention Law (Royal Decree 67/2014). This is a clear indicator of how powerful groups 
were able to delay such an important law until 2014. 
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Figure 2-9: Corruption Participation Index, Oman, 2003-2016  
Source: Transparency International, (2016) 
 
2.5 Summary	
The main aim of this chapter was to provide a descriptive overview of the Omani economy. 
The chapter highlighted the economic structure and its historical development. Furthermore, 
the chapter provides insight on the structure of government revenues and the role of the 
hydrocarbon sector and economic activities. In addition, an overview of the strategic 
development plans and the challenges facing diversification from economic perspective was 
provided. The human resource development and its relationship to the labour market and the 
government strategies to minimise the gap between the education system output and the 
world market demand was also demonstrated. The last section of the chapter demonstrated 
the development of the governance institutions in Oman and of the legislation to counter 
corruption. It also highlighted Oman’s governance ranking according to the international 
institutes prospective. The next chapter analyses the literature regarding the resource curse 
impact on economic diversification. 
 
  













Chapter 3 Literature Review 
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3.1 Introduction	
This chapter provides a comprehensive literature review concerning the lack of economic 
diversification in the natural resource dependent states through the prospect of the ‘resource 
curse theory’, its channels, and natural resource dependency impact on economic 
performance. The main argument of resource curse theory is that dependency on natural 
resources, such as oil and gas, hinders the state’s ability to create a diversified economy. 
However, as demonstrated in Chapter Two the absence of a diversified economy does not 
necessarily limit overall development in a resource dependent state such as Oman.    
 
The limitations of social, economic and political development in oil-dependent states 
has been the topic for much research. One explanation put forward for the limitations is 
resource curse theory. However, resource curse theory does not suggest a clear strategic or 
policy direction to resolve the problems that are associated with the oil wealth. It can be 
argued that those states need to consider oil dependency to be a long-term challenge for the 
regime’s stability as the accumulated problems can have a serious impact. The impacts can be 
exacerbated by demographic considerations; about 80% of the population are below 25 years 
old in the oil-dependent countries (Barany, 2013). To understand the causal relationships 
between wealth, regime type, and limited economic reforms, it is important to use a 
theoretical framework to suggest a roadmap for oil wealth countries.  
 
The literature regarding the negative impact of resource abundance on economic 
performance primarily uses the concept of the Dutch disease, which highlights the crowding 
out effect and the effect of the international price volatility of the resource. The research 
provides new arguments not only concerning the impact but also on the causes. For example, 
certain scholars (Corden, 1984; Matsen & Torvik, 2005; Pegg, 2010; Smith, 2014; Usui, 
1997) use the Dutch disease model to clarify the causes of the resource curse while others use 
the rentier state model (Hertog, 2010a; Moore, 2002; Springborg, 2013). Furthermore, other 
academics (Bravo-Ortega & Gregorio, 2007; Wantchekon, 2000) analyse the main channels 
of the resource curse. Some research (Dietz et al., 2007; Manning, 2004; Shao & Yang, 2014) 
suggests that states with low levels of human capital are more affected by the resource curse 
while others (Apergis & Payne, 2014; Bulte et al., 2005; Hamilton & Ruta, 2006) argue that 
the issue is more about the institutional quality, supporting their argument by the two positive 
examples of Norway and Botswana. Appendix 1 summarises examples of the research on 
resource curse and it causes and effects. 
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The main objective of this research is to try to understand the root cause of Oman’s 
inability to create a diversified economy, despite the fact that it was among the first countries 
in the region to adopt an economic diversification strategy. This chapter is divided into four 
main sections: the first identifies the main research stream in regards to resource 
abundance/dependence, the resource curse theory, and its characteristics. The literature that 
focuses specifically on the Arab Gulf States oil wealth dilemma in general and on Oman in 
particular is highlighted in the second section of this chapter. The last two sections of the 
chapter will provide the research gaps and the chapter summery. 
 
3.2 Resource	Curse	Characteristics	
After the Second World War, an abundance in natural resources was seen as a blessing for 
any state’s economy. However, researchers such as Prebisch (1950) and Singer (1950) who 
took a Marxist approach challenged this norm at that time. They argued that the global 
economy was set up in a way that was challenging for developing countries which were 
becoming increasingly dependent on the export of a particular resource as a basis of their 
trade with the industrialized states. In such cases, their economies faced a risk because of the 
reliance on the exports of natural resources. Most researchers opposed these views at that 
time because, in theory, the availability of large revenues from natural resources should allow 
the state to develop a stable economy and reduce poverty. However, this dominant view 
changed in the 1980s, as the negative impacts of resource abundance on a nation’s economic 
and political situations became a widely studied topic, from different viewpoints. Among the 
scholars was Auty (1998) who argues that natural resource-rich countries would not be able 
to utilise such wealth to create sustainable economic growth. The concept of ‘resource curse’ 
started to be used by many researchers, to the extent that it became a field of study in its own 
right.   
 
The link between resource curse, growth rates and the nature of the impact on the 
economy, such as ‘Dutch Disease’,7 was the focus of many researchers (Brock Smith, 2014; 
Mikesell, 1997; Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001; Torvik, 2001; Usui, 1997) who establish that 
resource abundant countries faced the danger of the Dutch Disease. Similarly, Davis (2011) 
finds a negative relationship between resource abundance and the economic growth rate. 
Ross (2003) examines another aspect; he argues that levels of poverty and human 
                                                
7 This is discussed in detail in the next section. 
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development are negatively related to the wealth derived from the oil and non-fuel minerals. 
He also finds that there is a negative relationship between resource abundance and 
democracy. In a similar way, Stevens (2003) argues that the fluctuation in resource revenues 
might explain the poor economic performance in these economies. The relationship between 
resource curse and institutional quality was the focus of Leite and Weidmann (1999) who 
find that if a nation depends on the rent acquired from oil, the quality of the institutions is 
poor and associated with high rates of corruption. Meanwhile, Ding and Field (2005) explore 
the idea that the curse occurs because of a negative association between human capital and 
export dependence.  
 
Furthermore, Collier and Hoeffler (1998) and Reynal-Querol (2002) show that natural 
resource abundance increases the risk of civil war. However, the relationship between 
resource curse literature and the possibility of civil war is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
although it is useful to highlight the available literature on this topic. For example, the 
relationship between natural resource wealth and the increased possibility of civil war has 
been studied empirically. The findings demonstrate a non-constant relationship between the 
natural resource wealth and the start of a civil war. This occurs even if the rent-based 
measure of natural resource abundance is substituted for the original export-based measure 
(Ross, 2003a). In addition, Reynal-Querol (2002) shows that natural resource abundance is an 
important variable when focusing on the connection between natural resources and the start 
of civil wars (ethnic or non-ethnic). This is apparent in the research data, which sampled the 
situation in 138 countries between 1960 and 1995. The results indicate that natural resource 
abundance provides an explanation to help understand political violence and non-ethnic civil 
wars, although ethnic civil wars are not shown to be an important variable.  
 
In this context, Doyle and Sambanis (2000) and Rosser (2004) conduct studies on the 
duration of civil war. Their findings show that the correlation between natural resource 
wealth and peace-building initiatives was found to be negative. Rather, the findings support 
the idea that natural resource wealth creates and is associated with longer wars. In addition, 
scholars, such as Jensen (2004), posit the idea that Africa’s civil wars were worsened by the 
intensity of dependency on natural resources. However, Ross (2004) argues that natural 
resources have little-to-no effect on the intensity of civil wars. Ross’s conclusion is based on 
studying 11 cases; only two are found to be affected by natural resources.   
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The following sections discuss in-depth the main aspects/factors that the literature 
looked at when studying resource curse theory. The research classifies these characteristics 
as: the Dutch disease; slow economic growth; institutional weakness, corruption and rent-
seeking; and regime type. The importance of understanding the resource curse characteristics 
can lead to a better understanding of the complexity of this issue and the “paradox of plenty”, 
as described by Karl (1997). 
 
3.2.1 Dutch	Disease	
The concept of ‘Dutch disease’ is linked to the discovery of The Netherlands’ gas reserves, in 
1959 (Stevens, 2003). The Netherlands started to become dependent on the revenues from its 
gas exports. The direct impact was a weakening of the country’s other productive economic 
sectors. This was the consequence of the gradual appreciation in the currency’s exchange 
rate, that forced non-gas economic activities into recession (Lam & Wantchekon, 2003). This 
phenomenon is simply defined as a condition, which leads to a negative impact on the 
economy of countries that have access to a natural resource, such as oil or gas, as a result of 
the increase in the currency exchange rate, the interest rate, and real wages. This creates a 
domino effect, which will damage the country’s other economic sectors such as 
manufacturing, services, agriculture, and other tradable sectors, as they become less 
competitive in the international market (Larsen, 2006). Another definition for the Dutch 
disease was provided by Sarraf and Jiwanji (2001) who define the disease as the inability of 
the state to create a competitive industrial sector.  
 
During the 1980s, researchers who studied resource abundant countries found that 
Dutch disease could hinder those countries from achieving sustainable economic growth 
(Bruno & Sachs, 1982; Corden & Neary, 1982). To overcome the problem, economists have 
explored the idea that such countries need to adopt specific macroeconomic policies in order 
to avoid the build-up of debt, uncompetitive exchange rates, accumulated budget surpluses 
and inflation (Mikesell, 1997; Sarraf & Jiwanji, 2001; Usui, 1997). Furthermore, researchers, 
such as Bravo-Ortega and Gregorio (2007), Gylfason (2001), Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004) 
and Sachs and Warner (1995), argue that the symptoms and consequences of the Dutch 
disease include a decrease in savings and investment, partnered with lower investment in 
education and human capital. According to Usui (1997), if the country starts using 
preventative measures, they are less likely to succumb to the Dutch disease, as can be 
observed in the Norwegian case.  
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Furthermore, Gylfason (2001) finds that the impact of Dutch disease is not limited to 
economic issues. It can also lead to social and political problems because of higher levels of 
unemployment and corruption as a result of uncontrolled government spending.  
 
However, other theorists such as Leite and Weidmann, (1999) and Sala-i-Martin and 
Subramanian (2003) argue that there is no empirical evidence supporting the idea of Dutch 
disease as this phenomenon itself does not provide a sufficient explanation for the resource 
curse. Moreover, the idea that the domination of natural resource exports as the main obstacle 
to development of the industrial sector is being challenged because it is not possible to 
separate the inputs or the contributions of each sector, especially in countries that have a 
strong base for the industry and the services sector (Neary & Wijnbergen, 1986). 
Furthermore, Auty (1994) argues that if the state provides protection to non-resource based 
tradable sectors through policies such as subsidies, it can have a negative effect and that 
sector might become unsustainable because of its dependency on the state protection. 
   
3.2.2 Weak	Economic	Growth		
The relationship between resource abundance and economic growth rate is a key concern of 
researchers who study the resource curse. In this context, Sachs and Warner (1995) find a 
negative correlation between economic growth and the resource dependency, through the 
analysis of 12 oil-intensive economies between 1970 and 1989. Leite and Weidmann (1999) 
and Gylfason et al. (1999) find similar results using larger datasets. Furthermore, Neumayer 
(2004) finds that the economic growth is negatively affected by natural resource abundance, 
when the former was measured through genuine income.8 However, other analysis finds that 
economic growth is not influenced by natural resource abundance when measuring growth in 
relation to the levels of production (Stijns, 2005). Additionally, Auty (2001b) finds that the 
per capita incomes of those who were in a resource-poor country grew at rates that were 
double, or in some cases three times higher, then those in resource abundant countries. 
  
The impact of resource abundance on the economic situation is not only limited to 
economic growth rates; in the longer run it can also create recurring problems for the country. 
For example, some studies conclude that between 1971 and 1983 (the mineral price boom 
                                                
8 This measures net investment in produced GDP (natural and human capital) by measuring the gap between the 
gross income natural capital depreciation (= GDP- natural capital depreciation) (Neumayer, 2004). 
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period), mineral economies experienced a deterioration in the efficiency of domestic capital, 
in comparison to non-mineral economies. The deterioration in the efficiency of domestic 
capital then led to the negative growth of the oil exporting economies (Auty, 1994; Gelb, 
1988). Moreover, Ross (2003a) concludes that poverty and human development levels are 
negatively related to the export revenues of oil and the other non-fuel minerals, such as 
copper, diamond and gold.  
 
In relation to the non-oil tradable sectors, Wood and Berge (1997) find that growth in 
the export of manufactured goods was greater in resource-poor countries than in resource-
rich countries. This occurs because most mineral-based economies perform relatively poorly 
in terms of their agricultural growth, inflation rates, and export diversification in comparison 
to non-mineral economies, which may have a lower average of saving rates, superior 
technological innovation and more diversified exports (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; 
Nankani, 1979). Another significant finding is that oil and other depleted resources have a 
higher negative effect on economic growth than the agricultural or food production sector 
(Leite & Weidmann, 1999). The research also concludes that agricultural resources, unlike oil 
wealth and non-fuel mineral wealth, does not create a negative outcome for the poor. 
 
Although a considerable amount of literature has been published in regards to the 
impact of natural abundance on economic growth, the robustness of the findings are 
inconclusive, as there is no agreed method of measuring the impact of natural abundance on 
economic growth. The next section discusses the literature regarding the third channel of the 
resource curse, institutional quality.    
 
3.2.3 Institutional	Weakness,	Corruption,	and	Rent-seeking		
This critical review of the resource curse literature finds that most scholars identify a 
negative relationship between the resource wealth and the quality of institutions. 
Furthermore, Leite and Weidmann (1999) and Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) find that 
resource abundance can increase the levels of corruption. However, resource-rich countries, 
which have efficient institutions, appear to have more diversified investment than resource-
rich countries that have poor quality institutions. In this context, the quality of institutions is 
defined by focusing on the level of government corruption, the rule of law and the 
administrative quality. Leite and Weidmann (1999) also suggest that the resource curse can 
reflect the government’s inability to manage the sustainability of large resource revenues. 
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Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) emphasise that resource abundance has led to a low rate of 
genuine saving in the cases where the combination of natural resources, macroeconomic 
policies and public expenditure policies were evident (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003).  
 
Rent-seeking behaviour in the resource-rich country can be defined as the situation in 
which corrupt officials or the political elite manipulate state expenditure in a wasteful manner 
that allows them to acquire access to resource rents (Lane & Tornell, 1996). Similarly, 
Baland and Francois (2000) argue that rent-seeking be the direct result of weak legal and 
institutional barriers and the misallocation of human resources, as this eventually leads to 
losing talented human capital. Furthermore, other findings show that rent-seeking activities 
associated with natural resource abundance have a negative effect on growth, and may result 
in lower welfare levels (Robinson et al., 2006). Furthermore, Boschini, Pettersson and Roine, 
(2007) conclude that the type of the resource affects the level of rent-seeking. They argue oil 
and diamonds have a higher probability of causing rent-seeking problems, than agricultural 
commodities such as wheat. Torvik (2009) tests the effect of rent-seeking activities on the 
quality of the entrepreneurs’ activities. He concludes that rent-seeking is associated with 
natural resource abundance, which results in an increase in the number of entrepreneurs 
engaged in rent-seeking and reduces the number of entrepreneurs running productive firms. 
Another perspective on this topic are the findings of Butkiewicz and Yanikkaya (2010) which 
suggest that a mineral resource curse is found in developing countries because the natural 
resource is owned by the political elite. 
 
In contrast, other researchers argue that resource abundance could have a positive 
effect on economic growth and improve the quality of institutions. They find a positive 
correlation between resource abundance and quality of institutions because of wealth 
distribution and the increase in exploration activities (Brunnschweiler & Bulte, 2008). 
According to Lane and Tornell (1996), resource abundance can be beneficial to a country, as 
success comes down to the existing institutional quality. Furthermore, Auty (2001b) uses 
Norway as an example of the good utilization of natural resources, as it used its oil 
abundance without falling into the weak institution trap, to become a wealthy country; 
thereby becoming an exception to the curse. A number of researchers (Auty, 2001a, 2001b; 
Davis, 2011) highlight that stabilisation funds are crucial when dealing with high commodity 
price volatility and the uncertainty of revenue streams. Norway has used this policy when 
dealing with natural resource revenues, in order to save proceeds and distribute them to future 
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generations through a public fund. These findings support the idea that, although there is a 
possibility that natural resources can affect institutional quality, a state with strong existing 
institutions is in a better position to overcome the negative impacts that can be associated 
with resource wealth (Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 2006).  
 
Moreover, a number of researchers confirm that at a certain level of institutional 
quality, natural resource abundance has no direct impact on economic growth, instead, 
abundance penalises growth indirectly. Those impacts tend to be obvious only when 
resources (such as oil) are geographically concentrated (Isham et al., 2002; Sala-i-Martin & 
Subramanian, 2003). This argument is supported by Papyrakis and Gerlagh (2004). In their 
investigation to the situation within the USA, the resource curse is found to affect specific 
resource-rich regions, which are impacted negatively in terms of investment ratios, enrolment 
rates and quality of schooling and eventually corruption.   
 
The relationship between the public and the political elite was the focus of Ghaffar 
(2014). His findings show that clientelism, which can be defined as the exchange of welfare 
and services for political support, was associated with resource wealth. The research 
concludes that there is a causal relationship between clientelism and development. Most oil-
rich states have patron-client structures embedded in the political system, where a form of 
unwritten contract exists in the form of an interdependent relationship that means the political 
elites (patrons) provide economic incentives and security to the public (clients), in return for 
loyalty and personal assistance from their clients. The research lists four factors that 
influence clientelism “(1) low productivity and socioeconomic inequalities, (2) social and 
ethnic divisions, (3) large state economic policies and (4) political participation surpassing 
the development of political institutions” (Ghaffar, 2014:64). Such findings are similar to 
those of Beblawi (1987), Davidson (2013) and Herb (2005) in relation to rentier state theory, 
which is also based on the type of the social contract between the regime and the public in the 
oil-rich countries. In fact, Ghaffar’s (2014) argument is consistent with the rentier state model 
developed by Beblawi and Luciani (1987) who highlight the relationship between the 
political elite and the public in the oil-rich countries. 
 
3.2.4 Regime	Type		
In recent years, there has been an increasing interest in the relationship between resource 
abundance and the kind of regime or the political system in that country. One of the most 
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significant analyses in this context uses rentier state theory which, in the context of the 
Middle East and North Africa, is attributed to Mahdavy (1970) and was later adopted by 
Skocpol (1982), Beblawi and Luciani (1987, 1990), Chaudhry (1994), Davidson (2013) and 
Vandewalle (1998). The premise of this theory is that it is the condition created when a state 
is dependent on the revenue acquired from selling a natural resource, such as oil, and the 
political elite uses part of that revenue to purchase political obedience from the citizens and 
to neutralize any political or social opposition.  
 
According to Mitra (1994), the governments in resource-dependent countries do not 
pursue economic change to overcome the resource curse unless the political elites are forced 
to do so by a period of low prices for the resource. This is because economic diversification 
and promoting institutional reform is unlikely to benefit the political elite; indeed, it may 
reduce their economic and political power. Furthermore, Auty (2001a) and Karl (1999) argue 
that a successful economic policy requires institutional reinforcement, professionalising the 
civil service, reducing corruption, and democratization. However, such policies might still 
not be sufficient to overcome the resource curse if they are not combined with building up the 
social and political capacity of the populace, which means that the public should be involved 
in the economic and political behaviours of the state (Isham et al., 2002). This idea is 
supported by Gelb, Eifert, and Tallroth (2002) and Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian (2003), 
who go further to suggest that in resource-abundant countries direct redistribution of the 
wealth to the populace will lead to lower levels of corruption and misappropriation of wealth.  
 
In addition, other researchers (Ascher, 1999; Pearce, 2005; Peterson, 2009) focus on 
the political and social reforms that could help the state to overcome the resource curse trap. 
They conclude that a total transformation of the political and social environment is the key 
element of any economic policy reform. Moreover, in a resource-abundant country, such as 
Norway or Canada, the political and social system is safeguarded by the regulations and the 
rule of law. This enables changing economic policy more easily when compared to countries 
with less developed legal and political systems. 
 
Furthermore, Wantchekon’s (2000) statistical analysis shows that a one percentage 
increase in natural resource dependence increases the probability of an authoritarian 
government by about eight percent. These statistics were derived from an examination of 141 
countries between 1950 and 1990. This finding is supported by Jensen (2004) who focuses on 
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African nations. His research concludes that African countries with resource abundance are 
more likely to undergo breakdowns in democracy after a democratic transition. He argues 
this is because the democratisation process is negatively affected by natural resource wealth, 
which can hinder any transition towards democracy. Similarly, Davidson (2013) argues that 
an authoritarian resource-rich country is less likely than an authoritarian non-resource-rich to 
transform its political order to a democratic one. Other researchers (Beblawi, 1987; Jensen, 
2004; Lam & Wantchekon, 2003) investigate the roots of this tendency. They find that the 
democracy is held at bay by natural resource wealth because the revenues earned from the 
export of the natural resources replace the necessity for taxation. In parallel, the economic 
growth benefits the local political elite, strengthening their power base and popularity. 
Consequently, the authoritarian power of the state negates the possibility of any democratic 
reform. 
 
A number of theorists find that when looking at natural resource abundance in terms 
of rent as a percentage of government revenue there is a negative correlation between natural 
resource abundance and the occurrence of democracy. This view is supported by Ross 
(2001), who conducted an analysis on data from 113 states between 1971 and 1997. The 
findings show that if the state is dependent on oil or mineral exports, then this will make it 
less democratic. It can be argued that resource abundance allows the governments to build up 
a strong and well-equipped internal security force. Hence, democratic transition is hindered, 
as political opponents can be manoeuvred into obscurity and thus elitist rule is maintained 
(Jensen, 2004; Ross, 2001). However, Herb (2005) argues that when natural resource 
abundance is measured in terms of rent as a percentage of government revenues rather than 
levels of natural resource exports, there is little support for the idea that there is a negative 
relationship between natural resource abundance and the occurrence of democracy. 
 
Meanwhile, De Soysa (2002) establishes that there is a strong negative relationship 
between political stability and the level of mineral wealth. The research findings also 
highlight that point-source resources rather than natural resources or general resources, such 
as agriculture, had the biggest impact on political stability. The conditions in oil exporting 
countries provide strong support for the argument since those countries tend to suffer from 
political instability or even civil wars. In contrast, other researchers such as Smith (2004) find 
that oil wealth does not have an adverse impact on regime stability. The study also shows a 
lower level of anti-state protests. Similarly, the findings of Humphreys (2005) and Sørli, 
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Gleditsch, and Strand (2005) show that oil dependency in the Middle East has resulted in a 
lower likelihood of civil wars, and if they did occur were very short. However, these findings 
can be questioned since the outbreak of the political and security problems in the region since 
late 2010. 
 
Many researchers argue that poor economic management in oil-rich countries is the 
main cause of falling into the resource curse trap, with a mixture of ill-thought out policies 
such as maintaining an artificially high exchange rate, or the over-use of subsidies on fuel or 
other basic necessities (Ascher, 1999; Karl, 1997; Mitra, 1994). In fact, poor economic 
performance combined with the government's spending behaviour is just the tip of the 
iceberg. The problem in those states can be deeper, more structural in nature, because of the 
political regime’s behaviour. The absence of public accountability allows the political elite to 
acquires much of the wealth for themselves, in what is described as rent-seeking behaviour 
(Levin, 1962; Nurkse, 1958). Research conducted by Mitra (1994) shows that the high price 
of oil encourages the oil-rich governments to increase their expenditure because of the 
‘tendency to optimism’; usually higher government spending is associated with unrealistic 
projects from which the political elite benefit. This gives them the advantage of having extra 
money which can be used to buy loyalty. Also, they are able to eliminate any prospective 
competition from the other traders in the market. Ross (2001) describes this situation as ‘rent-
seizing’, which is the process by which rational political elites gain control over the windfalls 
of a resource boom instead of directly seizing the rents created by this resource boom. 
Furthermore, if there is a perception that the resource boom will be temporary, the rent-
seeking behaviour is more likely to take place and ultimately leads to a negative economic 
outcome. However, if these resource booms are thought to be permanent, the political elites 
are less likely to look for short term rent-maximisation, as these booms increase the 
likelihood that they will stay in power (Acemoglu et al., 2002).  
  
Similarly, Ascher (1999) finds that resource-abundant countries tend to waste their 
natural resources due to the political behaviour of the elite, as they are incapable of grasping 
the opportunity of natural resource abundance, instead creating rent-seeking acts. These elites 
use the wealth to pursue other objectives, which may provide economic benefits to particular 
groups, which gives them the option to create rent-seeking opportunities (Mehlum et al., 
2006). Such findings confirm that the type of regime determines the economic problems in 
the state. This occurs as a result of the absence of public accountability and the domination of 
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the political elite over most of the trading activities. This is accompanied by the use of state 
capabilities to provide expansive services to the public or even by distributing wealth directly 
in a way that eliminates the state’s ability to promote self-sustaining economic development 
or economic diversification (Chaudhry, 1994; Vandewalle, 1998). Correspondingly, Broad 
(1995) and Karl (1997) find that in some countries, oil wealth resulted in the creation of the 
‘petrostates’, in which the political distribution of the oil revenues is the norm, along with a 
lack of control over expenditure policy. This leads to the state becoming ‘locked in’, due to 
weak institutions, which, in turn, increases reliance on external influences from their 
international allies, resulting in little accountability to their citizens, bad governance, the 
creation of conglomerate companies and a likelihood of increasing a class divide; all helping 
to reinforce the elite status.  
 
Furthermore, Wantchekon (2000:10) argues that oil-rich countries are more likely to 
have authoritarian political systems, due to three factors: (1) the existent dominant or 
authoritarian party will be able to utilise the rents to extend the level of  popular support; (2) 
it could generate political  instability which could be used to adopt repressive policies 
towards the opposition; and (3) “it could generate an open and extraconstitutional conflict 
(civil war), which could result in a dictatorship by the opposition party or the incumbent 
party”. 
 
Relatedly, Isham et al. (2002) finds that the issue with natural resource abundance is 
that it encourages the development of a niche of capitalist gainers. Governments can fall in 
line with more powerful nations by selling their resources to the highest bidder, the foreign-
based multinational organisations. Such companies deal with specific elite families or 
organisations that own the majority of point-source resources. With the vast majority of the 
natural resources being owned by ruling families, the government can find itself 
circumvented during the economic crisis but in a stronger political position in relation to 
more powerful countries when the economy flourishes. Good relations between the elitist 
families and the powerful companies can result in economic aid in times of need. In turn, the 
aid mitigates the chance to introduce radical social and economic reform, thereby blocking a 
rare and crucial opportunity for a better future for the citizens of the rich-resource country. 
Moreover, governments in resource-abundant developing countries are given a long leash to 
pursue questionable and economically inadvisable projects, so long as they toe the line of the 
dominant nations and allow the natural resource wealth within their borders to be acquired by 
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firms from wealthy countries (Perelman, 2003). Snyder (2006) suggests that resource-rich 
countries depend on the ruler’s ability to construct a working infrastructure capable of 
exploiting and maintaining the natural resources. This reliance leads to an inflow of revenue 
to the architect of the infrastructure, the ruler. The rulers are then well-funded and less likely 
to find themselves in open conflict with opponents or with any public antipathy.  
 
3.2.5 Summary			
This section reviews the discussion of the literature on the resource curse theory. The main 
observation is that the concept of resource curse cannot be separated from resource 
abundance or resource dependence, as both underpin the foundations of the theory. The 
characteristics of the theory are summarised in six important aspects—Dutch disease, slow 
rates of economic growth, institutional deterioration, corruption, rent-seeking, and regime 
type. Furthermore, many researchers look at the impact of the resource curse in different 
regions or particular countries, in relation to different resources. However, there are 
exceptions to the theory. For example, Norway and Canada are examples of oil-rich countries 
that have successfully managed their wealth to boost their economy and avoid the resource 
curse. This stands in contrast to less successful countries such as Venezuela. With regard to 
the type of the resource, the literature suggests that Botswana was an exception amongst the 
diamond-rich countries as it had the highest average economic growth rate in the world, as 
opposed to Sierra Leone, for instance. Such findings might be evidence that the resource 
curse theory does not resolve the paradox of spot resource wealth. One can also argue that 
studying this phenomenon in many countries collectively might not be the best use of the 
theory as each country has its unique characteristics. 
 
Furthermore, the section highlights the political and social environment associated 
with the natural resource dependency. The literature suggests that the country should aim for 
a total transformation of its political and social environment to be able to avoid the resource 
curse trap. However, this contradicts with resource curse theory and the rentier state theory, 
which argue that transformation will not occur as it is not in favour of the political elite in oil-
rich countries, as the transformation would jeopardise their power.  
 
In conclusion, the key problem with the suggestions proposed in the literature is that 
the differences among the resource-rich countries are not considered; most researchers use 
collective case studies either by looking at the countries by resource type or by looking into 
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the effects of resource wealth within a group of countries. This thesis overcomes this 
weakness by addressing the resource curse impact in a particular country through the analysis 
of different factors. The thesis argues that the literature overlooks the resource curse impact 
on the resource dependant states and the reasons behind the unsuccessful economic 
diversification in those states. Therefore, the next section discusses the literature regarding 
the resource curse and rentierism generally in the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries 
(Bahrain, Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates, UAE) and, 
more in depth, in the case of Oman.  
 
3.3 Natural	Resource	Impacts	in	the	GCC	States		
The discovery of oil in the GCC countries transformed them in a way that no single 
commodity has previously transformed a nation. In the pre-oil era, the region can be 
described as a group of tribes in divided societies with a traditional political and economic 
structure. However, the discovery of oil changed the region significantly, with new states 
created. The huge oil exports revenues following the oil price hike in 1973 from USD2.5/b to 
USD11.6/b in 1974 allowed the GCC governments to establish massive infrastructure and 
industrialisation projects. The governments were also able to initiate huge educational, health 
care, and cultural programmemes, effectively redistributing wealth directly or indirectly to 
the public (Peterson, 2009). As a result, the GCC governments managed economic 
development that resulted in a dramatic increase in per capita income; by 2015 the average 
per capita income in the GCC countries was USD41,486 (IMF, 2016). Furthermore, the 
improvement also saw human development indicators improve, including life expectancy 
(Saif, 2009). In addition, the quality of education and number of schools, universities and 
training colleges has increased, along with the introduction of a modern educational system 
(Saif, 2009).  
 
However, the development is associated with problems highlighted by a number of 
researchers (Callen et al., 2014; Espinoza, 2012; Fasano, 2003; Peterson, 2009; Saif, 2009). 
For example, GDP growth in each of the GCC states is highly reliant on oil income and oil 
exports account for the vast majority of exports. For example, in 2015 oil exports were 84% 
of the total GCC exports. Furthermore, the oil and gas sector accounted for 41% of the 
GCC’s GDP and 72% of the government's income (IMF, 2016). In addition, Saif (2009) 
argues the common problems of the GCC economies also include: the public sector as the 
main driver for the economy with a huge fiscal surplus; high growth rates in the national 
  57 
labour force; and a reliance on an expatriate workforce. As a result, the GCC countries face 
common challenges, which include economic diversification, low productivity and high rates 
of unemployment among the nationals, a weak non-oil private sector, and inefficient public 
sector institutions.  
 
Another issue is that certain GCC states (Oman and Bahrain) face is the oil depletion 
problem as the major oilfields have been mature for a number of years or decades, while, the 
recently discovered fields are smaller, with lower quality oil. In Oman, for instance, it is very 
expensive to extract oil from the new fields because of two issues: the first one is the 
presence of heavy oil which needs sophisticated technology for the extraction such as the 
steam injection techniques to liquefy the oil. The other problem is the quality of the oil itself 
as it contains high levels of sulphate (BMIResearch, 2013).  
 
Furthermore, Peterson (2009:1) finds that the drop in the oil prices during the 1980s 
alerted the GCC countries to the problems associated with their dependency on a resource 
that was depleting and fluctuated in price. His main conclusion was that after 40 years of 
talking about diversification policies the GCC countries are still dependent on the oil and gas 
exports. Hence, hydrocarbons are still the dominant source of wealth in those countries. 
Similarly, Beblawi (2011:187) concludes that neither the oil-based nor the import substitution 
industries would survive the post-oil era. He argues that economic diversification efforts in 
the GCC countries have not yet achieved a sustainable development pattern. This is despite 
generous subsidies in certain industries such as petrochemicals, fertilizers, and other oil and 
gas related industries. Furthermore, it is difficult for those industries to survive without 
government subsidies, which are usually in the form of cheap gas, cheap electricity, and tax 
exemptions. 
 
Another perspective is the issue of hydrocarbon dependency and its impact on the 
state’s political stability. For example, Moore (2002) analyses the implications of a point 
resource dependency in the GCC from 1980 to 1990 in order to test whether or not oil 
dependency results in the decay of the political system. He highlights that the lack of data and 
the lack of transparency in the GCC states might affect the results. However, he summarises 
research, such as Chaudhry (1997), Clark (1997), Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Ross (2001) 
and Yates (1996), into the GCC countries. The main conclusion of the research is that even 
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though Gulf states are resource dependent, their capital surplus and the volume of the 
resource can mitigate the political instability effect. 
 
3.3.1 Oil	Dependency	and	Economic	Growth		
The inability of the GCC states to create a sustainable economy in the long run might be the 
most critical impact of their dependency on oil revenues. Thus, the GCC countries are cited 
in many studies as an example of countries that have been affected by the resource curse 
(Auty, 2007; Busse & Gröning, 2013; di John, 2011; Sachs & Warner, 2001). Although many 
researchers focus on resource abundance and its impact on the economy, only a few analyse 
the impact of the resource curse on the GCC countries. Examples of such research include 
Al-Yousif (1997), Canada (2008), Coury and Dave (2009) and Fasano (2003). Other 
researchers such as Sachs and Warner (1997) and Gylfason (2004), who also look at natural 
resource abundance effects on the economy, did not include the GCC states because of the 
limited availability of data. This is because these states considered data regarding national 
income as a national security issue (Gylfason, 2004). However, in this context, Auty (2001, 
2004) predicts that oil dependent countries would not be able to create a sustainable 
economic growth and development. The main conclusions were that if the economy in a 
particular country starts to rely on a point-source resource, then this could lead to a reduction 
in economic growth. A number of researchers have gone further and argue that countries with 
oil dependency might end up poorer than before the oil discovery (Basedau & Lay, 2009; 
Ross, Kaiser, & Mazaheri, 2011). 
 
Furthermore, most studies conclude that diversification of the economy is a crucial 
element in encouraging sustainable economic growth in the oil-abundant countries (Hvidt, 
2011; Peterson, 2009). According to Coury and Dave (2009), high government expenditure 
has a negative impact on economic diversification. The results also suggest that GCC states 
had a substantial insufficient funding allocation in the period 1980 to 2005. Other 
researchers, who analyse the situation from a political science point of view, conclude that 
those countries’ ruling systems will be challenged by the public in the future as a result of 
limited resources (Davidson, 2013).  
 
Al-Yousif (1997) studies the long run relationship between the economic growth and 
the oil exports in the GCC countries by using available data from 1973 to 1993. The research 
shows that there is no relationship between oil exports and the GDP growth rate in the long 
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run. However, there are signs of a positive correlation in the short term. The main conclusion 
was that economic diversification in those countries is crucial for the growth of the economy 
in the long term. 
 
In contrast, Herb (2009) separates non-oil GDP from the total GDP, and tests GCC 
countries from 1973 to 2005. His findings show that in the long run oil exports do not have a 
relationship with the overall economic performance. However, he finds that there is a 
correlation in the short term and argues that the reason for this could be attributed to the local 
economic policies. The results suggest that the oil wealth abundance might not be the cause 
behind the weak economic performance in those countries as this could be attributed to the 
economic structure, as well as political and employment policies. 
 
Titulaer (2010) studies the phenomena of the negative impact of natural resource 
dependence on economic growth. The main finding highlights that the resource curse 
elements are the primary cause of such adverse effects. Those elements are Dutch disease, 
institutional quality and political freedom. His research shows that the Dutch disease can 
explain the lack of economic growth in the GCC countries as the manufacturing sector falls 
sharply behind the oil and services sectors. However, arguably the lack of a manufacturing 
sector in those countries prior to the oil era weakens this hypothesis. The other finding relates 
to the role of the services sector in the economy. The conclusion is that this sector has 
become necessary for all GCC countries, and has a bigger impact on the economy than the oil 
sector, despite the latter still being the main driver of the economy. Furthermore, other 
economic sectors, such as the transport and communication, experienced negative growth 
rates in the previous 10 years (Titulaer, 2010). 
 
The poor economic performance and the negative non-oil GDP growth in oil-rich 
countries is also found by other academics. For example, Yousef (2004) analyses economic 
development in the Middle East and Africa from 1950 and concludes that oil price volatility 
had a negative impact on the GDP growth in the GCC countries. Similarly, Hakura (2004) 
assesses the weak economic performance in the Middle East and North Africa. The findings 
show that per capita growth in the GCC was negative between 1980 and 2000 even though 
there was positive growth in the overall GDP in those countries over the same period 
(Hakura, 2004). 
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The failure to achieve economic diversification is a major concern for the GCC states, 
despite positive, sustained economic growth over the past 45 years. However, the oil price 
fluctuations and the demographic boom have contributed towards a weaker than potential 
economic performance. Furthermore, the reliance on oil income means that it is difficult to 
boost the non-oil sector (Elhiraika & Hamed, 2001; Makdisi, 2000; Saif, 2009; Yousef, 
2004). 
 
According to Cherif and Hasanov (2014) reinforcing the growth model to create more 
diversified economies is a difficult task for the GCC countries. The diversified economy can 
be achieved by allowing the private sector to drive the economy; however, creating the 
conditions has proved difficult. The other challenge is that most capital expenditure is 
undertaken by the state, as a result the major driver of the economy is government spending. 
Thus, although the neo-liberal agenda of reforming the economy was in the various economic 
development plans in all the GCC states, in reality little has been achieved. For example, the 
governments create companies or privatised some assets; however, those companies are still 
subsidised by the government. In other words, there are still under the umbrella of 
government, albeit with different names (Cherif & Hasanov, 2014). 
 
Looney (1994: 266) highlights a number of the problems that might be behind the 
weak diversification results in the GCC countries. He argues that it is mostly related to the 
industrialisation strategies adopted by the governments. He also highlights other problems 
such as a weak bureaucracy, the lack of the qualified work force and the levels of competition 
from abroad versus the weak incentives for domestic production and export. 
 
Paradoxically, the GCC countries are attempting to use government spending to 
achieve several objectives, including targeting economic diversification through developing 
the private sector and job creation (Looney, 1994). In addition, Espinoza (2012) shows that 
the increase in per capita income is lower than would be expected given the massive wealth 
accumulation. His findings highlight that the high rate of government expenditure can lead to 
weaker-than-potential growth. Furthermore, the subsidies and the government expenditure 
model used in the GCC has created problems in the labour market. For example, government 
spending has boosted incomes directly through high salaries in the public sector and 
indirectly through investment in the infrastructure which benefits the construction sector. 
However, the high wages available in the public sector has resulted in lower employment of 
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Omanis in the private sector, which means that the government expenditure also works in 
favour of foreign labour. 
 
This section demonstrates that most of the literature concludes that the oil dependency 
has had a negative impact on economic diversification in most GCC states, as the 
governments, could not implement economic diversification policies or did not provide 
sufficient support for other economic sectors. Also, the oil dependency hinders the 
development of the non-oil tradable sectors such as manufacturing sector. Hence, the oil 
sector is still the main economic driver. The next section highlights the literature regarding 
rentier theory applied to the GCC. 
 
3.3.2 Rentier	Theory	Applied	to	the	GCC		
Most research focusing on the effect of the GCC’s oil dependency on its economic structure 
had been done under the umbrella of resource curse theory, which includes theories such as 
rentier state theory.9 For example, Hertog (2010) develops a new perspective for the rentier 
state theory in his work on the Saudi Arabian political economy. His findings show that in 
Saudi Arabia the state institutions and rentierism work in combination and although the 
rentierism penetrates most of the state’s institutions the state is still a separate entity. 
 
Moreover, the relationship between oil revenues and the political structure in the GCC 
is the main topic of many researchers. For example, Schwarz (2008) attempts to understand 
the independent state formation by using the rentier state theoretical framework. Other 
researchers argue that because of the dependency on oil is not a sustainable source of wealth 
then the ruling families themselves are not sustainable. By analysing the level of direct and 
indirect subsidies, which account for more than 25% of Saudi Arabian GDP, it is argued that 
the fiscal policy might in the short term maintain social unity (Davidson, 2013; Levins, 
2013). However, such policies cannot be sustained for many reasons, but one of the most 
important is the oil price fluctuations; in 2015 the oil prices almost fell to the fiscal breakeven 
point in many of the GCC countries10 (Carpenter, 2017). 
 
                                                
9 See Section 4.3.3.1.  
10 According to Fitch’s break-even oil prices per barrel in 2017 are forecast to be: Bahrain at USD84/b, Oman at 
USD75/b, Saudi Arabia at USD75/d, UAE at USD60/b, Qatar at USD51/d, and Kuwait at UDD45/b (Carpenter, 
2017). 
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Similarly, Herb (1999) states that rulers and the political elites control the wealth, 
providing the power to rule the nation. He argues that rents can be considered as an 
intervening variable in politics as such an impact requires further analysis of the political 
institutions and other elements to arrive at a valid theoretical framework. This point was 
analysed by Ehteshami and Wright (2007) who conclude that the GCC states ruling elites’ 
manage to guard their position through three main elements:  intensive public expenditure, 
expanding the public sector employment, and  creating public policies, especially those 
relating to economic subsidies and land allocation, “The elites generally see themselves as 
the ‘owners’ rather than the ‘rulers’ of their countries” (Ehteshami and Wright, 2007:915). 
This has been achieved through particular practices in the region such as land ownership or 
land distribution and also by expanding the influence of the political elites in the trading 
sector. This approach has created a new layer of merchants who have become part of the 
political decision-makers. Furthermore, allowing those merchants to win government project 
contracts, as is the case in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait in particular, can be seen as a business 
owned indirectly by members of the Royal family. It is very clear that economic power gives 
the ruling families the ability to manipulate the political and economic position in their 
countries (Herb, 1999). 
 
Other researchers considered rentierism as an element in state politics rather than a 
model for the political structure. This position can be found in Valeri (2011) on Oman, Herb 
(1999) on Kuwait and Davidson (2013) on the GCC. Such arguments highlight that 
rentierism as a political behaviour is accepted by the researchers as a common characteristic 
of the region. Furthermore, some of the early proponents of rentier state theory, such as 
Luciani (1990, 2012), argue that rentierism could be a model for a better economic and 
political performance.  
 
Another view posited by Levins (2013) is that although the GCC economies can be 
considered as part of the capitalist system, the states produce little besides oil. Even then, oil 
is not really produced, it is simply extracted with assistance from foreign companies and, to a 
large extent, employing imported technologies and skilled expatiates. Beside the political 
determination and advocacy towards the economic reform, Levins (2013) argues that there 
are other reasons preventing the rentier states of the GCC from entering into new economic 
non-oil tradeable sectors. One reason is the shortage of skilled human capital. This fact 
reflects an inverse relationship with the external rent. As the state receives huge amounts of 
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wealth from the oil exports, this implies that the state will need to control its foreign 
exchange rate in order to minimise the exchange cost. This results in imported goods 
replacing the domestic goods as a result of the exchange rate impact on the prices. In turn, it 
will lead to a weak performance in the productive sectors such as agriculture and small 
industries. 
 
In a rentier system, the state is responsible for the allocation of the rents that dominate 
the economy. As a result, the state becomes the engine for growth in the economy and the 
employer of last resort. In this context, Davidson (2013) argues that in the GCC, working in 
the public sector has the most prestigious status, in addition to the highest salaries and 
benefits. As a result, the public sector acts as a hoover sucking up the skilled workforce from 
the private sector, which can be described as the rentier mentality (Levins, 2013). 
 
The other observation regarding GCC countries is the absence of a direct taxation 
system which many researchers (Aydin, 2013; Dunning, 2006; Herb, 2005; Hvidt, 2011; 
Ross, 2001; Skancke, 2003) argue is behind the lack of any political demands from the 
public. Furthermore, the policy might explain why the state enjoys a high level of autonomy 
as there are accountable bodies to check the state’s financial behaviour. This also allows the 
political elites to change and amend any public policies if there is a need. This high-level of 
flexibility in the fiscal policies are used by the political elites to overcome any public 
demands which are usually related to employment or education (Herb, 2005). Therefore, the 
rulers use their oil-derived wealth to gain political loyalty and as protection from social 
disturbances (Davidson, 2013). 
 
Another reason for the lack of political demands is the generous welfare and service 
system. This arrangement impacts on the citizens’ mentality and behaviour, driving them to 
form specific expectations about their roles in the domestic economy. Hence, the citizens 
become dependent on the state, curtailing efforts to engage in commercial activities or to set 
up their own business. 
 
The classical concept of the rentierism in the GCC has been revisited recently, as a 
number of researchers argue that the GCC states have started to incur real economic and 
political development in what Gray (2011) describes as ‘late rentierism’. This is defined as 
when the state is “more responsive, globalized, and strategic in its thinking” (Gray, 2011:24). 
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However, after the outbreak of the Arab Spring the states have tended to return to the old 
style rentierism. All the GCC states have initiated a lavish public expenditure programmeme 
that includes employment in the public sector, unemployment benefits, and state subsidised 
housing, as well as many other benefits. Such excessive expenditure has created massive 
pressure on the state fiscal position, to the extent that some states have issued bonds to 
finance their budgetary shortfalls (Aydin, 2013).  
 
According to Rumaihi (1996), Gulf governments will face more social and political 
challenges. He argues that existing policies for distributing wealth directly or indirectly will 
not be sufficient to defend the governments from the public requests for more political 
participation, administrative reform, less corruption and greater accountability. Furthermore, 
the current weak oil price can pose an immediate threat to those governments, as they are 
forced to withdraw subsidies and impose tariffs and taxes alongside extra expenditure on 
military and security budgets. Thus, it is clear that the GCC states need to implement 
economic diversification policies to overcome the oil price fluctuations.  
 
Economic diversification is not a new strategy among the GCC states. It has been on 
the political agenda since oil and gas became the main and almost sole source of income in 
these countries over half a century ago (Al-Iriani, 2006; Callen et al., 2014; Espinoza, 2012; 
Fasano, 2003; Hvidt, 2011, 2013; Peters, 2008; Peterson, 2009; Reiche, 2010; Titulaer, 
2010). The specific aim of the policy is to diversify the economies by investing the oil 
revenues in productive assets (Hvidt, 2013). However, the majority of the diversification 
initiatives that have been taken are still indirectly associated with oil and gas. For example, 
many industrial projects in the region are energy-intensive, such as the aluminium smelters in 
Bahrain and Oman and the industrial cities of Yanbu and Jubail in Saudi Arabia. 
 
In this context, Peterson (2009) argues that the GCC states have been through three 
stages of economic transformation. The first one was immediately after the discovery of oil in 
1930, as those countries were transformed from being among the world’s poorest to being 
able to start to build the core elements of infrastructure. The second phase between 1973 and 
1980 when the jump in the oil price allowed the regimes to enjoy a huge income that was 
spent mainly on economic development and infrastructure projects, which resulted in raising 
living standards for the citizens. In the third phase, between 1980 and 2008, oil price 
volatility forced governments to consider the question of what to do when oil reserves 
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become depleted. As a result, all the GCC states began to implement economic 
diversification strategies. However, apart from UAE and Qatar, oil export revenues are still 
the dominant contributors to the government’s revenues in the GCC states. 
 
Peterson (2009) argues that the GCC countries have adopted several diversification 
strategies. One is to create a knowledge-based economy, while the second is to create 
sovereign wealth funds (SWFs), which use budget surpluses, and can work as a backup 
during low oil price cycles. The third strategy is to focus on downstream added value 
industries such as petrochemicals, thereby integrating other industries with the oil sector. The 
fourth strategy is to enhance the oil recovery process by investing more in oil extraction 
technology that allows the capture of the associated gas from the oilfield which can be used 
for electricity production or in cement factories. Another strategy is to create feedstock bases 
such as Jubail and Yanbu industrial cities in Saudi Arabia where petrochemical, fertiliser, 
plastic and steel plants utilise cheap feedstock. 
 
Relatedly, the importance of economic diversification on the state’s stability is the 
focus of Davidson (2013), Peterson (2009) and Rumaihi (1996), who conclude that, in 
contrast to Iraq and Iran, the GCC countries have enjoyed political stability. However, those 
countries face challenges in several areas such as demography, politics, and leadership. To 
overcome these challenges these states need to implement serious reform, otherwise it will be 
difficult to maintain the stable relationship between the ruling families and the citizens. In 
this context, the Gulf states face a number of severe failures that were inherited from the oil 
price boom eras. These include: 
1. The governments are the biggest employer and tend to use this policy to mitigate 
unemployment. 
2. The governments use employment as another method of wealth distribution rather 
than creating an active, productive private sector. 
3. The governments might face the need to use external financing through loans in order 
to provide the citizens with the same living standards regardless of the cost of 
financing. 
Thus, Davidson (2013) predicts that even in the short term the GCC countries will not be able 
to provide their citizens with the same levels of subsidies and social welfare, and they will be 
forced to raise tariffs and taxes. The situation will result in tensions between the government 
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and the populace. Therefore, GCC leaders would be forced to give the public more political 
power.  
 
According to Hvidt (2013), the ultimate goal of most development plans in the GCC 
is to achieve economic diversification. In other words, the governments are aware that this is 
the only way to achieve a secure sustainable economic development and to safeguard the 
levels of the current living standards for their citizens. Nevertheless, the state dominance over 
the economies and the weak private sector makes it difficult to achieve these reforms. Other 
barriers to diversification are home-made obstacles such as the absence of consistency in 
economic development plans and policies. Furthermore, military expenditure as a percentage 
of the GDP is among the highest in the world, even though there are no direct military threats 
against most GCC states (Hvidt, 2013). 
 
A number of researchers test the economic diversification efforts in GCC countries. 
For example, Coury and Dave (2009) analyse data from 1980 to 2005 to test for the progress 
towards diversification in the GCC countries as an economic bloc, as well as for each 
individual country. The main findings are consistent with the resource curse theory, 
highlighting that oil export revenues were behind the positive GDP growth, thereby 
confirming that the GCC countries are still dependent on the oil and gas revenues. However, 
the research also finds that government spending has no influence on the GDP growth. 
Specifically, the results of the research conclude that the growth in the finance and transport 
and communications sectors has a positive relationship with GDP per capita in Kuwait as this 
sector shows a positive growth itself. In Oman and Qatar, there is also a positive correlation 
between the GDP per capita and the growth of the services sector. In the UAE, the test results 
include the tourism sector which shows a positive relationship with economic growth. 
 
Additionally, researchers argue that the private sector could be the crucial driver in 
achieving economic diversification even though the GCC countries adopted different 
policies. However, only a small number of the local population are involved in the private 
sector. Therefore, adopting policies that develop the private sector could assist with job 
creation for locals, bringing a greater number of the domestic population into economically-
productive activities (Coury & Dave, 2009). Furthermore, Hertog (2010) argues that a well-
functioning private sector will not only affect the unemployment level but also will 
encourage FDI inflows into the economy. FDI not only brings capital into the country but 
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also introduces new technology, advanced management methods and, above all, create jobs. 
Although, the GCC countries are trying to attract FDI, there has been limited success. With 
the exception of Dubai, which has little oil, the other GCC states have only been successful in 
terms of the hydrocarbon sector, which belongs to the state. Titulaer (2010) also focuses on 
attracting FDI as an economic diversification strategy. He argues, this strategy was very 
effective in the UAE and Bahrain in particular. However, increasing FDI requires policies 
that include market liberalisation, which can be difficult because of the economic structure in 
those countries.  
 
Hertog (2010) also analyses the state-owned enterprises (SOEs) and shows that there 
are examples of efficient and successful SOEs in the GCC in both the manufacturing and 
services sectors. He argues that, although SOEs in countries such as Iran and Russia are less 
efficient than their market counterparts, in the GCC those companies managed to escape the 
inefficient institutional environment and are successful examples. However, this creates a 
problem in itself as the goal for the diversification efforts is to create a strong private sector 
that works without any direct intervention from the state.  
 
The next section reviews the literature that focuses on Oman.  
 
3.4 Oman:	Resource	Curse	or	Resource	Blessing		
Like the other GCC countries, Oman has adopted different diversification strategies to reduce 
its reliance on oil. Since 1976 the Omani government has launched a series of medium-term 
FYDPs, during which the government has achieved a stable economic environment with low 
levels of inflation. Furthermore, the development process has focused on expanding 
education and strengthening the business climate, such as legal reform to liberalise the 
market to encourage FDI and to enhance and to create a stable stock market. In each FYDP, 
the main themes are replicated including human capital development, encouraging new 
industries and services and working with the private sector to expand its role in the economy. 
In this context, official data shows that the non-hydrocarbons and the non-hydrocarbons 
exports share in GDP have increased since 1980, yet remain below the target levels (Callen, 
et al., 2014).  
 
According to the UN in its publication, ‘The Growth Report: Strategies for Sustained 
Growth and Inclusive Development’, Oman is among the nations that has achieved an 
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economic miracle (Spence, 2008). However, the fact that oil export revenues are still the 
main source of government revenues, the weak industrial, agricultural and fisheries sectors 
and the high rate of unemployment amongst Omani is evidence that there are structural 
problems in the economy. These problems also include low labour productivity and a 
negative total factor productivity growth for the overall economy in general and for the non-
oil economy in particular over the last 40 years (Al-Saqri, 2010).  
 
Furthermore, the situation in Oman is different from the other GCC countries 
regarding the seriousness of the challenges. Oman produces less oil than its neighbouring 
countries, and also has the second highest population and territory in the GCC. Furthermore, 
the cost of producing oil is much greater than in the other GCC states. According to the IMF, 
Oman and Bahrain are the most vulnerable states in the GCC from the perspective of oil 
reserves’ expectations (Treichel & Mansur, 1999). As a result, the Omani government has 
focused on infrastructure building, which has resulted in a heavy reliance of the private sector 
on government expenditure. This was highlighted by the IMF publication titled ‘Oman 
Beyond the Oil Horizon’ in 1999: “The need to diversify the economy and build up the State 
General Reserve Fund (SGRF) reserves for future use is much more pressing in the case of 
Oman than in other member countries of the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC)” (cited in 
Treichel & Mansur, 1999:4). 
 
Atkinson and Hamilton (2003) research results can explain what has happened in 
Oman. Their findings show that resource abundant economies which consume rather invest 
their revenues are more likely to experience a significant resource curse. This conclusion was 
achieved when testing the relationship between point source exports and government 
expenditure and consumption. In a consuming economy, most of the resources are divided 
between public wages, infrastructure development, and subsidies. In contrast, governments 
which manage to invest the wealth acquired from the resource exports managed to avoid the 
resource curse. 
 
ElMallakh (1972) was amongst the first scholars to analyse the Omani economy in an 
article titled ‘Economic Requirements for Development, Oman’. He highlights that in the pre-
oil era agriculture and fisheries were the leading economic sectors in Oman and that these 
sectors still had the potential for expansion. ElMallakh suggests that Oman had greater 
potential for economic diversification than its neighbours. He insists that Oman should not 
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rely on the oil revenues but should diversify its economy by expanding the current non-oil 
economic sectors, attracting foreign investment and building a technical and knowledge base. 
Another important paper was published by the IMF (Treichel & Mansur 1999). This studied 
the economic performance in the period 1980-1997. The authors find that Oman recorded the 
highest GDP growth rate in the world but this achievement has its downside, which is mainly 
attributed to large fiscal deficit that forced the government to use funds from “the foreign and 
domestic investments of the State General Reserve Fund (SGRF) and a loss of foreign 
exchange reserves of the monetary authority, as well as the accumulation of a sizable 
domestic and foreign debt” (Treichel & Mansur, 1999:13). The research points out that 
structural reforms are needed in the Omani economy, such as “the saving-investment 
imbalance, slow growth in factor productivity, and the need to diversify the production base.” 
Furthermore, it concluded, “the Omani economy recorded little diversification in real terms 
from the oil toward the non-oil sector; the saving-investment gap widened, and economic 
growth was primarily linked to increased use of capital and labour” (Treichel & Mansur, 
1999:15). However, the research analyses overall economic growth measured by real GDP 
growth, which is fundamentally dependent on the oil prices and output. If the research studies 
non-oil GDP growth in Oman, they would see the growth rate was lower.  
 
Furthermore, a number of researchers attempt to analyse particular elements of the 
resource curse impact on the oil producing countries. For instance, Robinson, Torvik and 
Verdier (2006) analyse the resource curse impact from the perspective of institutional quality. 
The main conclusion is that countries with low institutional quality do not escape the 
resource curse. The authors argue that efficient institutions allow the state to maximise the 
benefits of oil price booms and enables the government to avoid negative impacts from oil 
price fluctuations. They conclude that good institutions reflect a positive resource 
management and, hence, will lower the levels of corruption. The study finds that Oman has 
been affected negatively by the resource curse because of its inefficient institutions. Similar 
results are found by Nunnenkamp (2004) and Beblawi (1987) when they identify the 
obstacles that block the Arab oil producing countries from achieving sustainable economic 
growth. Their research highlights two main reasons for the negative impact of the oil wealth 
in those countries including Oman. The first reason is the institutional weakness and the 
second is the inadequate economic and political policy reforms. 
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Out of the limited research that studies Oman in-depth, Al-Saqri (2010) tests whether 
or not Oman suffers from the Dutch disease by examining the relationship between the oil 
income and the economic transformation in Oman. He considers several economic factors 
such as the relationship between oil extraction operations and economic development in 
Oman, and the relationship between government expenditure and non-oil GDP growth. He 
concludes that the Omani economy can be characterised as follows: a heavy reliance on the 
hydrocarbon sector activities; the services sector is becoming the second most important 
sector; a very pre-mature industrial sector; hydrocarbon exports account for 85% of Oman’s 
sources of foreign currency; the government depends heavily on oil revenues to finance its 
expenditure; and, finally, because of the economic structure the state is reliant on foreign 
expatriates to fill the gap in labour market demand and to enhance the productivity. The 
situation can be described as a dilemma whereas there is a sharp growth in the expatriate’s 
number is associated with a sharp growth in Omani job seekers. 
 
In addition, Al Abduwani (2013) examines the resource curse symptoms in Oman by 
analysing economic data for the period 1980 to 2011. The research concludes that the oil 
wealth had a positive impact on Oman’s economy from the perspective of GDP growth and 
the GDP per capita growth. However, elements of the resource curse exist in Oman such as 
the Dutch disease. Furthermore, the lack of economic diversification is a critical challenge 
given Oman’s limited oil reserves. 
 
Meanwhile, Titulaer (2010) investigates the economic growth in the GCC countries 
each country individually. The findings in relation to Oman show that that oil sector is the 
main driver of economic growth, followed by the services sector. Furthermore, the 
manufacturing sector does not contribute significantly to economic growth. Another finding 
was that transport and communication sector share in the GDP has increased over time, but 
this sector has no significant effect on economic growth overall. These findings do not 
disclose the impact of each sector on the economic diversification process as the research 
focuses on the impact of each sector’s share of the GDP.  
 
Furthermore, Flamos, Roupas and Psarras (2013) analyse the economic diversification 
efforts in the GCC by testing six different indicators: GDP per capita at market exchange 
rate; hydrocarbon intensity at market exchange rate; value of hydrocarbon exports in relation 
to GDP; value of hydrocarbon imports in relation to GDP; energy intensity; and hydrocarbon 
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share in the primary energy mix. The conclusion is that all GCC economies demonstrated 
very limited diversification, as they are significantly dependent on the hydrocarbon sector 
and the industries associated with it. Furthermore, Figure 3-1  highlights the economic 
concentration index (ECI)11 for a number of countries. Oman scores 0.89 which means that 
Oman has the lowest economic diversification outcome among GCC states. Such findings 
reflect the importance of adopting a structural change that diversifies the economy away from 
the hydrocarbon-related industries.  
 
In addition, Sturm, Strasky, Adolf and Peschel (2008) conclude that Oman is the most 
vulnerable state in the GCC because of the very limited diversification effort. In addition, 
Bahrain and Oman face other critical challenges, such as the depletion of their oil reserves 
and the demographic boom. Furthermore, the authors argue that the GCC countries’ 
traditional employment policies which absorb nationals by employing them in the public 
sector has proven not to be sustainable. The solution might be the development of the non-oil 
private sector, not only to absorb entrants into the labour market but also to protect the 













Figure 3-1: Economic Concentration Index comparison of GCC states vs Norway, 
France, and Germany 
Source: Flamos et al., (2013). 
                                                
11 The ECI was developed by Flamos et al. (2013:363). The index is calculated as a weighted sum of: energy 
intensity, hydrocarbon share in the primary energy mix, hydrocarbon intensity at market exchange rate, value of 
hydrocarbon imports per GDP, value of hydrocarbon exports per GDP, and GDP per capita at market exchange. 
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3.5 Research	Gaps		
The literature review identified several shortcomings with respect to the impact of the natural 
resources in relation to economic diversification policies and which factors influence the 
impacts. The main gaps that require further research are discussed below. 
 
First, the resource curse theory posits only positive or negative impacts on the 
economy. Studies on resource curse theory use cross-sectional analysis to test whether the 
availability of natural resources can be classified as blessing or as a curse. However, this 
study highlights that this dichotomy does not necessarily hold with the impact of resource 
dependency/abundance on economic performance. 
 
Second, the resource curse channels have been studied in isolation from each other 
(see Appendix 1). For example, some researchers concentrate on the resource curse impact in 
terms of human resource development (Gylfason, 2001), while other researchers analyse oil 
dependency impact on the investment structure and capital accumulation (Atkinson & 
Hamilton, 2003; Gylfason & Zoege, 2006). Therefore, this research’s contribution is by 
providing an analysis of the relationship amongst all four channels.  
 
Third, identifying the impact of the resource curse by testing the natural resource 
export revenues share of the GDP or the percentage of total exports is one of the main 
analytical tools used. For example, Boschini et al. (2013) and Sachs and Warner (1995) use 
primary exports as a percentage of GDP, Auty (2007), Collier and Hoeffler (2009) and Ross 
(2006) use the percentage of natural resource export revenues as a percentage of GDP, 
Gylfason (2001) and Gylfason and Zoege (2006) measure the share of natural capital in 
national wealth and Daniele (2011) and Dietz et al. (2007) use the share of mineral exports in 
total exports. However, using macroeconomic data indicators neglects the impact of the other 
channels of the resource curse which are human resource development, the institutional 
quality, and the political and social factors. Furthermore, using these indicators is not suitable 
for Oman, because GDP growth is a function of two conditions. The first is related to the 
increase in the international oil prices over the last 45 years, while the second is related to the 
increase of oil production in Oman. Only a few researchers, such as Coury and Dave (2009); 
Edwik (2007); and Herb (2009), analyse the non-oil GDP growth rate which can highlight the 
real development of the economy by removing the effect of the oil exports. This thesis 
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overcomes this gap by using economic diversification as a proxy for economic performance 
measure. 
 
Fourth, most scholars test the resource curse economic channel using the Dutch 
disease hypothesis. As demonstrated in Section 3.2.1, there are structural differences between 
the Dutch disease characteristics and the situation in Oman. The Dutch disease model 
presumes the existence of an active non-hydrocarbon tradable sector pre-oil which is not the 
case in Oman. Therefore, this thesis not only uses the Dutch disease hypotheses to test the 
economic factors effects on economic diversification but also examines other elements under 
the umbrella of the economic factors such as the private sector’s role in the economy, oil 
price instability, and the government as the main actor in the economy. Furthermore, in 
relation to the Dutch disease hypothesis most studies do not take account of the fact that 
beside the Kuwaiti dinar, which is pegged against a basket of currencies in which the USD 
dollar predominates, the exchange rate in the rest of the GCC countries is fixed against the 
US dollar. This could affect the results of any correlation between the export growth rate and 
the exchange rate, and this might be the reason behind the conclusion of certain research that 
GCC countries do not suffer from the Dutch disease.  
 
Fifth, an important gap identified in the literature review is that despite the growing 
number of studies on the resource curse theory, limited research analyses the resource 
abundance/dependence impact in a single case study. Furthermore, most research on the 
resource curse in the GCC is based on the data that is provided by the governments, which 
might result in a biased result. Moreover, most researchers use oil price fluctuations 
correlated with the nominal exchange rate, which might affect the results, as it should be 
correlated with the real exchange rate. Another issue is that the correlation of the analysis 
includes exports from industries that depend on oil or gas subsidies or using hydrocarbons as 
a raw material for the final product. In other words, such industries cannot be considered as 
independent, and should be considered as part of the hydrocarbon sector. According to Hvidt 
(2013), measuring the progress of the economic diversification in the GCC is difficult. 
However, a number of measures can be applied, including: the ratio of oil export revenue to 
GDP versus non-oil export revenues to GDP; the ratio of oil revenues as a share of the total 
government revenue; the percentage of non-oil exports to total exports; the proportion of 
public sector contribution to GDP versus the contribution of private sector to GDP; and the 
relationship between GDP and oil prices volatility. However, this again focuses on 
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macroeconomic reasons for the failure. This research looks beyond the narrow economic 
focus.  
 
Furthermore, only a limited number of studies analyse Oman’s political economy, 
including Allen and Rigsbee II (2014), Rabi (2011), Reilly (2014), Skeet (1992), Takriti 
(2013), and Valeri (2009). This research fills this gap with its focus on Oman.  
 
3.6 Summary	
This chapter presented the literature review which provided the theoretical foundation for the 
thesis. The chapter started by reviewing the literature regarding the resource curse 
characteristics. The initial resource curse theory framework hypothesises the negative impact 
of the Dutch disease, weak economic growth, institutional performance, and corruption as 
channels of the resource curse which can hinder the economic diversification process. The 
review of the resource curse channels identified the main gaps which have not been 
addressed adequately by previous studies. One of the main observations in this regard is that 
most of the literature focuses on the symptoms, the consequences and how to avoid the 
resource curse. The main conclusion of the latest research is that economic diversification is 
the answer to overcoming the resource curse. 
 
The chapter also critically reviewed the literature on economic diversification 
obstacles in the GCC in general and Oman in particular. The review highlighted the main 
gaps which require further investigation. For example, the resource curse impact in an oil 
dependent state such Oman is not addressed by looking at the different channels of the 
resource curse, rather it is achieved by testing the failure of economic diversification policies 
through macroeconomic analysis. 
 
The next chapter highlights how this thesis addresses and utilises the resource curse 
theory framework to examine the reasons behind the unsuccessful economic diversification in 
Oman. 
  













Chapter 4 Theoretical and Conceptual Framework 
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4.1 Introduction		
This chapter provides the theoretical framework of the thesis by providing the main 
arguments in relation to the resource curse effects on economic diversification efforts in 
Oman. It posits that the availability of large-scale resource revenues can have both positive 
and negative effects. The positive impact is through the availability of the required wealth to 
establish development in a particular state. The negative consequences, which outweigh the 
superficial positive impacts, are felt through the resource curse channels such as weak 
economic performance, institutional inefficiency, inadequate human resource development 
and negative social and political outcomes, which consequently impede the economic 
diversification process. It is this later aspect upon which the thesis focuses. 
 
The discovery of oil in a country provides the means to establish massive socio-
economic transformation. There are two main streams of thought about the impact of a single 
commodity dependency. One believes that the availability of such wealth allows nations to 
introduce a radical transformation in their economic structure that leads to enhancing the 
living standards of its citizens; examples include Norway, Canada, Australia and Botswana. 
In contrast, the second argument posits that the wealth is associated with adverse effects such 
as civil wars, corruption, a lack of democracy and weak economic growth; examples include 
Venezuela, and the oil exporting countries in the Middle East and North Africa.  
 
In the case of the Arabian Peninsula oil wealth has had a massive positive impact in 
certain measures. The massive investment in infrastructure resulted in better standards of 
living (Stevens, Lahn, & Kooroshy, 2015:14). Thus, on this basis oil wealth in the low 
economic development states can be seen as a blessing.12 However, on other measures, the 
picture is less clear cut. The high dependency on a single commodity is associated with 
factors such as the weak performance of the private sector, a lack of human resource 
development and inefficient institutions. 
While natural resources provide low-income countries with a significant 
development opportunity, serious risks are attached to a policy of growth based on 
their extraction, monetization, and domestic consumption. The extractives-led 
growth consensus appears largely blind to those risks (Stevens, Lahn, & Kooroshy, 
                                                
12 According to the World Bank, low-income economies are defined as those with a GNI per capita of 
USD1,025 or less; lower middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between USD1,026 and 
USD4,035; upper middle-income economies are those with a GNI per capita between USD4,036 and 
USD12,475 and high-income economies are those with a GNI per capita of USD12,476 or more (World Bank, 
2017). 
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2015:2).  
Thus, this thesis argues that the effects of such wealth cannot be considered to be only 
a blessing or only a curse. Furthermore, the thesis argues the negative impacts on economic 
performance and sustainable development in the oil -dependent countries is not just limited to 
the effects of the Dutch disease but is a combination of different factors such as institutional 
quality, human resource development and the political system which includes lack of good 
governance. Figure 4-1 summarises the main resource curse channels highlighted by the 
literature survey. This thesis tests the resource curse impact through the four factors of 
economic, human resource development, institutional quality and political and social factors. 
It does so by using Oman as a case study. To my knowledge, no previous studies examine the 
distribution channels of the resource curse. Thus, the contribution of this thesis is achieved 
through expanding the analysis of the resource curse impact by using different models to 
assess the impact on the four channels. The four channels are strongly interconnected, as a 
result it is difficult to analyse how one channel affects the other channels. Overall, I argue 
that the four channels are moving in the same direction simultaneously, although the effects 
are liable to vary across countries. 
 
Figure 4-1: Resource Curse Channels 
Source: Compiled by the author  
 
This chapter is divided into two main sections; the first section provides insights on 
how this thesis implement the resource curse theory framework and its channels. It also 
addresses how the thesis mitigates the critiques raised against the resource curse theory. In 
addition, it highlights the main differences between the concepts of resource dependence and 
resource abundance. Furthermore, it discusses the various measurements of economic 
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macroeconomic tools used by different states to avoid the resource curse and to achieve 
economic diversification. The second section narrows the focus to the four resource curse 
channels. The first sub-section discusses the economic channels mainly through the concept 
of Dutch disease and the private sector involvement in economic activities. The following 
section assesses the argument that institutional quality argument hinders the state’s ability to 
achieve economic diversification. The political and social channels section analyses the 
argument reliance on resource revenues results in issues such as political elite corruption and 
crony capitalism. Finally, the last section focuses on human resource development as an 
element undermining the ability to achieve economic diversification. 
 
4.2 Resource	Curse	Theory	
Gelb (1988) was the first scholar to use the concept of the resource curse in his book ‘Oil 
Windfalls: Blessing or Curse?’. His main argument is that there is a negative correlation 
between oil revenues and economic performance. However, it was in 1994 that Auty (1994) 
used the term’ resource curse’ for the first time in relation to this issue (Ross, 2015:240). 
Auty’s main argument is that resource abundant countries are not able to use the wealth 
efficiently, so that economic performance in these countries is worse than countries without 
natural resources.  
 
In this context, Sachs and Warner (1995, 1997, 2001) test the impact of resource 
abundance on economic performance. They use a cross-sectional analysis to test the 
relationship between oil abundance and economic performance. Sachs and Warner 
empirically confirm the negative relationship between oil abundance and economic 
performance. The results are confirmed by other scholars using different quantitative analysis 
techniques and different country cases (Bulte, Damania, & Deacon, 2005; Gylfason & Zoega, 
2006; Stijns, 2005; Titulaer, 2010). 
 
According to Auty (2002), the discovery of natural resources could assist economic 
development in the early low-income stages. However, in the long-term resource-dependent 
economies experience lower growth rates than those achieved in the non-oil dependent 
countries. In the case of Norway, oil was discovered when the country already had a 
developed economic structure that was not reliant on oil exports, along with a modern 
political system. Thus, the early low-income stage did not apply to Norway. By contrast, the 
Arabian Gulf states demonstrate the best example of the low-income stage in Auty’s 
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argument, which states: “The new evidence suggests that not only may resource-rich 
countries fail to benefit from a favourable endowment, they may actually perform worse than 
less well-endowed countries. This counter-intuitive outcome is the basis of the resource curse 
thesis” (Auty, 2002:1).  
 
Furthermore, Gelb (1988) argues that oil price fluctuations have a harmful effect on 
the oil-dependent states’ economies. For instance, the oil price booms and the subsequent 
massive inflows of revenues encourage states to expand their expenditure to the extent that 
they are not be able to sustain this during low oil price cycles. Thus, the oil price volatility 
weakened the performance of oil-dependent economy compared with their counterparts in 
non-oil states.  
  
Auty and Warhurst (1991) focus on the economic sustainability of the oil-dependent 
countries. They argue that oil dependent countries require more than the conventional 
requirement to achieve sustainable development as “this requires a pragmatic orthodox 
macroeconomic policy”. This is mainly attributed to the lack of proper planning in relation to 
oil depletion. In addition, sustaining development is difficult because of the accumulated 
problems arising from the effects of the Dutch disease, such as exchange rate appreciation 
because of favourable terms of trade and the absence of a proper taxation system. Thus: 
For most mineral economies, sustainable development means first muting the 
potentially corrosive impact of the mining sector in agriculture and manufacturing. 
Attention can then be directed at replacing the depleting asset and reducing 
environmental degradation (Auty & Warhurst, 1991:16). 
 
To understand why the resource curse is more associated with finite resources, it is 
important to identify the main difference between renewable and finite resources. The first 
difference is that finite resources do not require to be produced as they are extracted. The 
nature of the extraction process means that the sector develops independently, virtually 
unrelated to the other economic sectors. Furthermore, oil and gas operations are usually 
capital-intensive industries which means that they do not create a significant number of new 
jobs, relying on a small number of high skill jobs, which have historically gone to expatriates. 
The second difference is because the resources deplete, their impact on the economy is not 
sustainable. Thus, the combination of the two factors should rationally be a driver for 
economic diversification in the oil-dependent states (Humphreys, Sachs, & Stiglitz, 2007). 
However, the resource curse theory does not provide a clear answer to the paradox as it 
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concentrates on the consequences of the resource abundance/dependency. This could be 
partially attributed to the misleading use of concepts of ‘resource abundant’ and ‘resource 
dependent’. Accordingly, the next section highlights the distinctions between the two 
concepts.  
4.2.1 Resource	Dependency	Versus	Resource	Abundance		
According to Brunnschweiler and Bulte (2008), one of the critiques of the resource curse 
thesis is that it does not distinguish between natural resource dependence and natural resource 
abundance. In this context, resource dependence refers to the state’s economic reliance on the 
resource export revenues. It can be measured by the percentage of the resource export 
revenues in relation to GDP, the ratio of resource exports to total exports or the ratio of oil 
revenues to total government revenues. However, resource abundance refers to the 
endowment of natural resources and is measured by estimating the natural resource capital 
per capita. Thus, resource abundance by definition might not pose a similar adverse effect on 
economic performance. For example, Australia, Canada, Norway, Botswana and the USA 
can be classified as resource-abundant economies. In these cases, the availability of the 
resources did not undermine the economic structure as the states were already in the middle 
to high income economic development stage (Torvik, 2009).  
 
In contrast, resource-dependent states are affected by the resource curse symptoms as 
the discovery of the new resources in most of those states occurred when they were in the 
early stage of economic development. Furthermore, natural resource extraction and export 
should not be considered as an economic activity. In reality, it is a change in the assets’ 
portfolio through exchanging the resource for the import of foreign currency. Although, the 
exchange requires labour, capital and technology, hence it is similar to other economic 
activity, finite resources such as oil are eventually depleted. Moreover, the GDP growth rate, 
which might be driven by an increase in the level of oil exports or the price of oil, cannot be 
taken as an indicator of a positive economic growth. Consequently, if the state is dependent 
on the natural resource export revenues, then it is resource dependent.  
 
According to Auty (2002:2): “The mineral economies are defined as those developing 
countries which generate at least 8 percent of their GDP and 40 percent of their export 
earnings from the mineral sector”. However, the IMF sets the barrier higher arguing that a 
state is considered as resource-dependent if the resource exports account for 60% to 95% of 
its total exports. Karl introduces another measure, arguing that a state is resource-dependent 
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if the export revenues account for more than 25% of government revenues (Karl, 2007). On 
such measures over the last half century Oman has been resource-dependent: oil exports 
account for around 62% of the total exports and for between 48% to 85% of the government 
revenues (NCSI, 2013). This clearly indicates Oman is an oil-dependent state, and thus 
susceptible to the resource curse. Figure 4-2 highlights the Omani governments’ dependence 
on oil revenues.  
 
Figure 4-2: Share of Oil and Non-oil Government Revenues 
Source: Compiled by the author using data obtained from (The WB, 2016).  
 
Furthermore, it is important to differentiate between the GDP growth rate and 
economic performance. Since the export of oil started, Oman’s GDP has recorded positive 
growth but this does not necessarily imply that Oman has achieved a good economic 
performance. In reality, the positive growth rate is the result of two main factors: the increase 
in oil production from 121m b/y in 1970 (Alhajri, 2010:46) to 358.1m b/y in 2015 (NCSI, 
2016b:191) and the increase in the oil prices from USD1.4-USD11.5/b in 1970 to USD45-
USD100/b in the last 10 years (Statista, 2017). However, the literature suggests other 
measures, such as the limited growth in the non-oil tradable sectors and high levels of the 
state intervention in the economy, which can lead to the classification of a state to be 
considered as affected by the resource curse. Table 4-1 matches the symptom to the Omani 
case.  
 
Table 4-1: Resource Curse Symptoms in Relation to Oman 
Resource Curse Symptom Confirmation re Oman 
The government is the only recipient for the external 
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The concentration of the investment in the 
development of the resource sector. 
In 2015 the Gross Fixed Capital Formation for 
the hydrocarbon sector represents 42% of the 
total Gross Fixed Capital Formation (NCSI, 
2016b:327)  
Imported goods as there is no local manufacture. The current account of the Sultanate recorded a deficit of OMR4.2bn in 2015 (NCSI, 2016b:236) 
High growth in the non-oil non-tradable sectors The share of services of GDP was 48.9 % in 2015 (NCSI, 2016b:325). 
The state is the primary employer 
48% of the national work force are in the civil 
service (no numbers given for the defence 
employees) (NCSI, 2016b:94) 
High levels of state intervention in the economy 
The average government share of the Gross 
Fixed Capital Formation was 69% for the last 5 
FYDPs(Alhajri, 2010:175)  
High levels of military expenditure 
The average military expenditure from 2000-
2015 was 30% of the total government 
expenditure which represents  an average of 12% 
of the GDP (SIPRI, 2015). 
Limited growth in the non-oil tradable sectors. Low 
growth rate of the non-oil exports 
In 2015 the non-oil exports were only 23% of 
the total exports (NCSI, 2016b:236) 
The oil export revenues represent the biggest share of 
the government revenues 
The average value for revenue minus production 
cost of oil, from 1970 to 2014 was 40.53% of 
GDP (WB, 2014). 
Crony capitalism, corruption, oligopoly and rent 
seeking behaviour which reflects weak institutional 
performance 
In 2016 Oman scored 45/100 in the corruption 
perception index where 0 is highly corrupted 
(Transparency International, 2016). 
High levels of subsidies 
In 2015 subsidies on utility bills, housing loans, 
fuel and other goods are representing 7.8% of 
the state budget (AlArimi, 2015). 
Source: Compiled by the author 
 
4.2.2 Economic	Performance	Measures			
The literature regarding the impact of resource dependency on the economy highlights that 
most studies use two concepts, economic performance and economic diversification, to 
measure the resource curse impact on the economy. This thesis argues that the difference 
between positive economic performance and economic diversification is only in the 
terminology itself. As a result, the thesis does not focus on measuring economic 
diversification efforts in Oman. Furthermore, the core argument of resource curse theory 
refers only to a negative impact on the economy and does not discuss economic performance 
or diversification. Additionally, resource curse theory does not propose a measure in terms of 
economic performance or diversification by which to test for resource dependency. For 
example, Hausmann and Rodríguez (2011:12) examine economic performance by tracing 
non-oil export growth in 10 countries (Mexico, Oman, Bahrain, Indonesia, Saudi Arabia, 
Trinidad and Tobago, Venezuela, Ecuador, Algeria, and Nigeria) in the period 1981 to 2002. 
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Out of the ten countries, only two (Mexico and Indonesia) experienced strong growth in non-
oil exports. The positive growth rates in those sectors compensated the decline in the oil 
exports and generated positive economic growth. Hausmann and Rodríguez’s (2011) findings 
support the argument regarding the importance of non-oil export growth to boost the 
economic growth in oil-dependent states. However, it can be argued that to achieve economic 
diversification the state must develop the non-oil tradable sectors which includes 
manufacturing and exports. Moreover, it includes the spillover effect from the oil sector to 
the other economic sectors.  
 
Many scholars (Busse & Gröning, 2012; Edwik, 2007; Pendergast, Clarke, & Van 
Kooten, 2011) use GDP growth to measure the impact of the natural resource dependency, as 
well as to measure the economic performance. However, this thesis argues that GDP growth 
is not the best measure by which to test the impact of resource dependency for two reasons. 
First, over the past 45 years, oil prices have tended to grow in real terms for example “oil in 
2014 seems to be 50 times more expensive than in 1970” (Smil, 2015), while improvements 
in oil extraction technology has cut the cost of production. This means that the share of oil 
export revenues in the GDP grows. Second, the growth rate of the GDP in the oil-dependent 
states does not reflect a strengthening in the economic performance rather it reflects the 
erosion of the state’s assets (oil reserves) through the increase in its oil production. Other 
measures such as genuine savings are more relevant as this takes into consideration growth in 
all economic activities. However, even such measures are not accurate as there are elements 
that cannot be measured effectively such as human resource development. This only leaves a 
measure that tests the development of the non-oil tradable sector alongside non-oil export 
growth.  
 
The importance of the development of the non-oil tradable sectors as a reflection of 
the real economic development can be seen in countries such as Malaysia, Indonesia, 
Botswana, Canada and Chile (Rosser, 2006). Using this measure is more appropriate than 
measuring human resource development indicators, such as infant mortality for example, as 
measuring the growth of the non-oil tradable sectors will reflect the economic performance 
and development more precisely. Thus, the different measures of the Omani economy are still 
highly dependent on oil revenues. For example, the growth rate on the non-oil exports in 
Oman between 1980 and 2014 was very low whereas the improvement in human resource 
development health indicators was high over the same period.  
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This section highlighted the different methods of measuring economic performance. 
However, in order to arrive at a better understanding of the importance of the existence of an 
overall measure for testing the resource curse impact on a particular economy it is important 
to highlight the consequences of implementing economic policies to avoid the resource curse. 
 
4.2.3 Is	it	all	about	the	Microeconomic	Policies?	
Microeconomic policies are important in helping a country reduce its finite natural resource 
dependency. For example, in 1990 the copper reserves in Zambia were expected to be 
exhausted in 20 years. The Zambian government was aware of the future challenge and the 
importance of enhancing the non-mining tradable sectors by implementing microeconomic 
policies. However, it was unable to achieve this task (Auty, 2002). The Zambian example 
clearly demonstrates the chronic problems of natural resource dependency on the economy 
especially if the country has started to enjoy the fruits of large resource export revenues while 
in the early stage of development. Similarly, Peru attempted to use conventional economic 
tools to overcome copper price fluctuation but this resulted in a poor economic performance.  
 
In contrast, Chile is considered to be a successful example, despite the fact that the 
economy was highly dependent on copper export revenues. The Chilean government 
implemented a consistent policy to overcome the copper price fluctuation and thus mitigate 
price uncertainty and the duration of each price cycle. In addition, as a result of the increased 
investment in the non-mineral tradable sectors, the economy became more diversified and 
less affected by the copper price fluctuations (Auty, 2002). However, Auty (2002) does not 
reveal the process and the tools used by the Chilean government to achieve it success. One of 
the contributions of this study is the analysis of all elements that might affect the state’s 





According to Gelb (1988), the oil-rich countries face critical management problems which 
affect their economic performance at the microeconomic level. Those problems are 
inefficient expenditure policies during booms, the increase in unsustainable patterns of 
expenditure in non-tradable projects, the lack of investment in the non-oil tradable sectors 
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during the booms and the absence of a proper strategy to counter the future oil price 
downswings. In fact, by analysing the oil price booms, it can be observed that since the early 
1970s, the only positive effect of the oil exports on the Omani economy is the increase in 
GDP. However, the increase in the GDP was not associated with comparable increase in the 
non-oil GDP; this observation is not limited to Oman but applies across the entire GCC 
region. In addition, most GCC states tended to increase their subsidy spending during the oil 
price booms but when the oil price fell, there was a lack of countermeasures. However, in 
1986 as a result of the low oil price, the Omani government devalued the exchange rate 
against the US dollar by 10%, and started an austerity programmeme by cutting public 
service benefits to address the critical financial situation (MONE, 1997). Nevertheless, most 
of the austerity measures were eased immediately after the oil prices started to recover.  
The required real depreciation of the exchange rate, cuts in public expenditure and 
increases in non-oil taxes were difficult to implement. Perhaps governments 
expected to be rescued from such unexpected and difficult decisions by a renewed 
oil boom. Overall, the resulting high costs of downswing adjustment in most oil-
exporting countries swamped any gains made during the booms (Auty, 2002:21). 
 
It is clear that without sustainable policies to deal with the oil price fluctuations the 
oil-dependent states could lose the gains made during the boom periods. Economic policy 
reform is believed by many scholars (Hvidt, 2011; Schwarz, 2008; Yousef, 2004;) to be a 
condition by which to achieve sustainable economic development. However, other 
researchers (Arezki & Ploeg, 2007; Roy et al., 2013) attribute the weak economic 
performance to other non-economic reasons. However, it is difficult to isolate the economic 
channels of the resource curse such as the Dutch disease and the role of the private sector on 
economic activities. The following section highlights these two elements. 
 
4.3.1.1 The Dutch Disease 
The Dutch disease can be described as follows: as a result of the oil export revenue inflows, a 
direct positive impact is seen first in the expansion of non-oil non-traded goods such as 
services and construction. The second negative impact is in the non-oil traded sectors such as 
manufacturing, agriculture, and fisheries as employment moves out of these sectors to the oil 
sector and the non-oil non-traded goods sectors (Corden & Neary, 1982). Moreover, 
structuralists, such as Bature (2013), Corden (1984) and Brock Smith (2014) point out that 
there is an appreciation of the exchange rate which results in the decline of the 
competitiveness of the domestically-produced products (and therefore reduces exports) and 
which has an adverse impact on the sustainability of non-oil tradable sectors. Furthermore, 
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the appreciation in the exchange rate cuts the cost of imports, and further reduces the ability 
of the domestic industries to compete. 
 
In the case of Oman at the time of the first oil exports in 1967, there was no 
manufacturing sector. After the regime change in 1970, the priority of the government was to 
enhance the living standards of its citizens and provide an improved level of infrastructure in 
a short period. However, from 1975 the call for economic diversification entered the 
government’s agenda, and it was repeated in each subsequent FYDP. Nevertheless, non-oil 
export growth rate was low: in 1980 it accounted for around 6% of total exports, and in 2014 
it was around 13%. This can be attributed, in part, to the weak industrial sector growth in the 
country. This supports the resource curse argument concerning the non-oil tradable sectors 
development.  
 
4.3.1.1.1 Measuring the Dutch Disease 
Corden and Neary (1982) suggest the use of a “Dutch disease index”13 to calculate and 
measure the economic performance and the non-natural resource tradable economic activities 
development in a particular country. Accordingly, a negative score reflects the existence of 
the Dutch disease effects. However, using such an index in oil-dependent countries might not 
reflect the reality of economic activities because many oil-rich countries established 
manufacturing sectors, such as petrochemicals, which use cheap oil and gas as an input. It is 
difficult to justify considering those industries as a new non-oil input in the economy. The 
Dutch disease index would be more accurate if it included more factors which enable it to 
measure the effectiveness of the production process in each sub-sector in the economy. By 
doing so, the analysis could distinguish between natural resource-related industries and other 
manufacturing exports. 
 
In addition, the Dutch disease argument does not provide sufficient justification for 
the question: why it is difficult for the oil-dependent states to achieve economic 
diversification? By taking Mexico, Malaysia, Indonesia and Norway as examples, one can 
argue that successful economic reform was the result of many factors including: the 
availability of a human critical mass; human resource development; the institutional quality; 
                                                
13 Calculated by measuring the country’s non-mining tradable sectors development. The negative index 
indicates weak development of the non-mining tradable sectors, which reflects the Dutch disease effects (Auty, 
2002:32). 
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low levels of rent-seeking and corruption; and a democratic political system. By taking these 
factors into consideration the researcher can achieve a better analysis and overcome one of 
the main critiques of resource curse theory which highlights the existence of outliers such as 
Botswana and Norway. 
 
4.3.1.1.2 GCC Disease  
In fact, the Dutch disease symptoms tend to be seen in the middle- to high-development 
economies. In contrast, the GCC countries’ economies in the pre-oil era were at a low 
development stage as they contained no significant manufacturing and other non-oil tradable 
sectors. Thus, the employment crowding out effect is not relevant for the GCC countries. In 
addition, it is similar with the non-oil non-tradable sectors as the majority of the development 
in those sectors is associated with oil export operations. Nevertheless, this thesis tests if the 
Dutch disease could be a channel for the resource curse in Oman. However, it is important to 
highlight the main structural differences between The Netherland’s Dutch disease and the 
Omani case. The reality is that the low impact of the crowding out effect from the non-oil 
tradable sector to the oil sector and the pre-mature non-oil tradable sector in Oman makes it 
very difficult to test for the Dutch disease impact on the economic diversification process. 
Additionally, as a result of the low non-oil exports it is rational behaviour for the state to peg 
the exchange rate to the currency in which the revenue from oil exports is gained, the US 
dollar. 
 
Table 4-2 summarises the main differences between the Dutch disease symptoms and 
the economic problems in the GCC countries. It can be seen from the Table that there are 
important structural differences such as the absence of the employment crowding out effect. 
Therefore, this thesis suggests a new concept, termed the GCC disease, to replace the Dutch 
disease for use as a description of the economic structural problems in the GCC countries. 
 
Table 4-2: Comparison of the Dutch Disease and GCC Disease Symptoms 
Dutch disease symptoms GCC disease symptoms 
The increase in the 
resource exports leads to 
an increase in investment 
in the non-tradable sectors. 
The increase in investment in the non-tradable sectors, such as 
construction and financial services, is attributed to the availability 
of resources to invest in infrastructure projects rather than in 
projects related directly to oil operations. 
Employment suffers from 
the crowding out effect 
from the non-oil tradable 
sectors to the oil sector. 
Oil operations tend to be capital intensive which means limited 
demand for employees (in the case of Oman only 2.4% of the total 
national workforce work in the oil sector). Also, the economic 
structure was pre-mature in the pre-oil era, so there was no 
  88 
employment crowding out effect from the other economic sectors 
to the oil sector. Additionally, the availability of expatriates who 
accept a lower wage than nationals means there is no crowding out 
effect. Furthermore, the situation does reflect in an increase in the 
salaries in the private sector. 
Exchange-rate 
appreciation. 
The fact that the GCC countries were in the early development 
economic stage pre-oil means the national currency was set to 
reflect their main export which is, in this case, the oil. 
Negative growth in the 
manufacturing sector. 
There are two sides to the argument: 
1) there was no manufacturing sector in the GCC states in the pre-
oil era. 
2) as a result of their dependency on foreign expats in the 
workforce and the high exchange rate there is no viability in 
establishing a manufacturing sector unless it is highly subsidized. 
Source: Created by the author 
4.3.1.2 Private Sector Involvement in the Economy 
One of the resource curse channels in the economy is the limited private sector participation 
in economic activities. Many scholars (e.g. Cocks & Francken, 2016; Dunning, 2005; Ross et 
al., 2011; Titulaer, 2010) argue that in the GCC countries the involvement of the private 
sector is limited mainly to the non-tradable sectors, which is partially attributed to the public 
sector being the principal actor in the economy. In a well-developed economy, the private 
sector is the leading actor which has a positive impact on the overall economic performance 
as well as on job creation. Thus, Hertog (2013) argues that Norway, Chile, and Indonesia 
managed to escape the resource curse by ensuring a major role for the private sector with the 
government working as a regulator rather than as an investor. However, the situation in the 
GCC countries might not be the result of state intervention in the economy but could be 
related to the political system, rentier mentality or because of the rent-seeking, oligopolistic 
and crony capitalist behaviours from the political elite. In fact, even with the start of neo-
liberalist policies, such as privatisation in the telecommunication and electricity sectors, in 
Oman there are very few successful private sector companies; most of the privatised 
companies are still managed by government officials but within the private sector. According 
to Hertog (2013:1):  
While the Gulf private sector has made huge strides since the first oil boom, most 
of its activities still amount to more sophisticated rent recycling rather than 
autonomous diversification. Its interests are in stark opposition to those of the 
citizenry at large, as it provides no taxes, little employment and few investment 
opportunities for GCC nationals. 
 
4.3.2 Institutional	Quality 
The second channel is that of institutional quality. According to Stevens and Mitchell (2008), 
standard economic theory suggests that the availability of new resources should enhance the 
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economic performance of the state in two ways: the massive revenues would help the state to 
invest in productive and efficient programmes to improve the sustainability of the 
development. The second benefit from the large foreign currency inflow is that it allows the 
state to acquire advanced technology and imported capital goods. However, the effective 
utilisation of such wealth requires knowledge and rational decision-making which in turn 
depends on strong institutions and human capabilities. In effect, Stevens and Mitchell's 
(2008) argument leads to the conclusion that the negative impact of the resource curse is 
related to institutional quality rather than economic practice. 
The standard policy advice for extractives-led growth focuses on governance 
imperatives such as transparency and sovereign wealth funds. But this ignores the 
fact that such growth frequently encourages poor governance. Without strong 
institutions, it leads to the enrichment of minority elite groups; and as the sector 
develops, the interest of those groups in capturing rents and maintaining their hold 
on power acts as a barrier to improving governance (Stevens et al., 2015:3). 
 
Other scholars (Arezki & Ploeg, 2007; Mehlum et al., 2006; Sarmidi et al., 2014) 
argue that strong institutions are the cornerstone of good natural resources management and 
positive economic performance. The logic behind the conclusion is that inefficient 
institutions increase the possibility of rent-seeking and corrupt behaviours. In addition, the 
institutions shape relations between the political elites, society, and the economy. For 
example, Botswana managed to escape the resource curse because of having effective 
institutions that allowed the government to use multi-year economic development plans based 
on a very clear legal framework to protect the implementation of its plans. In contrast, as a 
result of the weak institutions in Venezuela, the country could not achieve sustainable 
economic development and remains vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. However, a number 
of academics (Dunning, 2006b; Oskarsson & Ottosen, 2010; Tsui, 2011) argue that the 
construction of effective institutions requires a high-level of democracy as without an 
embedded electoral system there is lack of checks and balances and accountability. Scholars, 
such as Gylfason (2010), Holden (2013) and Limi (2007) use the example of Norway  and 
Botswana as evidence. However, the counter argument is that states, such as Indonesia where 
democracy is weak, have achieved high levels of economic performance (Alonso & 
Garcimartín, 2013; Mĳiyawa & Ganiou, 2008). In addition, oil-dependent states, such as 
Qatar, are ranked 31 which make it among the most transparent economies in the world 
which reflects low levels of corruption (Transparency International, 2016). Furthermore, 
accountability and checks and balances are not conditionally related to a democratic political 
system. For example, Singapore, which is not very democratic, has achieved high levels of 
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economic performance by implementing strong accountability measures. According to Bulte 
et al. (2005:16) 
Our results confirm a general conclusion emerging from other policy research: that 
the “black box” of good institutions in some way improves economic outcomes. 
However, this generic finding does not by itself provide any firm policy 
prescriptions, nor does it provide any evidence of causal mechanisms. 
 
In this context, the regime type and the relationship between the political elite and the 
public can affect the institutional quality. For example, in the GCC countries, there is a 
vertical relationship between the leaders and the populace, which could block positive 
reforms of the institutions. This is because the political elites benefit from the existing 
arrangement. According to Stevens and Dietsche (2008:7): 
Chances for positive institutional change are lower in countries where society 
features vertical relationships and resource rents are captured by narrow elites. 
These are likely to lobby for the maintenance of existing institutions in order to 
protect narrow sector interests. 
 
This thesis argues that the resource curse’s negative impact cannot be analysed 
through the lens of institutional quality in isolation from the other resource curse channels. It 
is important to reiterate that the channels are interrelated. Thus, regime type has an impact on 
the institutional quality, which in turn is a reflection of the human resource development. The 
next section analyses the third of the four interrelated channels, the political and social. 
 
4.3.3 The	Political	and	Social	Channels	
The political and social channel of the resource curse tends to be analysed using the rentier 
state model. This model has moved the argument concerning the developmental path of the 
oil-dependent states beyond the economic or institutional channels. The main argument of the 
rentier state model is similar to the staples thesis.14 Thus, di John (2011:5) states: “rentier 
state models are part of a growing trend of reviving the staples thesis, the notion that natural 
factor endowments or technology shape the relations of production or institutional evolution 
of a society”. Furthermore, from a political regime stability point of view, the rentier state 
model argues that in most oil -dependent states the leaders use oil export revenues as a 
bargaining power to gain the social acceptance. 
                                                
14 The staples thesis was developed by Howlett, Ramesh and Netherton (1999). The main argument of the thesis 
is that the Canadian economy would benefit from exporting natural resources products and the impact would not 
be limited to the economy but would also have a spillover effect on the social and political environment. 
Additionally, Canada would benefit from exporting the natural products allowing it to import more advanced 
technology. 
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The basic idea behind these models is that there is a substantial cost to the working 
of an economy when the allocation of resources is channelled primarily through 
state leaders, who have discretionary authority, rather than through bargains 
between private economic agents (di John, 2011:6). 
 
Furthermore, the rentier state model posits that in the oil-dependent countries there is 
a high level of government intervention in the economy, high levels of rent-seeking and 
corruption, low levels of governance and a weak taxation system. It argues that the state 
controls the hydrocarbon sector through its ownership of the oil and gas fields and export 
operations, which is the basis for the state becoming the major actor in the economy through 
intervention in most of the economic activities. Additionally, the state assumes responsibility 
for redistributing wealth to its populace in two ways: directly, to the political elites as they 
secure private gains or indirectly to the populace by increasing recruitment in the public 
sector without a real need for such employment. Furthermore, the influence of the political 
elite leads to an increase in rent-seeking activities and corruption as they can manipulate the 
legal system and expand their oligopolistic practices through lowering governance measures. 
The increased levels of corruption, oligopoly, rent-seeking, and crony capitalism have a 
direct negative impact on institutional quality and block reforms that are against the interests 
of the political elite (Ades & Di Tella, 1999; Kutan et al., 2009; Leite & Weidmann, 1999; 
Pendergast et al., 2011; Wei, 1999). 
 
4.3.3.1 The Rentier State Model 
Mahdavy (1970) was the first to ask the question: despite all the wealth windfalls why are 
rentier states not among the fastest growing economies? Mahdavy (1970) attributes the 
answer to the social and political structure in those countries as the pre-mature administration 
was an obstacle to those states utilising the wealth efficiently and productively. The other 
reason posited is related to consumption behaviour, which hinders the growth of domestic 
manufacturing. Government spending becomes the driver of the economy which increases 
demand for certain goods and services, in the non-oil non-tradable sector. This is positive 
from the microeconomic view but if the development is not associated with a similar level of 
growth in the non-oil tradable sector then the overall macroeconomic growth is imbalanced. 
To overcome this economic development paradox, Mahdavy (1970) suggests that oil-
dependent states use the external rents to enhance the manufacturing sector by providing 
subsidies. He argues that the improvement in the manufacturing sector leads not only to an 
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improved economic performance but also enhances knowledge transfer and provides more 
work opportunities. 
 
In the context of the Middle East oil-dependent countries, rentier state theory was 
further developed by Beblawi (1987) and Luciani (1990). They categorised political 
economic systems into ‘allocation states’ and ‘production states’. According to Luciani 
(1990), allocation states are those states which depend mainly on external revenues such as 
oil export revenues or foreign aid. In contrast, he defines the production states as the states 
which are mainly dependent on the domestic economy to generate state income, usually 
through taxation. 
 
The rentier state model developed by Beblawi and Luciani (1987) argues that political 
behaviour can affect the way in which oil export revenues are handled in a particular state. 
According to Beblawi and Luciani (1987), the combination of a lack of a democratic political 
system and the existence of massive oil export revenues underpins the continued existence of 
authoritarian regimes. However, the authors distinguish between two kinds of authoritarian 
regimes. The first is the developmental state, in which the political elite encourages the 
development of the country, while accumulating the wealth. The other model is the predatory 
state, in which the political elite use the oil export revenues for their benefit without focusing 
on state development. Thus, Beblawi and Luciani (1987) overcome one of the main critiques 
of resource curse theory: why are some oil-rich countries, such as Norway, not affected by 
the resource curse? When oil was discovered Norway was already developed economically 
and politically with a high level of transparency and legal framework. This enabled Norway 
to channel oil export revenues through the well-structured economy. In contrast, the GCC 
countries were underdeveloped, authoritarian states and the oil wealth allowed the political 
elite to implement large-scale development plans, while controlling the wealth, i.e. the GGC 
countries could be considered as developmental states.  
 
Additionally, Beblawi and Luciani (1987) provide an analysis of the political issues 
that can appear in the rentier state. One of the major features of the economic structure is that 
the state is the most important actor in the economy and is therefore the major employer, 
especially for nationals. The use of a policy that guarantees government jobs regardless of 
any need weakens the institutional performance of the state. Moreover, the legal framework 
is designed to protect local companies from foreign competition, including requiring foreign 
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companies to establish a partnership with local companies. Eventually, this leads to weak 
competitiveness in the global market and creates a situation in which citizenship becomes a 
financial asset. 
 
In summary, rentier mentality becomes one of the main adverse effects of oil revenue 
dependency. Furthermore, in all GCC countries, the redistribution of wealth is achieved 
through two main channels: the first sees the political elites gain oligopoly status, enabling 
them to control many of the economic activities for their own benefit. The other channel is 
through expanding public sector employment and high levels of social spending which 
mitigate the chances of social unrest and calls for political reform or to counter corruption. 
This creates a sort of unwritten social contract between the elite and populace. However, 
Okruhlik (1999) argues that the regime’s control over the oil export revenues might not be 
the only reason behind the high level of political stability in the GCC countries. Furthermore, 
the stability of the political system could change if the state does not manage to sustain such 
wealth distribution; a similar argument is also proposed by Davidson (2013). In addition, the 
employment boom in the public sector can undermine public sector performance for a 
number of reasons. The most important are: the lack of incentive to increase productivity as 
employment is not subject to performance targets but is the result of rights granted by the 
regime. In turn, this affects recruitment for the private sector as government employment is 
financially more rewarding while the workload is lower than in the private sector. 
 
4.3.3.1.1 Rentier State Critiques 
According to di John (2011), there are a number of loopholes in the rentier state arguments. 
For example, rentier state theory does not explain why certain resource-abundant countries, 
such as Botswana, Malaysia, Venezuela and Nigeria, have achieved positive average growth 
rates. Second, there is no clear evidence that resource-abundant countries experience higher 
levels of corruption and rent seeking activities than non-resource abundant economies. 
Furthermore, the theory cannot explain why resource-abundant countries such as Norway and 
Australia are not considered as rentier economies. 
 
In answer to the critiques, it is important to take into account the distinction discussed 
in Section 4.2.1 between resource-abundant and resource-dependent states. This thesis argues 
that the rentier state model is relevant when discussing resource-dependent but not 
necessarily resource-abundant states. Thus, Botswana and Malaysia as resource-abundant 
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states have a diversified economy; thus, the important variable is economic diversification 
rather than the GDP growth rate. Furthermore, high levels of rent-seeking and corruption 
cannot be isolated from other resource curse channels such as institutional quality. Relatedly, 
the governance system in resource-abundant countries such as Norway and Australia has a 
high level of the institutional efficiency which protects the economy from rent-seeking and 
corruption practices. In terms of levels of corruption, there is a clear difference between 
resource-dependent and resource-abundant countries.  
 
This thesis uses the rentier state model as one of the resource curse channels that 
impedes economic diversification in Oman. The thesis focuses on the political elements of 
the rentier state and therefore analyses the use of oil revenues as a tool by which the regime is 
able to gain legitimacy and to achieve social support and political stability. However, taking 
the rentier state model in isolation from the other channels is not sufficient to explain the 
issues. For example, the rentier state model is not able to explain the weak private sector 
performance in the oil-dependent countries in isolation from institutional quality. Logically, 
the private sector in any country should work with the government to maintain the exchange 
rate that helps the competitiveness of their exports in international markets. However, in the 
oil-dependent states the impact of the crony capitalism, the lack of proper governance and the 
fact that most private sector activities are in the non-oil non-tradable sectors means that real 
exchange rate appreciation continues despite the downside effects on the non-oil tradable 
sectors. This argument can only be analysed through the institutional quality channel in 
relation with the rentier state model.  
 
Furthermore, this thesis argues that a generalisation derived from the rentier state 
model can be challenged as there are a number of oil-dependent states, such as Qatar (ranked 
31) and UAE (ranked 24), amongst the most transparent countries internationally 
(Transparency International, 2016). Thus, the resource curse argument that oil-dependent 
countries were not able to achieve economic diversification because of high levels of 
corruption is not valid. The examples of Norway, Botswana, Canada and Australia also 
contradict the argument. Those countries could diversify their economy, despite being 
resource-abundant states.  
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4.3.4 Human	Resource	Development	
The final channel of the resource curse is lack of human resource development, which has 
only recently received attention from scholars. This can be attributed to the fact that human 
resource development could be influenced by other resource curse channels such as economic 
factors which can limit investment in education or the institutional quality. Furthermore, the 
political and social factors highlighted by the rentier state model could indirectly contribute 
to a negative relationship between the rentier state and the level human capital investment. As 
can be seen from the Table in Appendix 1 only a few scholars (Blanco & Grier, 2012; 
Elissaios, Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2007; Daniele, 2011; Gylfason, 2010) link human resource 
development with the resource curse. Their main conclusion is that there is a negative 
relationship between resource dependency and human resource development. Furthermore, 
most of the literature treats human resource development as a by-product of the overall 
economic performance. In contrast, Gylfason (2010) argues that wealth abundance can lead 
to education being deprioritised. In addition, he finds that the poor quality of education is the 
primary channel of the resource curse concerning sustainable development (Gylfason, 2010). 
Logically, the availability of a proper education system should minimise the adverse effects 
of resource dependency, such as corruption and institution performance. 
 
Accordingly, this thesis follows Gylfason’s (2010) argument about the importance of 
the weakness of human capital development as a resource curse channel. In the case of 
Oman, government expenditure on education represented 12.8% of total government 
spending similar to Estonia (13.9%) and Singapore (11.6%) (MOE & WB, 2013:183). 
However, the labour market in Oman faces a paradox. Despite an increase in youth 
unemployment levels, there has also been a sharp growth in expatriate employment. Other 
challenges facing human resource development in Oman include the government being the 
main employer and financial incentives in the public sector being much higher than those in 
the private sector. Therefore, most Omani graduates prefer to work in the public sector. 
Moreover, according to the Omani Minister of Education, even though the levels of education 
in Oman have improved impressively since 1970, in recent years the education quality has 
started to deteriorate “there are still persistent issues concerning the quality of student 
achievement that need to be addressed” (MOE & WB, 2013:6).  
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4.4 Summary	
In summary, this thesis provides a deeper analysis of the issue of economic diversification in 
Oman through the four channels of resource curse identified: 1) the economic channel, 
primarily through Dutch disease theory; 2) the political and social factors, through the rentier 
state approach; 3) human resource development; and 4) institutional quality. This thesis 
argues that the four channels are interconnected and move simultaneously in the same 
direction. This thesis also analyses if one any channel has a larger impact than the other 
factors.  
 
One of the main contributions of this thesis is through the analysis of the interaction 
between the resource curse channels. For example, how the political and social factors affect 
the institutional quality and the human resource development. The analysis is based on the 
fact that the decision-making process in Oman is vertical. Therefore, even if the Sultan were 
willing to reform the economic structure, the political elite can hinder reforms that they 
perceive to be against their interests. Furthermore, no previous study that assesses the 
economic channel of the resource curse highlights the linkages between the economic 
elements and the political and social environment. 
  



















Chapter 5 Methodology  
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5.1 Introduction	
The aim of this chapter is to describe the processes and procedures used in the thesis in order 
to collect the data to help identify what factors hindered Oman’s ability to achieve economic 
diversification from its dependency on oil revenues. The chapter also highlights the rationale 
behind the case study selection as well as the methods used throughout the research. This 
thesis fills a gap in the literature through the analysis of the data related to Oman over the 
previous 45 years regarding the impact of oil dependency on the economic performance in a 
single state. Although the thesis focuses on Oman there are similarities with the other GCC 
states. As a result the research can help identify the factors that also hinder those states’ 
ability to attempt a similar diversification process. Furthermore, the research questions which 
this thesis raises have not been addressed in the context of oil-dependent states or Oman. 
Because of the limited data available to answer the research question it was necessary to use 
three different techniques for data collection; semi structured interviews, focus groups and 
primary and secondary data from official state publications, IMF and World Bank 
publications, and the British archives. 
 
Furthermore, the single case study contributes to the literature as it explains the 
resource curse impact on the economy from different angles. According to Van Evera 
(1997:22), “we select cases where the phenomenon we seek to explain is abundant but its 
known causes are scarce or absent”. The primary objective of this research is to explain the 
obstacles preventing economic diversification in Oman from the perspective of resource 
curse theory. To arrive at a better understanding of that phenomena, the researcher conducted 
a comprehensive review of the literature in order to extract the main elements that might 
prevent an oil-dependent country from achieving economic diversification. The literature 
review allowed the researcher to draft a set of questions in order to guide the research. The 
research question is: even though Oman was the first country in the region to implement an 
economic diversification strategy, why has little been achieved in this regard? The research 
explores four major elements, which have previously been studied separately by other 
researchers but have never been investigated collectively in a single case study.  
 
This chapter elaborates the methodology as well as data collection used in the research. 
The first section covers the selection of the case study as the main methodology in this 
research. The second section reviews the first data collection method, which includes the use 
official documents such as annual reports, the annual budget, the Central Bank of Oman 
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reports, and the FYDPs. The second method of data collection is semi-structured interviews, 
and the third is focus groups. The semi-structured interviews and the focus groups were 
conducted in Oman and the UK between January and August 2016. The third section 
elaborates on the data analysis. The limitations and difficulties related to the methodology are 
discussed in the final section.  
 
5.1 The	Methodology	
The research is based on qualitative methodology in order to explore if economic factors, the 
lack of human development, inefficient institutions, or social and political elements hinder 
the state’s ability to achieve economic diversification. In contrast, most studies that study the 
resource abundant effects in a particular state adopt a quantitative methodology (Cherif & 
Hasanov, 2014; Fasano, 2003; Karl, 2007; Ross, 2001). Therefore, the qualitative 
methodology of testing the Omani case is one of the contributions of this thesis to the 
literature. Furthermore, by adopting such a research method the researcher can achieve a 
better understanding of the effects of each element on economic diversification.  
 
According to Creswell (2003), one of the main reasons for conducting a qualitative 
study is the exploratory nature of the research, especially if such a phenomena has not been 
analysed previously. Furthermore, as in the case of this research when there is a lack of 
theory or if the extant theories do not provide an adequate explanation of the phenomena, 
then qualitative research is a strong approach. From a comprehensive exploration of the 
literature, no studies focus mainly on the obstacles to economic diversification in Oman from 
the perspective of resource curse theory. Finally, according to Denzin and Lincoln (1994:3-4) 
by using the qualitative research methods the research can utilise a broad range of interlinked 




According to Yin (2013), the term case study refers to the unit of research whether it is an 
event organization or an individual. Yin (2013:23) defines the case study research method as 
an “empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life 
context; when the boundaries between the phenomenon and its context are not clearly 
evident; and in which multiple sources of evidence are used”. It is a scientific research 
method that is used to study contemporary phenomena through real-life contexts. Tellis 
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(1997) defines the case study as a research tool that is concerned with how and why things 
happen. This method allows the researcher to arrive at an understanding of the actors’ 
perspectives and behaviours, in contrast with quantitative statistical results. The case study 
approach is a robust research method that has been tested across different disciplines, such as 
government affairs, education, and management. For example, case study method might be 
the best application to test the efficiency of a particular government programme and whether 
it achieved its goals or not (Zainal, 2007). 
 
The case study method provides the researcher with the ability to examine the case 
within a particular context. A case study can be the best method to research a phenomenon in 
a small geographical area or to test the interaction among a limited number of cases. It 
provides the ideal tools to explore and investigate the phenomena through wider contextual 
analysis. It can also help the researcher to identify the cause and effect interaction and the 
relationship between different variables. Furthermore, it provides a systematic way of 
identifying and observing events throughout the research process starting from collecting the 
data to a detailed examination of the results through to the analysis. Furthermore, the 
researcher can analyse in detail the operation of the causal mechanism.  
 
In addition, the case study can provide the researcher with the ability to explore the 
causal mechanism. According to George and Bennett (2005:59),  
Case studies examine the operation of causal mechanisms in individual cases in 
detail. Within a single case, we can look at a large number of intervening variables 
and inductively observe any unexpected aspects of the operation of a particular 
causal mechanism or help identify what conditions present in a case activate the 
causal mechanism.  
Furthermore, there are two other key benefits associated with this method. First, it provides 
the researcher with a high level of conceptual validity, which is why the case study approach 
is used in political economy research as it provides the possibility of analysing unmeasurable 
variables. The other advantage of the case study is its inquisitive nature allows the 
identification of new variables throughout the study ( George & Bennett, 2005; Zainal, 2007). 
 
All the advantages of the case study approach are well-suited for this research. The 
ability to explore the causal mechanism allows the researcher to establish which element 
might have a greater impact on the government’s ability to achieve economic diversification. 
Furthermore, the case study methodology helps the researcher examine the concepts 
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thoroughly. For example, do the characteristics of Dutch disease correspond with Oman’s 
economic structure or they might there be other explanations? In addition, even though a 
thoroughly established theoretical framework helps the researcher conduct the analysis, there 
is a possibility that during the research process the researcher might identify new variables 
that also impact the Omani economic diversification process. 
 
One of the frequent criticisms of the case study is its dependency on a single case, 
which might lead to a difficulty in generalising the results. However, arguably the restricted 
nature of the case study as a research method is not a disadvantage. On the contrary, the 
fundamental purpose of case study research is to identify the causal interaction between 
different variables in order to arrive at a better understanding of the phenomenon being 
studied. The researcher is using the case study precisely to have an in-depth understanding of 
the particular case, which means it is not necessary to achieve results that can be generalised 
to other cases (Bryman, 2006). Moreover, according to George and Bennett (2005:233), “a 
researcher may study a few cases or even one case and uncover a new causal mechanism that 
proves applicable to a wide range of cases”. In this context, Oman has many similarities with 
the other GCC countries in terms of their dependency on a single resource revenue, the 
regime type, the economic structure and the social fabric. Thus, although, the aim is not to 
produce findings that can be generalised, the causal mechanism between oil dependency and 
economic reform could be similar in the other GCC countries. 
 
This research explores the causal mechanisms in order to identify which element has 
the greatest influence on the Omani government’s efforts implement a policy of economic 
diversification. In this context, the case study approach is deemed the most appropriate. 
There are many advantages of using a case study in political economy research. The case 
study can provide a high level of theoretical validity because the variables cannot be 
quantified. In addition, the case study allows the researcher to discover new variables. 
According to George and Bennett (2005:31), “case study researchers are more interested in 
finding the conditions under which specified outcomes occur and the mechanisms through 
which they occur, rather than uncovering the frequency with which those conditions and their 
consequences arise”.  
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5.3 Case	Selection		
According to George and Bennett (2005:83), the case study should be selected on the basis of 
the research objective. Those objectives are highlighted by Van Evera (1997:55) as testing 
theory, creating theory, identifying antecedent, testing the importance of these antecedent 
conditions and explaining cases of intrinsic importance. By choosing Oman as a case study 
this research focuses on explaining areas of fundamental importance such as: oil dependency; 
very limited oil reserves; the first country in the region to announce strategic development 
plan that economic diversification was one of its main pillars; and 80% of the population are 
under 35 years old—all of which make Oman an interesting case study. Using the process-
tracing15 approach gives the research an advantage, because it is investigating the existing 
theories related to the resource curse. Furthermore, George and Barnett (2005:215) argue that 
by using this approach the research can explain any deviant aspects not predicted or 
explained thoroughly by the existing theories. Furthermore, according to Van Evera 
(1997:55), the case study approach can be the most appropriate way to test an explanatory 
hypotheses or if the case is overlooked and was never studied in-depth. In this context, 
Chapter 3 demonstrates that several existing theories have attempted to diagnose if a set of 
countries or a single country is infected by the resource curse or whether the oil export 
revenues are a curse or a blessing. Scholars define the primary outcomes of a country’s 
dependency on point source resource revenues. However, there is a gap in the literature 
regarding the fundamentals of the resource curse effects in a single country. 
 
Furthermore, the studies on the resource curse theory overlook Oman. Thus, Oman is 
an ideal case study to build an understanding of the implications of the resource curse in the 
economy for several reasons. In 1976, Oman was the first of the oil-producing countries in 
the region to implement an economic diversification strategy. Furthermore, in 1996, Oman 
was the first country in the region to draft a long-term strategy which included economic 
diversification as one of its main pillars. In addition, the Omani government was aware of the 
limited oil reserves and the complexity of the oil fields in Oman, which was the primary 
driver behind implementing the FYDPs that include economic diversification as one of their 
main pillars. However, little has been achieved in this regard and the oil revenues still 
account for more than 85% of government revenues.  
 
                                                
15 See Section 5.6. 
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5.4 Data	Collection		
Resource curse theory diagnoses the oil dependency impact on a country’s economy. 
Furthermore, the theory suggests that oil-rich countries are unlikely to be able to achieve 
economic diversification (Auty, 2002a). In addition, other scholars who focus on point 
resource dependency conclude that countries who depend on single commodity export 
revenues are more likely to have poor human resource development, inefficient institutions, 
crony capitalism and suffer from Dutch disease (Beblawi, 1987; Hertog, 2010a; Humphreys 
et al., 2007; Manning, 2004; Stevens et al., 2015). Because of the complexity of the research 
topic, this thesis combines each element in a single case study of Oman. To do so, the 
researcher considers it important to use three different qualitative methods to create a 
comprehensive picture of the economic, social, and political environment in Oman. The first 
method is the use official documents, the second method is semi-structured interviews, and 
the third is focus groups. According to Olsen (2004:3), the researcher can achieve a high 
level of validity by incorporating different research methods for data collection, a process 
termed ‘triangulation’. By implementing this technique, the researcher is able to compensate 
for any weaknesses in one method by the strengths in the other methods. In addition, 
triangulation helps the researcher overcome any risks of selection bias that could be 
associated with the sample selection technique. According to Mays and Pope (2000:51), 
“Triangulation may, therefore, be better seen as a way of ensuring comprehensiveness and 
encouraging a more reflexive analysis of the data”.  
 
5.4.1 Official	Documents	
According to Brayma (2004:386), the researcher can use official documents as a direct source 
of data. In relation to the thesis the official government documents of importance are mainly 
related to economic planning such as: the annual budget plans; the FYDPs; the sectoral 
budget allocation; the annual Statistical Year Book; the Quarterly Statistical Bulletin from the 
first FYDP issued in 1976 to the current ninth FYDP; and the results of the General Census 
of Population, Housing and Establishments. In addition, data is sourced from the World 
Development Indicators published by the World Bank (World Bank, 2015), the Human 
Development Reports published by the UN and the Handbook of International Trade and 
Development Statistics issued by the UN Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD, 
2014). Another source is the National Archive of the UK government. In addition, the thesis 
used the Special Collection of Donald Hawley Papers at Durham University Library. 
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5.4.2 Semi-Structured	Interviews	
The second method of data collection is semi-structured interviews. The researcher prepared 
questions for the semi-structured interviews following a comprehensive review of the 
previous research on resource curse, rentier state and the paradox of plenty theories (See 
Appendix 2). The semi-structured interviews were conducted between January and August 
2016. The interview questions were divided into four core elements:  
• The economic effects: including the Dutch disease impact on the economy, the 
crowding out effect and oil price volatility.  
• The lack of human resource development: including the gap between general 
education outcomes and labour market demand, the lack of vocational training and the 
outcomes of the Omanisation process, in particular the sectors in which a high level of 
Omani employment is present.  
• Institutional performance and the weakness in government productivity.  
• Social and political elements: the social environment is related to rentier mentality, 
and the political environment including crony capitalism.  
Furthermore, each set of interview questions was associated with a questionnaire containing 
11 ‘yes/no’ questions to allow the researcher to quantify the answers. The questionnaire was 
drafted to cover the relevant points in relation to the research. 
 
5.4.2.1 Pilot Study 
According to Burnham, Lutz, Grant, et al. (2008:39), a pilot study is an important step in any 
research as it helps the researcher test the interview questions. This process reveals if any are 
ambiguous, meaningless or embarrassing questions. It also helps the researcher to discover if 
there are new issues that could be included, as well as if there are questions that are 
unsuitable. The other advantage of the pilot interviews is that it provides training for the 
researcher and prepares them for interviewees’ reaction to certain questions (Burnham et al., 
2008). 
 
Due to the sensitivity of the research, the researcher conducted four pilot interviews to 
overcome any conceptual and definitions of problems in the wording of the questions. It also 
helped the researcher to obtain feedback regarding the research questions and the interview 
questions. For example, in the pilot phase the researcher used the terms ‘crony capitalism’ 
and ‘political elite corruption’. However, the feedback helped the researcher to rephrase the 
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questions to ensure they would not trigger any discomfort for the interviewee; for example, 
questions regarding the quality of the government performance and political elite corruption.  
 
5.4.3 Focus	Group		
The third method of data collection was through focus groups. Morgan (1996) defines focus 
groups as a research technique that collects data through the discussion of a particular topic 
determined by the researcher (See Appendix 3). The interaction between different specialised 
individuals helps the researcher gain a better understanding of the phenomena under study. A 
focus group usually consists of six to ten individuals, who probably did not know each other 
previously, in a formal setting. One of the main advantages of a focus group is that helps the 
researcher triangulate the data. In addition, it provides the researcher with a better 
understanding of the phenomena by being involved in a direct discussion with experts who 
provide their own opinions. According to Morgan and Krueger (1993), the group effect can 
lead to a better discussion among the participants as they tend to explain themselves to each 
other which can provide valuable data. Furthermore, the researcher can ask the participants 
for clarification of their experience.  
 
The researcher organised a focus group discussion in two of the capital city’s cultural 
venues. The attendees were Omanis and non-Omanis from the private sector, journalists, 
NGOs and top-level government officials. In preparation for the discussion, the researcher 
provided the group with a short description of the research objectives and definitions of some 
of the concepts used in the research, such as crony capitalism, Dutch disease, crowding out 
effect and rentier mentality. The researcher translated the concepts into Arabic as that 
language was used in the discussion. The researcher performed the role of moderator. The 
group discussed four main topics: the impact of the economic factors in the economic 
diversification process; the impact of the human resource development in the economic 
diversification process; the impact of government performance in the economic 
diversification process; and the effects of the rentier mentality and the crony capitalism in the 




According to Marshall (1996), the ‘judgement sample’ (also known as the purposeful sample) 
is one of the most common sampling techniques as it allows the researcher to select 
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individuals who could provide knowledge to help provide a comprehensive answer to the 
research question. This selection strategy is suitable for political economy research as the 
sample is not based on demography, age, gender or social class. The technique is based on 
selecting individuals who have the necessary experience and expertise. 
 
In the first stage of the semi-structured interviews, the researcher selected four 
interviewees to conduct the pilot study interviews to help create the selection criteria for the 
participants. This approach helped the researcher to overcome any bias such as response or 
recruitment and ensured that each participant could provide the relevant data. The selection 
criteria for the participants were:  
• Been working in the government or the private sector for more than 15 years. 
• Been actively involved in national level committees. 
• Been specialised in one of the fields under study such as the economy, education and 
government policies. 
• Have experience or knowledge of the issue/s being addressed in the research 
(Oppong, 2013). 
 
Following the pilot interviews, the researcher started to implement a snowball 
sampling procedure. Noy (2008:330) defines snowball sampling as: 
when the researcher accesses informants through contact information that is 
provided by other informants. This process is, by necessity, repetitive: informants 
refer the researcher to other informants, who are contacted by the researcher and 
then refer her or him to yet other informants, and so on.  
Furthermore, snowball sampling is an appropriate procedure that allows the researcher to 
access groups which enjoy the status of social/political elites (Noy, 2008:330).  
 
To overcome any potential bias in the sample, the researcher did not only rely on 
interviewees suggested by the informants. The researcher used a parallel snowball sampling 
procedure through his network of friends and relatives to contact other interviewees. This 
approach served to minimise sample frame bias and allow relevant stakeholders to be 
involved. The importance of including stakeholders from each of the important sectors in 
Oman not only helps capture the relevant insights but also increases the reliability and the 
validity of the data, which in turn is reflected in better research quality (Mays & Pope, 2000). 
In addition, having more than one sampling procedure provides the opportunity to overcome 
any withdrawals of participants as it is easier to find a replacement. 
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According to Mason (2010:1): “Qualitative samples must be large enough to assure 
that most or all of the perceptions that might be substantial are uncovered, but at the same 
time if the sample is too large data becomes repetitive and, eventually, superfluous”. In this 
context, the researcher did not determine the number of interviews at the outset but used the 
‘saturation principle’. According to Mason (2010:8), the saturation principle is where the 
researcher continues with data collection until there is no new information being produced 
from the interviews. There are two measures to ensure saturation. The first is defined by 
Mason as the diminishing return of information where no new inputs or different perspectives 
are being produced by the interviews. The researcher realised that he reached this point after 
the 36th interview. However, five more interviews were conducted to confirm that the 
interviews had reached the saturation level. The second measure is to check if the researcher 
can achieve the objectives of the study, which was the case for this research. However, the 
researcher kept an open window with each of the participants in case of future 
communication concerning his research. 
 
Table 5-1 and Figure 5-1 demonstrate the distribution of participants by sector. Thirty 
nine percent are from the public sector, 22% from the Majlis Oman including interviewees 
from the State Council. The selection criteria for State Council members is based on (TOG, 
1996): 
• Former ministers, undersecretaries and their equivalents. 
• Former ambassadors. 
• Former senior judges. 
• Retired senior officers. 
• Those who are known for their competence and experience in the fields of science, 
arts and culture, and professors of universities, colleges, and higher institutes. 
• Dignitaries and businesspeople. 
• Persons who have performed distinguished services for the nation. 
• Whomsoever His Majesty the Sultan chooses and who does not fall under the 
preceding categories. 
Yin (2013:90) highlights the importance of interviewing the key policy makers as “such 
persons not only provide with insights into a matter but also can suggest sources of 
corroboratory or contrary evidence”. Consequently, the participants represent the main 
stakeholders in the economic, political and social decision-making processes in Oman. For 
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example, some interviewees from the private sector are also board members on government 
owned companies (GOCs) or retired top-level government officials. Additionally, two of the 





Table 5-1: Interviewee Distribution by Sector 
Sector Number of interviewees Reference code Total 
Majlis Oman16 
Three: members of the Majlis Al Shura Council 
MO 
3 
State Council (Majlis Al Dawla) 
One: The Speaker 
Four: members 
One: Special advisor in education affairs  
6 
Public sector 
Five: Ministerial level 
Two: undersecretaries 
Three: senior advisors 
Six: director generals 
GOI 16 
Private sector 
One: Ex Head of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry.  
Two: Board member of the Chamber of Commerce and Industry. BI 
3 
Four: CEOs 
Two: Businesspeople 6 
Academics Three: assistant professor AI 3 
Journalists 
One: online newspaper 




Source: Compiled by the author.  
 
	
Figure 5-1: Interviewee Distribution by Sector 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
 
                                                
16 Oman has a bicameral legislature system: Majlis Al Dawla (State Council) in which members are nominated 
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5.5.2 Focus	Groups			
After conducting several semi-structured interviews, the researcher asked the participants if 
they could help to organise focus groups. The selection for the participants in each focus 
group was similar to the selection criteria for the semi-structured interviews. All the 
participants in the focus groups have worked in either the public or private sector for more 
than 15 years and have experience and knowledge about the Omani economy, as well as the 
research topics. Unfortunately, the researcher was only able to conduct two focus groups for 
reasons which are highlighted in the limitations section in this chapter.  
 
Table 5-2 and Table 5-3 summarise the participants in the focus groups, which were 
conducted in two different cultural venues in the capital city Muscat. The discussions in both 
focus groups lasted for two hours and were recorded, at the same time notes were taken. A 
copy of the questionnaire was handed to the participants allowing the researcher to quantify 
their views regarding the research elements. 
 
Table 5-2: First Focus Group Participants by Sector 
Sector Number of participants Reference code Total 
Government Two undersecretaries FGO 2 
Oman Chamber of Commerce 
and Industry Two board members FPS 2 




Journalist Two FJ 2 
Total 10 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
 
Table 5-3: Second Focus Group Participants by Sector 
Sector Number of participants Reference code Total 
Government One senior advisor FGO 1 
The Omani Economic Association Two board members FNGO 2 
Government owned company 
(GOC) One CEO FGOC 
1 
Majlis Al-Shura One member FMO 1 
Journalist Two FJ 2 
Total 7 
Source: Compiled by the author.  
 
5.6 Method		
This research aims to undertake an in-depth analysis of the obstacles to achieving economic 
diversification in Oman. To do so, it is essential to use an analysis technique that can explain 
the relationships between the outcome (the unsuccessful efforts to achieve economic 
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diversification) and the potential causal variables: the human resource development; the 
economic factors; the quality of the government institutions; and the social and political 
factors. The researcher employs the process-tracing method, which is defined by Collier 
(2011:1) as “the systematic examination of diagnostic evidence selected and analysed in light 
of research questions and hypotheses posed by the investigator”. The process-tracing 
technique is one of the best methods by which to test the causal interaction between different 
variables. According to Beach and Pedersen (2013:2), the process-tracing method allows the 
researcher to identify, validate and test the causal mechanism in a theoretically informed way. 
Additionally, the implementation of the process-tracing method allows the researcher to 
investigate if the outcome of a particular case is the result of the intervening variables in that 
case (George & Bennett, 2005:21). 
 
Furthermore, the process-tracing method can be used for theory testing, theory 
building, and explaining outcomes (see Figure 5-2). The theory testing and theory building 
process-tracing aim to develop a framework that could generalizable. However, this research 
is based on a case study as it focuses on a particular case and it is not seeking to infer results 
that can be generalised (Beach & Pedersen, 2013:169). In this context, the ‘explaining 
outcome process tracing method’ is deemed to be more suitable as it allows an in-depth 
investigation of a case under study (see Figure 5-2). According to George and Bennett 
(2005:12, 20)  
Process tracing can help to assess whether each of the potential causal variables in 
the imperfectly matched cases can, or cannot, be ruled out as having causal 
significance. Process-tracing is particularly useful for obtaining an explanation for 
deviant cases, those that have outcomes not predicted or explained adequately by 
existing theories. 
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Figure 5-2: The Different Variants of Process-Tracing 
Source: Beach and Pedersen (2013:13) 
 
As can be seen from Figure 5-3 the four elements could have a causal effect on the 
government efforts to achieve economic diversification. However, those variables are not 
isolated from each other as they are interlinked. Thus, it is important to test whether if one of 
the variables has an intervention or part intervention as that will also help to identify the 
cause and the effect.  
 
 
Figure 5-3: The Interlinking/Casual Relationship between the Different Factors 
Source: Compiled by the author. 	
 
Thematic analysis is used to assess the output of all 41 semi-structured interviews, as 
well as the two focus groups. The thematic analysis technique helped the researcher identify 
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the patterns within the transcripts, based on the four main themes, which become the main 
groups for the analysis. The grouping provided the researcher with a clear description on how 
to carry out the analysis and also helped to determine what is important to answer the 
research question (Boyatzis, 1998) without being trapped in the “epistemological vacuum” 
(Braun & Clarke, 2006:12). Thus, the interview transcripts were coded into four main 
themes: political and social factors; institutional quality; economic factors; and human 
resource development. This helped the researcher to organise and describes the data; it also 
helped to identify any emerging themes that might be embedded in the transcripts. 
Furthermore, coding the data allowed the researcher to find and isolate the interlinking 
relationship/causal relationship between the different themes (see Figure 5-3). 
 
According to Boyatzis (1998), the development of the themes and codes must be in a 
particular order. The first step is the familiarisation with the transcripts and the data as that 
help to reduce the volume of raw information. The second step is the identification of the 
main themes and the sub-themes. However, this thesis is based on analysing four different 
factors and the semi-structured interviews questions been drafted accordingly. Thus, the set 
of four main themes were allocated during the process. Boyatzis (1998) recommends asking 
someone else to do a coding sample to ensure the reliability of the coding. The researcher 
followed that recommendation by asking another researcher to code a sample of the transcript 
to test the extent of agreement on the themes coding. Furthermore, for more confidence on 
the reliability the researcher constructed a codebook that included all the main and sub-
themes and which highlighted what content would be included in each theme. 
 
The researcher uploaded all the semi-structured interviews and the focus group 
discussions transcripts into the qualitative data analysis software NVIVO. According to 
Welsh (2002), “using qualitative data analysis software serves to facilitate an accurate and 
transparent data analysis process whilst also providing a quick and simple way of counting 
who said what and when, which in turn, provides a reliable, general picture of the data and its 
add rigour to qualitative research”. By rereading the transcripts multiple times and coding the 
text according to the main themes, sub-themes emerged (see Figure 5-4). The main themes 
and sub-themes were then used to choose extracts that could represent the participants’ views 
regarding a particular issue or to demonstrate the explanation provided by the participants. 
Furthermore, the extracts explained how the project/issue was dealt with by the government, 
or the participants’ opinions regarding individuals/institutions performance. As suggested by 
  113 
Corden and Sainsbury (2006), the researcher used the text on the empirical chapters to enable 
the reader to understand what the participants’ insights into a matter. However, the quotes 
used did not include irrelevant material as the objective was to enrich the meaning and, in 
some cases, provide evidence for the researchers’ analysis.  
 
Furthermore, secondary data was used to investigate the participants’ views which 
triangulated the analysis and increased the validity and precision of the research. The official 
documents collected by the researcher, such as the general budget documents and the FYDPs, 
were analysed through a textual analysis technique. The concept of textual analysis is related 
to the content analysis approach, which Stemler (2001:1) defines as “a systematic, replicable 
technique for compressing many words of text into fewer content categories based on explicit 
rules of coding”. It is an important research tool that allows the researcher to examine the 
documents that are relevant to the case study. The objective of the technique in this research 
was to examine those documents comprehensively in order to understand the root causes for 
the current situation in the Omani economy.  
 




The researcher fulfilled Durham University ethical committee requirements and was granted 
approval to start the fieldwork. The committee was provided with a copy of the semi-
structured interviews questions and a list of the prospective interviewees. In addition, the 
researcher implemented Rowley’s (2012:266) suggestions regarding the semi-structure 
interviews ethical considerations as following: 
• Introducing the identity of the researcher, and the research objectives.  
• Explaining the research concepts and theories. 
• Indicating the amount of their time that the interview will take.   
• Requesting their permission to record the interview. 
• Assuring the confidentiality and the anonymity of their identity. 
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• Assuring them that they will have a summary of the research if they request. 
• Exchanging contact details with them, for any future queries. 




It is not easy to conduct semi-interviews and focus groups in the context of an authoritarian 
state, especially if the research focuses on issues that are considered to be sensitive. When the 
researcher started the fieldwork, the oil producing countries were panicking because of the 
sharp fall in oil prices from USD110/b in 2014 to USD30/b at the beginning of 2016. As a 
result, the GCC governments begin to adopt austerity measures, which had an adverse impact 
on government employment as well as public expenditure. For that reason, even though 
Oman has a relatively small population and access to interview people is relatively easy, the 
problem is to convince interviewees to talk freely. Most interviews lasted between one to two 
hours; however, some interviewees were very helpful, in which case the interviews could last 
up to four hours. Many scholars (e.g. Aberbach & Rockman, 2002; Creswell, 2003; Kvale, 
2006; Rowley, 2012) believe that maintaining the anonymity of the participants can help the 
researcher conduct more effective interviews. The researcher followed the suggestion and 
thus codes are used to hide the participants’ identity. 
 
Some proposed participants apologised for not attending the interview under the 
justification they were very busy. Others were transparent, and stated that they did not want 
to discuss the research because of its very sensitive nature. Some top-level government 
officials did not attend the interview because they were not “authorised to talk”. Five 
candidates recommended that the researcher should choose a less politically sensitive topic as 
conducting the research might affect their future career in Oman. 
 
Nevertheless, the researcher used the snowballing method to choose the interviewees. 
The Omani social context of approaching the respondent through informal networks, such as 
relatives or friends, turned out to be a more efficient way not only to convince them to attend 
the interview but also to reveal important information. Thus, it was possible to gain access to 
top-level government officials despite their busy schedules. In addition, some interviewees 
did not object to the interview being recorded although three did refuse. However, in all the 
interviews the researcher could take notes. 
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Four interviewees stated that they only had a very short time for the interview. They 
asked to take the interview questions away and send the answers shortly. Although they 
returned the answers in detail, the researcher was unable to ask any follow-up questions. 
Moreover, the level of understanding of the interview themes varied across interviewees. For 
example, the interviewees from an academic background were very well informed about the 
economic and education factors, but they were not well informed regarding crony capitalism 
or institutional efficiency. In contrast, interviewees from the business sector and those who 
have previous experience in the government were more informed about the economy, 
government performance and crony capitalism. 
 
Furthermore, most interviewees were very transparent in expressing their opinions 
concerning human resource development, market structure, government performance and 
rentier mentality. However, there were very careful when discussing crony capitalism in 
Oman; for example, three interviewees asked for the recorder to be turned off and notes not 
to be taken when they talked about corruption being practiced by top government officials 
who are very close friends of the Sultan. Others talked more transparently after the interview 
was finished. Nevertheless, the researcher assured all interviewees that the main objective of 
the research is purely academic, and their identity will not be revealed. 
 
The focus groups also involved several challenges. For example, the researcher 
planned to conduct three focus groups. The first and the second one was planned around a 
focal point (i.e. an individual) who was interviewed by the researcher previously. The third 
one was to be created by submitting an official request to conduct a focus group with medium 
top-level employees in one of the government institutions. The first and second focus groups 
were conducted according to plan. However, even though the researcher stated at the 
beginning of the discussion about the importance of the confidentiality, unfortunately, one of 
the journalists involved Tweeted about the focus group. As a result, and because of the 
sensitive nature of the topic, authority for the third focus group was declined. In the first 
focus group, the researcher prepared a translated Arabic summary of the research topic and 
the discussion points, as well as definitions of the concepts that were to be discussed. 
Moreover, at the beginning of the discussion the researcher clarified that the research was 
approved by the research ethics committee at the University of Durham and that the data 
would only be used for academic research. Nevertheless, several of the participants withdrew 
at the last minute. Fortunately, the focal point managed to contact replacements. In addition, 
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at the outset the researcher noticed that some participants were not involved in the discussion 
until they received confirmation that their names would not be revealed. This approach 
helped to relax the atmosphere throughout the discussion. 
 
The other limitation was related to the language and transcription, as the interviews 
and focus group was conducted in Arabic. To mitigate this issue, the researcher coordinated 
with expert translators to help in the translation process of the comments and the specific 
meaning of some of the concepts. The transcription was conducted in three steps: first, after 
each interview the researcher revised the recordings and match them to the notes taken during 
the interview. Then with the use of notes, the researcher started the transcription process in 
Arabic. Finally, a translation of the transcripts was rendered into English. The problem with 
the translation was that some of the concepts have a very sensitive meaning when they are 
translated from English to Arabic, especially crony capitalism, Dutch disease and political 
elite corruption. This was why it was very important to implement the pilot interviews to 
ensure the interview questions would not trigger any negative reaction from the interviewees. 
  

















Chapter 6 Economic Factors 
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6.1 Introduction		
This thesis analyses the factors behind the unsuccessful economic diversification efforts in 
Oman by using the resource curse hypotheses as a framework while focusing on four specific 
set of barriers: economic factors; institutional factors; human resource development factors; 
and political and social factors. This chapter and the following two chapters provide the 
empirical findings of this research. This chapter focuses on the economic elements that 
hinder Oman’s ability to achieve economic diversification.  
 
The analysis is based on the process tracing method by using thematic analysis of the 
semi-structured interviews and focus groups conducted in Oman and the UK which included 
top level decision-makers from the government, members of the legislative chambers (Majlis 
Oman), private sector businesspeople, journalists, officials from NGOs, and academics. The 
chapter explores the interviewee's insights about the questions related to the economic 
factors. The questions focus on the Omani economy structure in general, the symptoms of 
Dutch disease in the Omani economy, and the performance of the private sector and 
government. The analysis tests to what extent the Omani economy was affected by the Dutch 
disease. It also investigates if oil price volatility poses an obstacle towards achieving 
economic diversification or policy implementation. Furthermore, the chapter analyses the 
limited participation of the private sector in the economy, and the impact of monetary policy 
and the fixed exchange rate on the ability of the manufacturing sector to grow. 
 
The literature review suggests four main elements under the umbrella of the economic 
factors, namely Dutch disease, oil price volatility, exchange rate impact and private sector 
performance. Accordingly, this chapter is divided into seven sections. The first section 
provides an overview of Oman’s economic structure. The following section evaluates the 
existence of the Dutch disease. The third section analyses the impact of oil prices instability. 
The following section analyses the impact of government intervention, while the last two 
sections evaluate the impact of clandestine trade and private sector performance.   
 
6.2 Omani	Economic	Structure	
This section offers an overview of the economic structure after the discovery of oil, which 
provided the government with the means to develop a modern economy (Al-Fazari, 2006). 
The transformation that took place clearly highlights that dichotomy provided in the literature 
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of oil dependency being either a blessing or curse is not the case in Oman. This is highlighted 
by one government official:   
The oil revenues for Oman could be seen as a blessing and as a curse. As a 
blessing because without such revenues the government would not be able to 
create such development all over the country. As a curse, because the government 
is continuously dependent on oil revenues and could not achieve a real economic 
diversification. Right now the Omani economy is still a point resource economy 
which is a huge problem (GOI14, 2016). 
 
Moreover, as predicted by resource curse theory, the oil revenues had an adverse 
impact on other economic sectors, despite the creation of sectors such as gas-related 
industries which presently account for around 15% of GDP. However, most industries are 
directly or indirectly related to the hydrocarbon sector because they rely on subsidized 
energy. These include energy-intensive ones such as iron and aluminium smelters, and 
petrochemicals, which use oil and gas as a feedstock. As indicated by a government official: 
We do not have independent industries … the government investment in the 
traditional economic sectors such as agriculture and fisheries was not productive  
(GOI13, 2016). 
 
The resource curse theory’s main argument is that the oil-dependent state finds it 
difficult to mitigate its dependency on oil revenues. The theory predicts that oil dependency 
can only be prevented through the implementation of microeconomic policies which totally 
reform the economy (Karl, 1997). An Majlis Oman member indicated the depth of the oil 
dependency’s impact as: 
No matter how many plans we put in place to overcome the dependency on oil not 
much has been achieved (MO1, 2016). 
 
6.2.1 Diversifying	Government	Revenues			
According to the literature, one of the main tools to reduce the dependency on a particular 
commodity is through the creation of an accommodative taxation system. A comprehensive 
and flexible taxation system would allow the state to move gradually from being the major 
actor in the economy to focus solely on the regulating and monitoring responsibilities 
(Okruhlik, 1999). However, the Omani government used tax exemptions to encourage 
stronger participation of the private sector in the economy. Nonetheless, many interviewees 
indicated that the approach was not effective. Instead of providing the government with 
different sources of revenues, it resulted in the loss of successful companies through the 
privatisation process. Furthermore, the government did not manage to maximise its tax 
returns from the government-owned companies (GOC). Thus, one government official stated: 
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The government decided to lower the tax rate before the privatisation process of 
the telecommunication company from 15% to 7%, and they justified it as 
encouraging investors to buy the stocks. However, it was short sighted in my 
opinion as the company is doing well and even with the 15% tax that investors will 
still enjoy a high return. This is one face of the resource curse as the government 
was not actively looking for another income resources away from oil. Moreover, 
all the efforts are not optimised properly (GOI4, 2016). 
 
Furthermore, there was limited progress in expanding the contribution of agriculture 
and fisheries sectors. In addition, other economic sectors, such as mining and quarrying, 
which is usually considered as equivalent to the hydrocarbon sector, were not established so 
that their capacity could be enhanced. In Oman, the mining sector has not been regulated 
similarly to the hydrocarbon sector as described by a government official: 
The mining sector in Oman as with other non-oil tradable sectors suffers from 
major problems such as the lack of planning and the lack of adequate management. 
There is no accountability or audit to check the real quantities being produced by 
that company which has resulted in a massive abuse of the natural resources. The 
natural resources should be re-evaluated, and that is not only limited to the natural 
resources (GOI3, 2016). 
  
In contrast, oil export revenues can have a positive impact on the non-oil tradable 
sectors in the short run. However, in the long term, oil dependency has negative 
consequences on those sectors. A participant from the private sector indicated the different 
implications of the oil dependency as following:  
If we are talking about long-term impact, yes it has negative consequences. 
However, in the short term, the existence of the oil revenues had allowed the 
agriculture and fisheries sector to develop for a brief period from 1970 till 1980. 
As the availability of the funds enabled the government to enhance the productivity 
in those sectors by providing machineries and modern boats equipped with engines 
to replace their traditional wooden boats (BI5, 2016). 
 
Most interviewees indicated that the oil revenues provided the government with 
massive funds that enabled the state to develop the economy. This included new job 
opportunities with better financial rewards than were available in the traditional sectors of 
agriculture and fisheries.  
 
Figure 6-1 highlights that 80% of the respondents believe that oil revenues had an 
adverse impact on these sectors. Similarly, 57% of the respondents believe that the oil 
revenues had a negative impact on the small and medium industries (see Figure 6-2). Such 
findings are not a surprise as the weak development of the non-oil sectors were highlighted 
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by government officials and Vision 2020 (MONE, 1995). One could argue that the FYDPs 
should have provided the opportunity to expand other sectors. That goal could be achieved 
through enhancing the productivity of the traditional sectors by providing modern training for 
the workers, equipping them with modern technology and implementing more scientific 
methods in the production processes.  
   
 
 
Figure 6-1: Respondent’s Opinions on Oil Revenue’s Impact on Agriculture and 
Fisheries 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
 
	
Figure 6-2: Respondent’s Opinion on Oil Revenue’s Impact on the Non-oil SMEs 
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6.2.1.1 Issues Related to Diversifying Government Revenues   
One of the main arguments regarding diversifying government revenues is through 
transferring some of the oil revenues into a sovereign wealth fund. Such a tool is working 
perfectly in Norway, for example (Holden, 2013). The sovereign wealth funds’ main role is 
to accumulate and manage wisely the state’s wealth generated from oil exports. In fact, the 
Omani government was among the first countries in the region to establish the State General 
Reserve Fund (SGRF) in 1980 (SGRF, 2017). Accordingly, the SGRF has two main duties; 
the first is to invest the budget surplus for the future generations. The second duty is to 
finance the critical needs of the government during low oil price cycles (SGRF, 2017). 
However, most participants pointed out to that the government budget deficit in Oman is an 
indicator of the inefficient government performance as the government regularly increases 
actual expenditure above the planned level. Such behaviour is a reflection of the weak fiscal 
role in the governance system. Figure 6-3 demonstrates the difference between planned and 
actual expenditure in each of the FYDPs, with the biggest difference in the 7th FYDP as the 
government raised spending to counteract the social unrest. According to interviewed Majlis 
Oman member: 
There was a big difference between the planned spending and the actual spending 
as the latter was much higher than the former. That reflected there were no 
guidelines for government expenditure; it is just that if you have massive funds 
then you must use them all. That reflects the absence of monetary and fiscal policy. 
The existence of a proper fiscal rule would help the government to create the 
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Figure 6-3: Expenditure Behaviour in the FYDPs. 
Source: Compiled by the author the data obtained from TDC (1976, 1981, 1986, 1991), MONE (1997, 2006) 
and FAERC (2011) 
*: Oil prices fell from USD28/b to USD8/b, before recovering to USD30/b by the end of the plan. 
**: Oil prices fell from USD39/b to USD16/b, before recovering to USD40/b by the end of the plan. 
	
The other tool that has been used in Oman to expand the government revenues scope, 
was through creating a strategic location by building a new multi-purpose city. Duqm was a 
small fishing village with a population of less than 500 inhabitants. In 2005, the government 
decided to transform it into a strategic port, including a free zone, an industrial estate, oil 
refinery, dry dock, logistic facilities, fisheries industries, a massive oil storage facility and 
tourism hub. The first project was the port and the dry dock, associated with the building of 
the airport. The total land space allocated for the Duqm Special Economic Zone is 2000 km² 
(SEZAD, 2017). In 2011, the government created a new government body that would be 
responsible for the newly created economic zone. Royal Decree 119/2011 announced the 
creation of Duqm Special Economic Zone Authority (SEZAD), which was to be one of the 
main economic diversification tools in the country. SEZAD was to be the hub for different 
economic activities to enhance employment opportunities for Omanis. To overcome any 
bureaucratic and administrative challenges SEZAD was granted a direct affiliation to the 
Council of Ministers in order to make it easy to collaborate with other government bodies. 
 
The government was aware of some of the economic diversification obstacles. To 
minimise any institutional or administrative issues the Royal Decree expanded SEZAD’s 
responsibilities so that it would not be limited to act as a regulator but it would also work as a 
business promoter, enabler and facilitator. The Decree allowed the SEZAD to provide very 
generous incentives to the investors such as: 
• tax exemptions; 
• long term lease with reduced rates; 
• no restrictions on the foreign ownership and no minimum capital requirements; 
• no employment restrictions; 
• duty-free statues and no custom duties; 
• very easy access to the exemptions and residence permits; 
• one stop shop for registration, licensing and business approvals; and	
• all government-owned companies would be allowed to work in the economic zone with 
exemptions from the tender law (SEZAD, 2017). 
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In addition, Royal Decree 79/2013 granted SEZAD the power to issue any necessary 
licenses and permits, such as tourist projects, environmental permits, customs and duties and 
the manpower. With such legal power SEZAD should be able to attract foreign investment 
much easier than any other areas in Oman. However, the FDI inflow to the zone has not been 
as high as expected, with the low oil price from 2015 curtailing the government’s ability to 
finance some of the projects in the pipeline. 
 
According to interviewed government official (GOI12, 2016) SEZAD is an exception 
as the government granted Duqm the necessary authority to enable them not to be restrained 
by government bureaucracy. Without such clear-cut authority, Duqm project might not be 
able to achieve is goals, particularly the ability to attract the required local and international 
investment. However, the policy has not overcome the overlap in duties and responsibilities.  
Even though Duqm being given such authority, they are still facing problems with 
some ministers as they try to force their intervention by using the law. And to get 
rid of that we managed to ask the Sultan to issue a new law that give Duqm 
authority over the other regional laws. We faced big problems to regulate lands 
issues in Duqm. Can you imagine one person given 90,000 m² land in a prime 
location and claiming that the land was inherited from his grandfather as it was 
camel pasture (GOI12, 2016). 
 
However, it seems that the obstacles are not limited to the regulations but are also 
related to the private sector. According to interviewed government official (GOI13, 2016) the 
private sector participation in Duqm projects is limited which could be attributed to the 
perceived belief that such projects require long periods before they are profitable. However, 
Duqm has started to attract investment from around the globe, despite limited participation 
from the big eight families’ business groups. 
	
6.2.2 Indicators	of	Inappropriate	Economic	Performance		
All respondents acknowledged that oil revenues were a blessing as they provided the 
government with the means to enhance living standards. However, they recognised that the 
wealth had an adverse impact on the economic structure by weakening productivity levels in 
other sectors. Moreover, some respondents highlighted the use of inappropriate economic 
performance indicators. For example, in 2008 the World Bank Development Forum 
considered Oman as one of 30 countries that achieved constant economic growth in the post-
war era based on the measure of GDP growth. Oman was the only Arab country included 
(Spence, 2008). However, performance indicators such as total productivity factor, which 
measures economic efficiency, paint a less positive picture. According to Al-Saqri (2010), 
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total productivity factor for Oman (1971-2007) was minus 60%, which reflects a persistent 
dependence on oil income, and a weak economic performance. However, most respondents 
highlight that decision-makers in Oman might not understand the core problem. The positive 
GDP growth rate is due to the increased oil output, as well as the increase in the global oil 
price. The use of inappropriate economic performance indicators could be a factor that affects 
the government policies towards economic diversification, as described by a government 
official.    
We are being deceived by our data. It is a worrying truth (GOI16, 2016). 
Furthermore, another interviewee highlighted that the economic performance 
measurement dilemma is misleading. For example, low oil prices in a particular period means 
that the non-oil sector’s share in the GDP increases. However, the output may not have 
increased, merely that the value of the oil sector’s contribution has fallen. Furthermore, one 
government official emphasised that the hydrocarbon-related industries classification in the 
balance sheet could be a further problem:  
In the national balance sheet, the government have two sets of sectors the oil sector 
and the non-oil sector. However, under the non-oil sector, we have the industries 
which most of them are using gas, or they are using electricity, and both of which 
are subsidised so it should be under the oil sector. In reality, everything is related 
to the oil directly or indirectly (GOI15, 2016). 
 
The use of clear and transparent performance indicators should be the cornerstone for 
the implementation of any strategy. As is demonstrated in this section, the decision makers in 
Oman appear to be misled by the data. The use of inappropriate positive economic indicators 
could be attributed to the fact that the decision-making process in Oman is vertical, which 
means that the belief in positive economic indicators reduces the drive towards economic 
diversification. In this context, the next part discusses government behaviours towards 
economic diversification. 
 
Most interviewees acknowledged the importance of the economic diversification for 
three reasons. The first reason is that without economic diversification the state is not be able 
to sustain positive GDP growth beyond the short term. The second is that given oil price 
fluctuations and long periods of low oil prices the state may not be able to sustain its current 
expenditure or to maintain standards of living. Finally, the dependency on a depleting 
resource can pose a critical threat to future growth rates and hence the stability of the state. 
Furthermore, several interviewees believe that it is the state’s responsibility to create a 
diversified economy. However, one government official stated: 
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Unfortunately, there is no consistency in the government planning. We have no 
economic identity for the country. They could do it if they followed Vision 2020 
but they did not do it (GOI7, 2016). 
 
In general, all the interviewees agreed that the Omani economy suffers from structural 
problems. Those problems are related to the accountability measures and the overall 
economic management style. A participant from the private sector summarises the main 
issues regarding economic management as: 
The current economic governance in Oman is not based on a deep understanding 
of the economy as it is more a kind of financial management. To be able to run the 
economy in the right way you must have clear KPIs, clear plans and strategy, and 
you must be able to check and evaluate periodically how much will you achieve, 
what were your achievements and what sort of challenges you face. This is 
unfortunately not the case in Oman  (BI8, 2016). 
 
An academic adds: 
The agricultural and fisheries sectors suffered throughout the last 40 years as it has 
not had adequate support from the government; also, it did not get sufficient 
investment to sustain its growth. The government concentrated on the development 
of other sectors such as the oil and small industries. The government attempted to 
create a strong private sector; however, we have the opposite results, and created a 
sector that is highly dependent on government expenditure (AI3, 2016). 
 
This section provides an overview of the Omani economy. The oil discovery in Oman 
had an adverse impact on the non-oil tradable sectors, such as agriculture and manufacturing 
(see Figure 6-4). The manufacturing sector recorded growth from 2000. However, this was 
because of the gas-related industries such as the natural gas liquefaction plant that started 
operations in 2000 (Alhajri, 2010), rather than non-hydrocarbon industries. Furthermore, as 
predicted by resource curse theory, the oil revenues had a positive influence on the 
development of the non-tradable sector, such as services (see Figure 6-4). 
  128 
 
 Figure 6-4: Economic Sectors Value-added as a Percentage of GDP 
Source: Compiled by the author from data obtained from The World Bank (2016) 
 
The following section analyses the Dutch disease symptoms in the Omani economy in 
order to understand the weak development of the non-oil tradable sectors. 
 
6.3 Dutch	Disease		
This section addresses the impact of the Dutch disease on the ability of the state to achieve 
economic diversification. However, this thesis argues that the traditional Dutch disease 
symptoms are not fully reflected in the GCC economies. As demonstrated in Chapter 4, there 
are fundamental differences between the impact of the discovery of gas in The Netherlands 
and the impact of oil revenues in the GCC countries, because of the different political, social 
and economic structures before the discoveries. Dutch disease theory is based on three 
assumptions. The first is the existence of a non-oil tradable sector that exports prior to the 
discovery of oil. The second is that because of the massive development of the new oil sector, 
the exchange rate of the currency appreciates which curtails non-oil exports. The third is 
related to the workforce crowding out effect from the other economic sectors to the oil sector.   
 
6.3.1 Dutch	Disease	Symptoms	in	the	Omani	Economy	
As predicted by this thesis, most of the interviewees acknowledged the differences between 
the impact of the oil discovery on a developed economy such as The Netherlands and 
underdeveloped economy such as Oman. However, some of the Dutch disease symptoms 
could match those experienced in Oman between 1970 and 1980 (MO2, 2016). Additionally, 
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Dutch disease symptoms and causes does not totally match the situation in our 
countries. We do have some symptoms such as the foreign labour inflow to the 
country and the weakening of the other economic sectors (GOI6, 2016). 
 
6.3.2 Workforce	Crowding	Out	
One symptom of the Dutch disease is the workforce crowding out effect from the tradable 
sectors to the newly developed oil sector. However, this thesis argues that this symptom is 
not reflected in Oman. In fact, the employment opportunities in the oil sector are low as it is 
capital intensive, which reduces the crowding effect of the Dutch disease. Furthermore, in 
relation to the traditional economic sectors, most interviewees indicate that the workforce 
crowding out from those sectors to the other sectors might not be directly to the impact of the 
discovery of oil. The workforce crowding out was a secondary outcome as state building 
provided employment opportunities with better financial incentives. The GCC crowding 
effect is the transfer of jobs into the public sector rather than the oil sector, which is a vital 
difference between this thesis’s argument and the traditional Dutch disease theory. The better 
incentives in the public sector encouraged workers in agriculture and fisheries to move to the 
newly formed government entities. This was highlighted by a government official who stated: 
Agriculture in Oman used to be a dominant pillar in the pre-oil economy, and it 
was the main recruitment sector. However, in 1970 the establishment of the 
modern state resulted in labour absorption, so most farmers left their farms to work 
in the newly developed public sector as clerical workers, teachers or in the army 
(GOI8, 2016). 
This statement confirms the roots of the rentier mentality in Oman. However, the rational 
choice for any individual is to work in an environment that provides better financial 
incentives with less physical demands. Although the government invested in the development 
of agriculture and fisheries, the strategy did not halt the workforce crowding out effect. A 
government official described this situation:  
The new generations are not interested in the agriculture as it is not as rewarding as 
working for the government (GOI4, 2016). 
 
Accordingly, the national workforce in the agriculture and fisheries sector was, to a 
large extent, replaced by expats. Furthermore, this resulted in a deterioration in the efficiency 
in those sectors, as highlighted by a private sector interviewee:  
The agricultural sector starts to be less productive through time, which was 
associated with less attention from the government to keep this sector as 
productive as it used to be in the past (BI5, 2016). 
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Furthermore, all the GCC countries face a similar workforce dilemma of growing expat 
workers, while there is growing national unemployment (Coury & Dave, 2009). This is a 
clear indication that Dutch disease symptoms of workforce crowding out are not present in 
the GCC countries, especially when it related to employment in the new sector (the oil 
industry) (Hertog, 2010b). Accordingly, this thesis argues that the GCC states suffer from a 
different form of disease. This argument is supported by a focus group participant from the 
private sector: 
We are not suffering from the traditional symptoms of Dutch disease. Because of 
the availability of cheap foreign labour in those countries. The oil income did not 
increase the salaries in the private sector. The Dutch disease might not be the 
factor that hinders the economic diversification in all the GCC countries. In my 
opinion, it is the labour regulation; more precisely the nationalisation of 
employment, alongside, the lack of a skilled workforce and the inefficient public 
sector and bureaucracy (FPS2, 2016). 
 
This section demonstrates that the workforce crowding out effect from the 
traditionally economic sectors was not to the newly developed oil sector. In fact, the 
workforce crowding out to the public sector was the indirect impact of the oil revenues being 
received by the government. Furthermore, only 11% of the workforce in the private sector are 
nationals (see Figure 6-5). Thus, two key conclusions can be drawn. First, the government is 
the main employer of Omanis, which is typically the case in other rentier states (Levins, 
2013). The second is that the private sector suffers from a structural distortion that makes it 
less attractive for the national workforce (Benchiba, Savenius, Mogielnicki, Owens, et al., 
2016). The distortion in the private sector can also be attributed to the clandestine trade (see 
Section 6.7 of this chapter). The next section illustrates on the second symptom of the Dutch 
disease which is related to the weak development of the non-oil tradable sector, or more 
precisely the manufacturing sector. 
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Figure 6-5: Breakdown of the Private Sector Workforce in Oman 
Source: Compiled by the author the data was obtained from NCSI (2016c).  
 
6.3.3 Manufacturing	Sector	Performance	
The second symptom of the Dutch disease is the collapse of the manufacturing sector because 
of two main factors; the workforce crowding out from the manufacturing sector and the 
appreciation of the exchange rate which makes imported goods cheaper than locally-
produced goods. However, the Dutch disease theory assumes the presence of an exporting 
manufacturing sector before the discovery of oil, which is not the case in Oman. 
Nevertheless, two interlinked economic problems evolved after the oil discovery in Oman. 
The first issue was the relative increase in domestic product prices compared with imported 
goods. The second symptom is the appreciation of the exchange rate. Both the elements had 
an adverse impact on the development of the local manufacturing sector. Unless the 
government provides incentives, this makes it less attractive to the investors in comparison to 
the non-oil non-tradable sectors, such as real estate and financial services. According to an 
Omani academic: 
The massive oil revenues resulted in the currency appreciation which results in 
weakening the competitiveness of the economy … the imported commodity prices 
start to become relatively cheap especially with the development of the logistics 
sector (BI9, 2016). 
 
Moreover, the oil sector is highly competitive and the added value is much higher 
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USD10/b to USD30/b but it can be sold without any processing for USD40/b to USD50/b. 
However, it is more related to the competitiveness of other sectors in comparison with the oil 
sector. This argument was indicated by many interviewees, including a journalist.  
If a government decides to diversify the economy by involving other sectors, those 
sectors must be more competitive and more productive. Whether that sector is 
providing work opportunities with very high incentives or helping knowledge 
transformation, the other sectors, such as tourism, agriculture and fisheries, 
services and any other sector, find it tough to compete with the oil sector (JI4, 
2016). 
Also, a government official clarifies the reasons behind the limited development in those 
sectors as: 
The slow growth in the traditional sectors, such as agriculture and fisheries, could 
be easily attributed to the mismanagement. Add to that the transformation of the 
society from being a productive society to a rentier society (GOI14, 2016). 
 
In summary, this section demonstrates that the weak development of the non-oil 
tradable sector, mainly the manufacturing sector cannot be attributed to the exchange rate 
appreciation. Government subsidies provided to the manufacturing sector could reduce the 
cost associated with the exchange rate appreciation. These subsidies were not limited to soft 
loans but included feedstock and energy with much lower prices than the international market 
(MOF, 2016a). Arguably, the manufacturing sector in Oman reflects the overall private sector 




The third symptom of the Dutch disease is the exchange rate appreciation as result of the 
massive revenues from the oil exports. In this context, the main argument of the participants 
was related to the exchange rate of Omani Rial being pegged to the US dollar. An 
appreciation of the exchange rate curtails the volume of exports, which become relatively 
more expensive on the international stage. The movement in the real exchange rate is the 
channel that connects the national currency to the foreign currencies, other than the currency 
of the peg. Though the national currency is pegged to the US dollar, the exchange rate of the 
national currency to other currencies is set by market forces. Therefore, the impact of the 
appreciation/depreciation in the real exchange rate is passed through to the process of 
producing goods and services in the local economy. Hence, periods of a strong US dollar in 
the foreign exchange markets might, partially at least, harm the competitiveness of Omani 
products in the international markets. Conducting a quantitative test for a such impact is not 
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straightforward. Moreover, the development of the non-tradable sectors was much higher 
than the development of non-oil tradable sectors as the oil and gas revenues were received by 
the government and then directed to the economy through the government expenditure. 
According to a focus group participant from an NGO: 
In Oman, we export oil to the international market, and the income which the 
government received is utilised in government spending whether it is for salaries or 
infrastructure development or the service sectors. This kind of expenditure would 
have a spillover effect in other economic sectors such as the construction sector. In 
conclusion, I do not think we have Dutch disease in the Omani economy (FNGO1, 
2016). 
 
The interviewees did not consider the exchange rate impact on the economic 
diversification to be important. This could be because the exchange rate is a technical tool 
that links developments in the international market with the development of the national 
market. The main task of the exchange rate is to reflect the credibility of the national 
currency in relation to foreign trade. Importantly, the exchange rate in Oman benefitted the 
government as its major export is oil which is sold in US dollars. The following statement by 
a private sector focus group participant summarises the majority of interviewee’s opinions 
about the exchange rate impact in Oman. 
For sure we benefit right now from such exchange-rate model because we are 
exporting only one product, but if we expand our industrial sector then such 
exchange rate model might not work for us (FPS3, 2016). 
 
The growth of the non-oil non-tradable sector, such as construction and financial 
services, in Oman was associated with government spending.17 However, it had a negative 
impact on the development of the manufacturing sector in particular and the non-oil tradable 
sectors in general. Accordingly, such an economic structure makes imported goods more 
attractive as they become relatively cheaper because of the exchange rate appreciation. At the 
same time, it is difficult for the local manufactures to export their products as the 
international market determines the commodities prices. 
In summary, it can be concluded that the unsuccessful economic diversification in 
Oman cannot be attributed to the Dutch disease effects. The main Dutch disease hypotheses 
assumes a negative impact on the existent tradable sectors which is not the case in Oman. The 
discovery of oil in Oman (and other GCC countries) was associated with other economic 
                                                
17 The extra revenues from oil exports increases the demand for non-tradable (e.g. services and construction) 
sectors at the expense the tradable sectors. The shift from industrial based sectors to non-tradable sectors results 
in “indirect-deindustrialization” (Corden, 1984:360). 
  134 
problems. For example, the workforce crowding out in Oman was to the newly developed 
government bodies, and they were replaced in the private sector by expats. Furthermore, one 
could argue that the fixed exchange rate regime could be the only rational choice for the oil-
dependent countries as they are mainly exporting oil. Such findings contradict previous 
studies regarding the impact of Dutch disease as the main economic factor hindering the 
state’s ability to diversify the economy from its dependency on natural resources. 




Resource curse highlights the impact of the resource price fluctuations as one of the obstacles 
that hinders the state’s ability to achieve better economic performance. Since 1970 
international oil prices have been through four major price cycles. This section analyses the 
interviewees’ perceptions regarding oil price volatility on Oman's ability to achieve economic 
diversification. As demonstrated in Chapter Two oil price fluctuations directly impact on the 
state’s ability to implement its economic strategies and policies. Paradoxically, oil price 
booms also have an adverse impact, as a state tends to expand its expenditure to such an 
extent that it is not able to sustain the level of expenditure during a period of low oil prices. 
 
Most participants believed that oil price fluctuations have an adverse impact on the 
state’s ability to execute different projects. However, according to one academic: 
The main obstacle towards economic diversification in Oman could be attributed 
to the lack of concentration rather than the effect of oil price volatility. The oil 
price volatility could be one of the major elements that might affect the 
implementation of the development plans which include the diversification efforts. 
It is a procyclical behaviour in the business cycle. The economic activities are 
associated with oil prices so when we have a high oil prices we have a very active 
economy but we will have a very slow growth when the oil prices are low to the 
extent there could be a recession, and that could be a clear evidence of the lack of 
the institution efficiency in Oman (AI2, 2016). 
 
In contrast, some interviewees argued that oil price volatility is not necessarily 
negative. For example, in low oil price cycles the government actively engages in economic 
reforms to reduce their expenditure and to enhance the domestic added value in the economy. 
However, as soon as the prices start to rise, most of the reforms are overwritten and 
government spending rises. This was emphasised by a government official. 
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I would argue the opposite as the oil price volatility could be taken as a wake-up 
call for the government. In 1986, in 1996 and in 2008, the economy went through 
five crises. We did not learn much from those situations because the oil price 
started to recover very fast and I believe the government thought that those prices 
do not have a long-term effect, so we did not do much to protect the economy from 
future crisis. The current situation is different as this crisis is very deep to the 
extent that the government does not know what to do (GOI9, 2016). 
Furthermore, the short length of the low oil price cycles raises the levels of confidence 
among the decision-makers. According to one government official: 
The availability of such massive funds might have an influence and raised 
confidence in the government that there is no need to search for other sources of 
income (GOI5, 2016). 
 
Overall, the participants highlight two main issues regarding oil price volatility. The 
first is the government has not learnt from previous oil price falls that it should create a 
sustainable model for economic development. Second, even though the government initiated 
expenditure reforms during the low oil price cycles, the measures were lifted gradually as oil 
prices recovered. The relatively short period of low oil price cycles has had a limited effect 
on the decision-makers’ attitude towards the importance of economic reform. In contrast, 
countries such as Norway initiated countermeasures including the creation of sovereign 
wealth fund which act as a safeguard against oil price fluctuations. Oman established a 
sovereign wealth fund to accumulate budget surpluses which were to be invested abroad. 
However, the government did not follow this rational, as during high oil price cycles it 
expanded its expenditure over the planned levels rather than transferring the extra funds to 
the sovereign wealth fund (see Figure 6-6). Robinson et al. (2006) and Mehlum et al. (2006) 
suggest that governments that do not have high levels of transparency and accountability tend 
to expand expenditure in different ways; for example, by increasing public sector 
employment and salaries or through subsidies which enhance the leaders’ popularity. This 
argument is examined more closely in Chapter Eight as it is related to the political and social 
factors. 
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Figure 6-6: Expenditure Behaviour in the 8th FYDP 
Source: Compiled by the author with data obtained from (MOF, 2016b).  
 
6.5 Government	as	the	Main	Actor	in	the	Economy	
This section assesses the claim that high levels of government intervention in the economy is 
one of the economic factors that hinders the state’s ability to achieve economic 
diversification. This aspect is not considered by the resource curse hypotheses. However, one 
of the semi-structured interview questions is related to the role of the government as the 
biggest spender and the ultimate employer in the economy and how this impacts economic 
performance. Moreover, throughout the interviews and focus groups, government 
intervention in the economy was highlighted as one of the elements that hindered Oman's 
ability to diversify the economy.  
 
High levels of government intervention in the Omani economy can be attributed to 
two main reasons. The first is related to the overall economic structure and the establishment 
of the modern state in 1970 as during that era there was no effective private sector, therefore 
the government substituted for the private sector. In addition, the government encouraged 
officials to engage in private sector activities alongside the traditional traders. This approach 
was borne out of necessity but resulted in the private sector being controlled by less than ten 
families and the advent of crony capitalism (GOI3, 2016; BI4, 2016; BI6, 2016; FGO3, 2016; 
FGOC1, 2016). Furthermore, it also created a private sector that relies heavily on government 
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reason can be attributed to the private sector’s unwillingness to be involved in projects that 
did not provide a return in the short period, or could be seen as risky. 
After 1990 there was no shift and no change in that stream. In reality, if the 
government had initiated a very clear system based on productivity and 
accountability we could be in a better situation now. Because of that, there is a lack 
of confidence among the citizens as they do not know what to do in the future. 
This is a serious security challenge for the country (FPS5, 2016). 
 
However, the government was aware of those two obstacles, and initiated economic 
policies to encourage the private sector involvement in the economic activities. According to 
an interviewee from the private sector: 
The government was working as a flagship for those sectors. The government 
usually invested in a particular project and later it will hand it to the private sector 
(BI5, 2016). 
However, the policies to encourage the growth of an independent private sector have not been 
successful. According to a government official: 
At the beginning in 1970 we did not have a proper private sector, now we have a 
huge private sector, but unfortunately most of its investment is outside Oman. So 
look at [Anonymised], none of them are willing to invest in Duqm, for example, 
although we have investments from all over the world in Duqm right now (GOI15, 
2016). 
 
Another Omani academic provided a different perspective by arguing that state 
protection for the private sector makes it unable to compete in the international market and 
vulnerable if the government cuts its expenditure: 
Any sector that grew up with the help of the government subsidies would always 
remain dependent on those subsidies, and it will be difficult for that sector to be 
sustained without government help. This will lead to a lack of efficiency and the 
absence of competitiveness. This was highlighted by the infant industry theory 
(AI2, 2016). 
Many interviewees confirmed the previous statement. For example, a government official 
highlighted the legal protection which the state provided to the private sector and its impact 
on its competitiveness as: 
The current laws and regulations are protecting those family companies directly or 
indirectly. They were never exposed to competition from international companies 
in the local market. That protection did not encourage the private sector to enhance 
their efficiency and be more active and productive. The government provided such 
protective laws and regulations for the local companies to strengthen them and 
give them the opportunity to compete in the international market and to be robust 
enough to participate in the national economy. Unfortunately, the approach 
resulted in the creation of a monopolised private sector that is unwilling to take any 
risk at all. Moreover, to grow just by feeding on government projects. The market 
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norm is to let the private sector compete, as competition would make it stronger 
(GOI7, 2016). 
 
In summary, 57% of the participants believe that government intervention in certain 
sectors had a positive impact on the expansion of the private sector (see Figure 6-7). The 
creation of some projects by the government was deemed to be the only way to encourage the 
involvement of the private sector. The expansion of any sector, in reality, requires increasing 
the number of the actors in the sector. The limited development of the private sector in Oman 
might not be directly attributed to government intervention. As is demonstrated in this 
section, government intervention in Oman provided the private sector with protection from 
international competitors. However, unfortunately this policy resulted in weakening the 
private sector rather than encouraging it to develop. The monopolistic business environment 
in the private sector has its roots in 1970s. This outcome is elaborated in depth in Chapter 
eight in the analysis of the political and social factors. The next section discusses the private 
sector performance as a vehicle to achieve economic diversification.  
 
 
Figure 6-7: Government Intervention Impact on the Private Sector Performance 
Source: Compiled by the author from the data been gathered from the participants.   
 
6.6 Private	Sector	Performance		
The previous section highlights the main elements of government intervention in the 
economy. As demonstrated government intervention in relation to the private sector was not 
limited to the legal and regulatory spheres, but also included the active promotion of private 
sector through partnerships, access to projects, subsidies and incentives. The expansion of the 
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private sector role in the economy was one of the main goals of each FYDP since 1986. 
However, the majority of private sector activities became concentrated in the non-tradable 
sectors such as construction, wholesale and retail services, and financial services, alongside 
oil and gas operations. 
 
In this context, this section analyses the interviewees’ perceptions regarding the 
private sector’s performance. The growth of the private sector is crucial towards diversifying 
from Oman’s oil dependency. Furthermore, the expansion of the private sector, especially in 
the non-oil tradable sectors, can strength the economy and act as a safeguard during low oil 
price cycles. Additionally, by establishing strong private sector, new employment 
opportunities can be created. As a result, the government would no longer be the major actor 
in the economy and would not be the main employer. According to a government official:  
The government managed to empower the private sector; however, the private 
sector in Oman is still not able to be involved in big projects or to invest in projects 
that require a long time to produce profit (GOI6, 2016). 
 
Most interviewees acknowledged that the private sector in Oman is weak and unable 
to play a full role in the economy. Participants highlighted three main issues: the oligopolistic 
structure of the private sector; the private sector is focused solely on government-related 
contracts; and a weak legal and regulatory environment. 
 
In terms of the oligopolistic structure of the private sector, the private sector is 
controlled and dominated by limited number of families owned companies. Thus, the private 
sector in Oman is family-oriented rather than institutionally-structured. Furthermore, the 
families have an informal mutual understanding that enables each family to specialise in a 
particular sector, while having smaller entities in other areas. For example, during a question 
session in the Shura Council the Minister of Health stated that more than 80% of the medical 
supplies fall under the monopoly of one company.18 As a result, growth in the sector has been 
constrained. Furthermore, the positive spill over effect is narrow as the profits benefit only a 
very small number of people. According to an academic:  
The government efforts to empower the private sector to involve it in the 
development process through direct contracts and subsidies was always under the 
umbrella of rentierism and crony capitalism. That had resulted in the creation of a 
private sector through the unstable base. The sector becomes inefficient and is 
highly dependent on government projects (AI2, 2016). 
                                                
18 The Minister of Health hearing session in the Al-Shura Council, 27/4/2016. 
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Furthermore, a participant from the private sector explains the private sector setup as:  
The private sector is dominated by a small group who adopt monopolistic 
practices. Such practices make it difficult for newcomers to enter the market and 
also to expand the private sector (BI2, 2016). 
 
Most interviewees believed that the oligopolistic and monopolistic behaviour in the 
private sector is a major obstacle to its expansion. For example, a focus group participant 
from the private sector stated:  
In the last 45 years, the government has supported oligopolistic practices in the 
private sector, and have given all possible support to less than ten family-business 
groups to control the market. It will be very difficult for any newcomer to 
penetrate their control. Small and medium enterprises have no access to financial 
facilities from the banks without heavy guarantees. If the young entrepreneurs did 
not sustain their projects, then they would be jailed because they could not pay 
back the loans. Clearly, there is no protection for the small and medium enterprises 
in Oman. On the other hand, the big family companies own or at least have a big 
share in the banks so access to financial facilities is not a concern and they will be 
protected if they could not pay back the loan (FPS2, 2016). 
In addition, a participant from the private sector highlighted the relationship between the 
private sector and the decision-makers as:  
In the last 45 years, I have seen ordinary citizens from normal families become 
multi-millionaires just because they are close to the policy makers and know how 
to benefit from it. Even the trader families who are not connected to any official 
position manage to create bridges with the decision-makers to the extent they start 
to function as part of the government (BI9, 2016). 
 
The monopolistic practice in the private sector is not limited to the control over 
particular products or services. According to many interviewees, the high cost of government 
projects can be attributed to the absence of competition among private sector companies. 
Most participants believe that government contracts are secured through an unwritten 
understanding amongst private sector companies. The understanding indicates which project 
a company can win and therefore other companies tender too high so as not to win. One 
government official provided an example of this practice: 
The private sector in Oman reached high levels of greediness that could be 
attributed to a conflict of interest and corruption. For example, the government 
announced a local tender for one projects and the lowest bid was OMR185 million 
which was clearly over-priced by the bidders. Accordingly, the government put out 
the tender again internationally. It was not a surprise that the highest bid was 
OMR83 million. There are loopholes in the system that are not regulated precisely 
and used by rent-seekers (GOI9 2016). 
 
  141 
Furthermore, the government has provided generous financial incentives to the private 
sector. The incentives can be in the form of soft loans, the provision of land for projects or 
tax exemptions. Moreover, the government established different financial entities that target 
small and medium enterprises. The main idea behind the initiatives was to increase the 
number of nationals involved in the private sector and reduce the recruitment pressure on the 
public sector. Nevertheless, most interviewees indicated that the current private sector 
environment makes it difficult for any newcomer to establish a business because of the 
presence of monopolies. The situation was described by one person from the private sector 
as: 
It seems the government finds itself in a position where it must choose between 
keeping those oligarchs in power or starting to establish a real private sector which 
is based on small and medium enterprises. The government initiated a OMR70 
million fund to finance the small and medium enterprises. The problem is that 
those oligarchs started to establish their own small and medium enterprises which 
compete with other newly created small and medium enterprises. For example, 
[Anonymised] owns one of the biggest resorts in the country right now. A to Z of 
the suppliers to that resort are small and medium companies owned by 
[Anonymised] (BI9, 2016). 
 
This occurs despite the fact that in 1983 the Omani government was among the first 
governments in the region to draft a conflict of interest law. However, the law has not been 
implemented or enforced. It is clear that without proper governance legislation that should 
work as a safeguard against such practices, the impact would be severe. The cost of the 
projects can be exaggerated as the local companies enjoy the state protection from the 
international competitors. The effects of such behaviour would not be limited to the cost of 
the project only, but furthermore, it reflects a negative image about the business environment 
in the country. Accordingly, the foreign direct investment can be negatively affected by such 
practices. 
 
The second reason for the weak private sector put forward by the participants is the 
fact that the private sector is focused solely on government-related contracts. Ninety three 
percent of the participants believe that the private sector in Oman is dependent on the 
government expenditure (see Figure 6-8). This dependency makes the private sector 
vulnerable to government cutbacks during low oil price cycles. Thus, the private sector 
cannot support the economy during low oil price cycles. Indeed, the relationship means that 
during low oil price cycles when the government curtails spending, the private sector also 
contracts, thus creating a negative spiral for the economy. 
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Figure 6-8: The Private Sector in Oman is Dependent on Government Expenditure 
Source: Compiled by the author.   
 
The third reason is related to the weak legal and regulatory aspects which did not 
provide a strong base to enable the private sector to move away from the control of the 
oligopolies and therefore grow (GOI6, 2016). 
 
Previous studies indicate the importance of a strong private sector in economic 
diversification (Abukumail et al., 2016; Lienert, 2009; Albassam, 2015; Ross et al., 2011). 
However, as demonstrated in this section the private sector in Omani is not able to play such 
role because of the chronic weaknesses in the sector. Nevertheless, arguably factors that act 
as obstacles to diversification might not necessarily be related to the economic structure. 
Other factors that affect economic diversification include governance levels and the existence 




This thesis contributes to the literature by identifying a new element, clandestine trade which 
emerged during the interviews and focus groups, to the economic factors highlighted by the 
resource curse. Clandestine trade can be defined as the situation whereby citizenship becomes 
a financial asset by which to secure business permits, franchises or access to subsidies and 
soft loans. Importantly, clandestine trade is not limited to Oman but exists in all the GCC 
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countries. This can be attributed to the protection offered by the governments to encourage 
their citizens to become involved in the private sector. 
 
However, most interviewees highlighted the negative impact of this phenomenon on 
the private sector’s involvement in the economy. Business permits allow expats to run the 
business in exchange for a certain amount to be paid to the permit/license holder.19 In 
addition, franchising is used to boost clandestine trade, as highlighted by an interviewed 
academic:  
One family company managed to secure franchises for more than 80 products they 
do nothing, but at the end of the year they get 20% of the profit that is also 
clandestine trade (AI1, 2016). 
Furthermore, the subsidies and soft loans scheme offered by the government were described 
by a government official as: 
The Omani citizen could secure a business permit and a soft loan, he might know 
nothing about the business. Obviously, the company will end up in the hands of the 
expat who does have the know-how but does not have the legal cover to secure 
such business permit. Unfortunately, such practices were not limited to the craft 
sector but also in other sectors like the mining permits where the Omani would 
hand the mining permit to an expat in exchange for a small payment at the end of 
each year (GOI10, 2016). 
 
Another aspect that encourages clandestine trade is the weak regulation which allows 
citizens who are employed in the public sector to secure business permits despite already 
holding a full-time job. As a result, the business has to be managed by someone else. Thus, 
according to a Majlis Oman member: 
In my opinion, there is no private sector in Oman. As we could have businesses 
owned by nationals but in reality the operations are by expats. There is no real 
input in the economy from that sector (MO5, 2016). 
Another Focus group participant from academia added:  
There are no clear regulations which clarify who can obtain such permits. The 
situation now is that anyone can get a business permit even if he is a government 
employee and has no time to run the business  (FGO2, 2016). 
 
Some interviewees indicated that the current licensing procedures resulted in an 
increase in negative commercial practices. The authorisation procedure prohibits non-Omanis 
                                                
19 The literature is increasingly discussing the ‘Kafala (sponsorship) system’ through which an expat becomes 
beholden to the Omani citizen who sponsor his/her visa. Accordingly, the sponsorship system can be considered 
as one facet of the clandestine trade. Furthermore, expat worker trafficking can also be considered part of 
clandestine trade.  
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from securing business licenses/permits unless it is in partnership with an Omani citizen. This 
practice can be used to ensure illegal gains, according to a private sector participant.  
It could also be used for tax evasion purposes as according to the law a company 
that makes less than OMR30,000 profit it is exempt from tax so they could 
distribute the profit through different companies to use this loophole (BI7, 2016). 
The business environment has been affected negatively as clandestine trade is 
associated with issues such as a decline in the quality of services, the dominance of a 
particular nationality over certain sectors and unfair competition with Omanis 
 
In summary, clandestine trade clearly has a negative impact on the private sector 
performance, as well as on the economy in general. The effects of the phenomena may 
explain the unbalanced labour market in which there is a high growth in Omani 
unemployment but a high growth in the inflows of expats. As illustrated in this section, the 
lack of a strong legal and regulatory framework are behind the clandestine trade. This creates 
other problems in the private sector environment such as unfair competition between the 
expats who are running the business on behalf of Omanis and new entrants into the market 
who are unemployed young nationals searching for a better opportunity. For example, 
according to NCSI (2016a), 44% of the national workforce in the private sector have higher 
education qualifications in comparison to 6.5% of expats. However, 62% of Omanis 
employed in the private sector receive less than OMR500 per month (see Figure 6-9). That 
could be attributed to the unfair competition posed by expat managers, because encouraging 
Omanis to develop their careers ultimately jeopardises the positions of the expats. 
Furthermore, one of the main insights of this thesis reveals is the illegal use of clandestine 
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Figure 6-9: National Workforce in the Private Sector by Wage 
Source: Compiled by the author with data was obtained from NCSI (2016a) 
 
6.8 Conclusion	
This chapter provides an in-depth analysis of the economic factor as a channel of the resource 
curse that impedes economic diversification in Oman. The oil revenues have provided the 
state with the means to develop the infrastructure of the country. However, the massive 
revenues have distorted the economic structure including the labour market. As suggested by 
the resource curse theory, the economic factors such as the Dutch disease and the oil price 
volatility are key reasons behind the state’s inability to diversify the economy. In contrast, 
although the Dutch disease hypotheses predicts that the exchange rate appreciation and the 
crowding out effect of the workforce from the other economic sectors to the newly developed 
public sector and the flourishing non-tradable sectors are behind the limited development of 
the tradable sectors. However, as demonstrated by the participants, the Dutch disease 
symptoms are not fully evident in Oman.  
 
Similarly, oil price volatility is not believed by the participants to be an influential 
factor in blocking economic diversification. In fact, most interviewees indicated that oil price 
volatility is a driver for reform policies rather than the opposite. Furthermore, the question 
triggered by many of the interviewees was, why has the government not learnt from the 
previous oil prices crises? This thesis argues that the answer is related to the decision-
makers’ lack of belief in the importance of the economy diversification. For example, in 1986 
when oil prices were weak the government initiated expenditure reform measures; however, 
as soon as the oil price started to rise the measures were abolished.  
 
The chapter highlights two of economic diversification tools being used by the 
government. The first was the creation of the SGRF which was intended to utilise surpluses 
from oil revenues by investing the funds for future generations and to support the government 
deficit during the low oil prices cycles. The second example was the creation of a new 
multipurpose city to utilise the strategic location of the country. In both examples the 
mismanagement, lack of consistency, and the overlapping duties have affected negatively 
those economic diversification tools. 
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In addition, this chapter analyses the role of the government as the main actor in the 
economy which to a large extent is a model of economic statism.20 However, economic 
statism in Oman is subtly different. In 1970, there was a dearth of state institutions. The need 
to create a modern state structure resulted in the government being responsible not only for 
the creation of a public sector but also for kick-starting a private sector. Since 1970, 
government has provided a limited number of top-level officials with the financial means to 
establish private sector companies. However, over time the officials have been transformed 
into oligarchs as they have the financial means and the political support needed to expand 
their businesses. This has resulted in the creation of an oligopolistic environment in the 
private sector which limited the expansion of the sector through competition from other 
enterprises. The relationship between capital and political influence is recognised in the 
literature as part of the resource curse channels. 
 
In summary, the economic factor as a channel for the unsuccessful diversification 
policies in Oman did not match the resource curse hypothesis. In this context, the political 
and social environment has had a greater impact on the economy environment than the 
impact of oil price volatility or the Dutch disease. Issues such as a lack of accountability, the 
absence of checks and balance measures, inconsistent decision-making, individualism and 
lack of a strong regulatory environment were repeatedly raised by the interviewees. In 
conclusion, the economic factors are the result of other factors, such as the lack of human 
resource development, institutional inefficiency and social and political factors. This finding 
supports the main argument of the thesis that the unsuccessful economic diversification is not 
the result of the economic channels alone. Accordingly, the next chapter investigates the 
human resource development deficiencies as another obstacle towards economic 
diversification in Oman. 
  
                                                
20 Economic statism occurs when “the state intervenes extensively in the development process” (Lewis, 
1994:438).  














Chapter 7 Human Resource Development 
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7.1 Introduction		
This chapter analyses the second of the four factors that impede Oman’s ability to achieve 
sustainable economic development without a dependency on oil; human resource 
development. The importance of human resource development is highlighted in most 
economic development literature, as human resources are the cornerstone of any development 
strategy (Al-Lamki, 2000; Daniele, 2011; Manning, 2004; Pineda & Rodríguez, 2010). The 
literature concludes that achieving sustainable economic development requires educated, 
trained and skilled human resources (Bravo-Ortega & Gregorio, 2007; UNDP, 2003; Wadho, 
2014).  
 
Decision makers in Oman have been aware of the importance of human resource 
development since 1970. This has been a goal in each of the FYDPs and also regularly 
features in Sultan Qaboos’s speeches. For example, in a speech on the occasion of the second 
National Day on 18 November 1972, he stated: 
Education is my great concern, and I saw that it was necessary to direct efforts to 
spread education. We have given the Ministry of Education the opportunity and 
supplied it with our capabilities to break the chains of ignorance. Schools have 
been opened regardless; the important thing is that there should be education, even 
under the shadow of trees (cited in MOI, 2015:19). 
Similarly, in his speech at the Vision 2020 Conference in 1995, he argued: 
Development is not a goal in itself. Rather, it exists for building man [sic], who is 
its means and producer. Therefore, development must not stop at the achievement 
of a diversified economy. It must go beyond that and contribute to the formation of 
the citizen who is capable of taking part in the process of progress and 
comprehensive development (cited in Al-Lamki, 2000:4).  
 
As discussed in Chapter Two, there has been an impressive improvement in the 
indicators associated with human development in Oman, and especially in combination with 
healthcare services and literacy ratios (MONE, 2012). Many factors, however, have 
prevented the country from benefiting fully from such improvements. These factors include 
the economic structure, the dominant role of the state and the rentier environment. Therefore, 
it is not surprising that the country is now facing negative consequences of the missed 
opportunity on human resource development, such as the relatively limited participation of its 
citizens in the private sector (Hazim, 2003:139). As a result, in recent years, the government 
introduced various initiatives to deal with the challenges facing human resource 
development. One of the main initiatives was the ‘Omanisation Strategy’ that commenced in 
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1988 (MONE, 1995). In 2014, the government announced its Human Resource Development 
Strategy, 2040, which aims to deal with many problems, but mainly focuses on reducing the 
gap between the output of the education system and the private sector demands for the 
workforce (EC, 2014:12). 
 
The availability of funds from oil exports has helped the government to initiate large-
scale development programmes that focus on improving the infrastructure. However, the 
labour market demonstrates a chronic distortion. For example, the government has been 
asserting in each FYDP the importance of Omani employment in the private sector. The 
government has attempted to implement its plans toward larger participation of citizens in the 
private sector through two dimensions. The first dimension is through the expansion of the 
private sector, and attracting more foreign companies to operate in the country. The second 
dimension is through attempts to encourage more citizens to apply for jobs in the private 
sector. However, the reality is somewhat different. The expat population in 2003 was around 
450,000, but by December 2016 had jumped to around 2 million, which accounts for more 
than 45% of the total population (NCSI, 2016c). Figure 7-1 highlights labour market 
participation in the private sector by nationality in 2011 and 2013. The growth of expat 
workers from India, Bangladesh, Pakistan and other nationalities is shown to be much higher 
than the growth of Oman’s citizens joining the private sector. These outcomes could be the 
result of a distortion in world labour markets, but also suggest that there are specific issues in 
labour market development in Oman.  
 
Figure 7-1: Private Sector Labour Market Participation by Nationality, 2011 and 2013 
Source: Ennis and Al-Jamali, (2014:13). 
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As discussed previously, rentier state characteristics are apparent in Oman with the 
government being the main employer and the use of employment in the public sector being 
the primary method of wealth distribution. According to NCSI (NCSI, 2016a), around 48% 
of the total domestic labour force work in the public sector, but only 12.7% in the private 
sector. Public sector employment is this context is behind the development of a rentier 
mentality, which affects productivity levels because of the absence of performance measures 
in the public sector. Furthermore, because of the increasing social tensions linked with the 
wider Arab Spring, in 2011, the government announced the creation of 50,000 new jobs in 
the public sector, which resulted in the transfer of more than 6% of Omanis from the private 
to the public sector. In turn, this lead to sharply falling Omanisation levels in the private 
sector (see Figure 7-2). Furthermore, according to Al Harithy (2013), the increasing numbers 
of young graduates mean that the state will not be able to sustain this type of recruitment 
strategy, and the only option is to encourage young graduates to work in the private sector.  
 
Figure 7-2: Omanisation in the Private Sector, 2010 to 2012 
Source: Ennis and Al-Jamali, (2014:12) 
 
In addition to the rentier mentality which reduces the motivation to obtain 
employment in the private sector, there are other challenges in the labour market. One of 
which is related to the mismatch between demand and supply of skilled workforce (EC, 
2014:88). In order to narrow this gap the labour market needs to work more closely with 
education institutions. This approach is normally absent in rentier states which is partly due 
to financial differences, job security and status that is often associated with public sector 
employment but not usually with the private sector. 
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In order to analyse the participants’ views on the impact of human resource 
development on economic diversification policies, this chapter is divided into five further 
sections. The first section provides an overview of the importance of education in achieving 
economic diversification and the performance of the Omani education system. Section two 
assesses the labour market structure on the implementation of economic diversification 
strategies. Section three evaluates the labour market environment in Oman, Omani 
participation in the private sector and obstacles that prevent Omanisation in the private 
sector. Section four analyses the importance of research and development (R&D) in 
transforming the oil-based economy to a knowledge-based economy. The section also 
analyses the R&D environment in Oman and highlights the main challenges that face its 
expansion. The final section summarises the main findings of the chapter.  
 
7.2 Human	Resource	Development	 
This section provides an analysis of the impact of educational policy on human resource 
development. The importance of human resource development in achieving economic 
diversification requires a strong understanding levels of education and knowledge needed by 
the private sector labour market (Hazim, 2003; Sajwani, 1997). More Omanis employed in 
the private sector would not only help to expand the private sector and decrease remittance 
outflows, but ease the economic pressure on the government that is currently the main 
employer, and increase productivity levels in both the private and the public sectors.  
 
Employment is a critical issue in Oman as there are around 130,000 registered job-
seekers, 110,000 registered students in the universities and an expectation that by 2020 
around 250,000 to 300,000 will be seeking jobs (NCSI, 2016a). The capacity for recruitment 
in the public sector has been shrinking in the last few years. Furthermore, during the period 
between 1970 and 2015, the total number of jobs that the private sector was able to provide 
for Omanis was only around 207,000 (NCSI, 2016a). The growth rate of Omani 
unemployment is related to the growth rate of expat workers, and indicates ineffective 
policies as suggested in an interview with a government official: 
We achieved very good overall development in all the aspects as services are 
available in every corner in the country where you can see schools, healthcare 
centres, and most of the important services. However, the distortion in the labour 
market is one of the main problems that could be attributed to the lack of a proper 
education system. Add to that we have overlap between the government 
institutions that are responsible for the education (GOI1, 2016). 
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Although human resource development has been addressed in each FYDP, the eighth 
FYDP (FAERC, 2011) argued that the economy diversification policies were incompatible 
with human resource development. Therefore, this has resulted in limited Omani participation 
in the private sector labour market. The plan highlighted that previous economic 
diversification policies focused on the expansion of the non-tradable non-oil economic 
sectors, such as construction, which resulted in an increased demand for a cheap workforce. 
Thus, the policies, rather than the lack of government expenditure, is the reason behind the 
weak human resource development, according to a Majlis Oman participant: 
All the GCC countries are facing a similar problem, which is not only the lack of 
human development, but also the availability of skilled human sources. In my 
opinion, it is not an economic problem, and it is not about allocating enough 
resources for education. As our expenditure in education and healthcare as a 
percentage was almost similar to other countries (MO2, 2016). 
 
In this context, most participants highlighted the importance of the performance of the 
education system as a cornerstone in achieving effective human resource development. For 
example, they suggest that the unsuccessful economic diversification in Oman and in other 
GCC countries can be attributed to the lack of proper human resource development (GOI13, 
2016), which, in turn, is related to the quality of education and the lack of good training 
opportunities. This relationship is also emphasized in the UNCTAD (2014:13)21 report, 
which concludes that quality of education is an issue of concern, especially regarding the 
enhancement of technological knowledge and related skills. The mentioned report highlights 
that even graduates of Sultan Qaboos University, the top university in the country, lack the 
competencies that are required by the labour market; for example, the curriculum in 
universities does not contain courses in communication skills, business practices, 
management skills or business research skills. UNCTAD stresses the importance of 
improving coordination between the primary and the university levels, and also suggests that 
universities should focus more on R&D, technology adaptation and innovation. 
 
In addition, the World Bank Enterprise Survey confirms that the observations related 
to the quality of education reported in the 2003 survey remain the same as in 2014. The main 
observations reported were: 
                                                
21 The UNCTAD report was conducted in response to a request by the Government of Oman. During visits to 
the Sultanate of Oman, the team held nearly 100 interviews and meetings with representatives of government 
agencies, research institutes, universities, trade unions, chambers of commerce, businesses and non-
governmental organizations (UNCTAD, 2014).  
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Labour-related constraints are the most severe for Omani firms. (…) Skill 
deficiencies, due to foundational reasons or lack of specific proficiencies, could 
explain the disproportionately lower growth rate and the “structural 
unemployment” of Omani labour in private sector employment between 2006 and 
2014 … The skill level of the private sector workforce is low and does not add 
value to the composition of economic activities. The Omani private sector is not 
benefiting from the large inflow of unskilled expat workers, and Omani workers 
are not well-trained to assume highly paid positions (Abukumail et al., 2016). 
The previous quotes indicate that participants and literature findings identify that one of the 
major challenges facing human resource development in Oman is the quality of education, 
which is analysed in detail in the following sections.  
 
7.2.1 Education	Quality		
Chapter Two explained that prior to the discovery of oil there were only three schools in 
Oman but by 2016 there were 1,647 (NCSI, 2016d). This was the result of huge government 
investment as Sultan Qaboos wanted the government to prioritise education as a means by 
which citizens could improve their living standards. To achieve this goal, the government 
initiated a large-scale development programmeme to provide basic education in all regions. 
According to Buckley and Rynhart (2011), Omani investment in education as a percentage of 
GDP was higher than the GCC average. This investment in the education system resulted in 
significant improvement in education participation and lower the illiteracy rates. According 
to Alsarmi (2014:33), the rationale behind the horizontal education philosophy was to 
decrease the illiteracy levels in the country as a first step. The second stage was to focus on 
the quality of education and to provide higher education opportunities. Thus, in 1986 the first 
university was established. However, the quality of primary education remains below 
international standards (GOI6, 2016; MOE & WB, 2013). 
 
Most participants acknowledge that the horizontal education philosophy was vitally 
important for providing equal opportunities in education. However, although the government 
has allocated appropriate funds to build schools and training institutions, it has failed to 
prioritise the development of human resources to staff these effectively. Alsarmi (2014:37) 
confirms that to establish effective large-scale educational institutions the state needs to 
invest in teacher development programmemes. In the case of Oman, the teachers’ 
development programmeme has mostly targeted students who have not been able to achieve 
other opportunities. Thus, most participants attribute the deterioration in primary education in 
Oman to the teacher selection process as it is not based on effective standards (Albalushi, 
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2014:10). The selection process has resulted in recruiting teachers who are generally not 
motivated to deliver effective learning, but instead are often motivated only to secure a job 
(MOE & WB, 2013:126). Teacher selection processes and training have resulted in replacing 
well-qualified foreign teachers with less-qualified Omani teachers, as indicated by a focus 
group participant from the government: 
In the 1970s and 1980s we had the best teachers in the education system … people 
genuinely believed in their message and their duties (FGO3, 2016). 
Furthermore, government official interviewee (GOI16, 2016) adds a further point that there 
have been poor financial incentives for teachers to undertake further professional training. 
 
In addition, the poor quality of primary education has negatively influenced standards 
in higher education. According to an interview with a political scientist (AI2, 2016), although 
the government invested large sums in the education system, it has not resulted in improving 
the quality of performance. The results of a survey by Abukumail et al. (2016) show that the 
lack of adequately educated citizens was the third most rated obstacle in the business 
environment constraining the sustainability of companies. This confirms that the horizontal 
education policy had a negative impact on the quality of higher education. This situation can 
be described as a circular dilemma. The universities receive students who graduate from a 
poor quality primary education system, and some of these students then become teachers, 
which contribute to maintaining the poor quality. This was confirmed by an academic 
participant:  
A government entity published a work opportunity announcement for an Arabic 
text reviewer. Most of the people who applied for the job were Arabic teachers; 
however, none of them fulfilled the job requirement and demonstrated a very low 
knowledge (AI1, 2016). 
 
Due to the poor quality of the educational process, general education students do not 
have the minimum knowledge required by the universities (Almamary, 2015). According to 
MOE and WB (2013:152), higher education institutions are forced to establish a foundation 
year because the students are not sufficiently qualified to study at university, especially in 
English, information technology, science and mathematics. This was confirmed in an 
interview with a Majlis Oman participant: 
SQU initiated a one-year programmeme that students must go through in order to 
achieve a particular requirement to start a course. Otherwise they have to continue 
the qualifying course; for example, out of 1200 students being accepted by one 
private university only around 20 were qualified to start their courses immediately, 
and the rest entered the qualifying course for one year. Through that year, only 
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20% successfully completed qualifying course, and the rest had to take an extra 
year. Unfortunately, this resulted in universities being forced to lower their 
teaching standards to be able to deal with these students (MO4, 2016). 
Furthermore, students in schools and universities often lack basic skills that are needed to 
compete for jobs in the increasingly competitive labour market.  
 
One of the issues raised by most participants was the financial incentives gap between 
teachers and other public sector institutions; for example, students who undertake a four-year 
teacher training programmeme graduate with a salary much lower than if they had chosen to 
enrol in a two-year military training programmeme. Figure 7-3 highlights the civil service 
employee distribution by financial grade in Oman. Ministry of Education employees are 
concentrated at financial grades 4, 5 or 6, but university graduates are recruited at grade 6 
level and over time can be promoted subject to the availability of funding. One academic 
participant (AI1, 2016) suggested that problems in the education system started when the 
government first established teacher training colleges. Students who could not find a better 
opportunity enrolled in these colleges. This was a two-year programmeme,22 and then the 
graduate was recruited as a teacher without any further training. Furthermore, they received 
the lowest salaries in the public sector, which contributed to the lowering of educational 
standards. The main demands of the widespread teachers’ protests and strikes that took place 
2011 and 2013 were increased salaries and the enhancement of education infrastructure 
(Aljazeera, 2011; Sky News, 2013). The importance of financial incentives and willingness 
of students to work as teachers was one of the main issues raised by various participants. For 
example, a government official argues that: 
In other countries like Germany, for example, the teaching is considered as one of 
the highest paid jobs, and not anyone could be a teacher unless they pass 
qualification exams to test if they are genuinely willing to teach. In comparison to 
Oman where the teaching as a job is still the worst in financial incentives. In 
conclusion, education in Oman was not the top priority in the government agenda, 
and that results in the outcome we have today (the worst in the region), and for 
that, we need to have a strategy for education that starts from preschool (GOI2, 
2016). 
 
Some participants highlighted the problems related to private higher education 
institutes, which depend on government scholarships for students as their primary source of 
                                                
22 The situation changed recently with establishment of teacher training colleges that provide a bachelor degree 
after four years. 
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funding. This often results in them accepting too many students which has an adverse effect 
on the quality of their education. One government official participant comments:    
The current higher education institutes in Oman are not producing a quality 
education as most of the private colleges and universities are seeking profit rather 
than the quality of education. This had resulted in graduates who do not have the 
minimum level of soft skills that are required by the labour market 
(communication, …). For that reason, the government tried to create an 
educational strategy that will cover and try to solve the problems in the current 
education system. That will also mean a restructure of the educational system in 
Oman to include vocational education. Unfortunately, we do not see that strategy 
yet (GOI2, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 7-3: % Civil Service Employees Distribution by Financial Grade. 
Source: Compiled by the author from data obtained from MONE (2010:104-112). 
 
Although financial incentives and social recognition for the teachers can influence the 
quality of their performance, human resource development depends on the sustainability of 
education policies. Therefore, the following section analyses policy constraints hindering the 
improvement of the education system in Oman.  
 
7.2.2 Education	Policy	Sustainability	
Key factors that affect the implementation of strategies are a lack of coordination and 
consistency in the strategy. The participants were asked about their views regarding the 
execution of the human resource development strategy as a subset of the main development 
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economic planning, which should include human resource development alongside overall 
state development. For example, a Majlis Oman participant (MO2, 2016) highlights the gap 
between the annual budget and the implementation of the long-term development plan. 
Additionally, he identifies the absence of coordination between annual budgets, the FYDPs 
and Vision 2020.  
 
In addition, many participants identified that the education system in Oman suffers 
from a structural problem in terms of the government bodies that are responsible for the 
education system and the overlap of duties between these institutions. For example, the 
Ministry of Manpower is responsible for vocational training, the Ministry of Education is 
responsible for general education, and the Ministry of Higher Education is responsible for 
higher educational establishments. There is one other body, the High Council for Education, 
which operates under the Royal Court and alongside the Educational Committee in the House 
of Parliament and an Educational Committee in the State Council. All these bodies draft 
plans without any coordination. This lack of effective planning is reflected by the low 
ranking in all international educational measures TIMSS; for example, Ludger (2015)23 
concludes that the education system in Oman was amongst the five lowest ranked countries 
in the world alongside Morocco, Honduras, South Africa and Ghana. These findings are 
supported by a Majlis Oman participant: 
There is no education law or education strategy. The education strategy drafting 
process started in 2003 and in 2007 the draft was sent to the Cabinet till 2011 when 
the State Council decided to step in and request that strategy to be handed to the 
State Council, and since 2011 it is still under draft (MO4, 2016). 
In this context, the State Council responds to the public calls for the education system 
enhancement. In March 2017 the State Council announce that there are critical challenge 
currently facing education quality as a result of the overlap of responsibilities requires an 
urgent resolution (TSC, 2017). 
 
The overlapping responsibilities have created a further structural problem in the 
labour market, whereby the increased growth rate of Omani unemployment is also associated 
with the increased growth rate of the expat workers (Ennis & Al-Jamali, 2014; Espinoza, 
2012; Hertog, 2010b). This issue can be attributed to weaknesses in government institutions 
                                                
23 The findings were presented at the World Education Forum in South Korea. The rankings are based on a 
mixture of international assessments, including the OECD’s Pisa tests, the TIMSS tests run by US-based 
academics and TERCE tests in Latin America, putting developed and developing countries on a single scale. 
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that are not able to improve performance of education systems; for example, 80% of Omanis 
employed in the private sector are non-graduates, and 88% of foreign expats are employed in 
the private sector (NCSI, 2016d). This indicates that the labour market does not require 
highly skilled employees, because of the structure of the private sector, which mainly consists 
of the non-oil non-tradable sectors, such as services and construction. In this context, a Majlis 
Oman participant suggests that the state should aim to expand academic education, or 
concentrate on vocational and technical training: 
Right now, we have 110,000 students in the universities. How can the government 
employ them in the current situation when there is a weak private sector? For that 
reason, the first step towards human resource development might be the 
enhancement of the education institutions’ performance (MO2, 2016). 
Similarly, an academic participant (AI3, 2016) argues that weak education quality can be 
attributed to mismanagement associated with lack of planning. For example, the government 
is anxious to provide higher education opportunities for all general education graduates, but 
the labour market does not require workers with such qualifications. As one government 
official participant points out, the current education system structure does not work in 
harmony with labour market demands: 
Oman’s need to create a layer of semi-skilled graduates that could work and 
replace the experts in jobs like plumbing or electrical work or even car mechanics 
(GOI13, 2016). 
 
Other participants (GOI14, 2016; GOI12, 2016) suggest a further reason for the weak 
human resource development is the lack of accountability, without which it is difficult to 
impose reforms. For example, it is not possible to fire unproductive employees even when 
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Figure 7-4: The General Education Student Growth from 2006/07 
Source: Compiled by the author from data obtained from NCSI (2016c:423-424). 
 
Most participants indicate a lack of coordination between different government 
entities; for example, the population censuses24 in 1993 and 2003 gave decision-makers the 
required data regarding demographic growth. However, although the data clearly indicated 
the required number of teachers to sustain the educational process, Royal Decree No. 62/2007 
transformed five colleges of education into colleges of applied sciences (EC, 2016). 
Figure 7-4 illustrates shows that general education student numbers have increased sharply 
since 2010/11, which could have been calculated from the 2003 census. Thus, a government 
official participant states: 
The government decided to close most of the teacher colleges under the 
justification that the Ministry of Education will not require any more teachers for 
the next seven years. However, before those seven years ends the government 
discovered that the state needed more than 20,000 new teachers to sustain the 
general education system. That is evidence of lack of planning in the sector (GOI7, 
2016). 
 
The participants also highlighted issues related to the consistency of implementing 
strategies in terms of the teacher selection process. A focus group participant argues that the 
lack of coordination between government institutions that are responsible for different 
aspects of education and financial incentives for teachers (FNGO2, 2016). 
 
7.2.3 Summary	of	Human	Resource	Development	Findings	
Three key findings can be derived regarding the importance of human resource development 
to achieve economic diversification. The first finding in this section underscores that 
although the government has created an education system accessible to all citizens, the 
quality of education was not a top priority for the government, even though the authorities 
were aware of the importance of human resource development. The second finding identifies 
that the sustainability and consistency of human resource development depends not only on 
policies and strategies, but also on the implementation process. In Oman, this process is 
hindered by too many bodies having responsibility for education, resulting in a lack of 
coordination in the implementation of policies. The third finding highlights the structural 
problems in the education system in Oman and the root causes of low quality in the education 
                                                
24 The census covered subjects such as demographics, education, housing, household, assets, employment, 
migration, fertility and disability. 
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processes. Most participants indicate that apart from the lack of effective application of 
human resource development strategies, there are other contributory factors, such as the lack 
of accountability and overlapping of duties of different government institutions. In addition, 
the lack of financial incentives for teachers has negative effects on the quality of teaching 
processes. These findings are supported by UNCTAD (2014:10), which reports that the 
education system in Oman focuses on quantity rather than quality. Thus, the education 
system needs reform with a focus on policies that improve educational outcomes. This report 
also suggests that the Omanisation policy adopted in the education sector has resulted in 
replacing foreign teachers with local teachers who do not have the required level of 
competency or motivation. Additionally, the report also highlights that: 
The need to improve basic education in Oman is confirmed by the fact that most 
tertiary education institutions require their students to take “foundation courses” 
before beginning undergraduate studies. Piecemeal information from Trends in 
International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) produced by the 
International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (Boston) 
indicates that Oman performs rather poorly in international education tests 
(UNCTAD, 2014:10).  
 
In conclusion, ineffective human resource development is related to the quality of 
education that can be attributed to poor institutional quality. The next section analyses the 
reasons for the gap between education system outcomes and the private sector demands for 
its workforce. This thesis argues that this gap between supply and demand in the labour 
market is not limited to the quality of the education itself, but also includes other aspects that 
are discussed in the following sections. 
 
7.3 Labour	Market	Supply	and	Demand	
Another issue raised by the participants about the impact of human resource development in 
relation to economic diversification is that of the labour market in Oman. According to a 
Chatham House report (Ennis & Al-Jamali, 2014:18), the Omani government deals with 
labour market problems by crisis management rather than the implementation of long-term 
strategies. “Oman is returning to old economic patterns, extending patronage rather than 
strengthening economic citizenship” (Ennis & Al-Jamali, 2014:18). This section highlights 
the main issues that hinder citizens participating in the private sector work force: 
Omanisation, rentier mentality and expat competition. 
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7.3.1 Omanisation	Strategy	
The rentier political and economic structure reflects the fact that the government is the main 
employer in the economy. According to NCSI's recent survey (2015), 95% of jobseekers 
prefer to work in the public sector, because working in the public sector provides stability 
and security, promotion opportunities and better financial incentives than the private sector. 
Thus, three main factors affect individuals’ decisions to apply for a specific job, namely: 1) 
financial incentives; 2) the status associated with the job; and 3) the availability of adequate 
training. Chapter Two discusses the Omanisation Strategy that started in 1988, which aims to 
replace expat workers with Omanis in the public and private sectors. However, by 1995 
around 80% of the workforce in the public sector were Omanis, and the policy of 
Omanisation then focused only on the private sector labour market. Figure 7-5 shows that 
despite the various human resource development strategies and the Omanisation 
programmeme, Omanis as a percentage of the private sector workforce has fallen sharply 
from 1975 to 2015. The other observation is that the predicted Omanisation percentage in the 
private sector in 2020 does not reflect the reality of the situation with only a few years to go 
before the target date is reached. 
 
Figure 7-5: Omani Percentage in the Private Sector Workforce 
Source: Compiled by the author from data obtained from multi publications of NCSI. 
Note: * Vision Oman 2020 Estimate. 
 
Drilling down further into the data, certain sectors of the private sector have achieved 
higher levels of Omanisation than others. Figure 7-6 illustrates the breakdown of Omanis and 
expat in various categories of the private sector. Financial services, utilities, transport and 
communication and property have achieved high levels of Omanisation, but the percentage of 
citizens’ participation in all the other sectors is relatively small. The participants were asked 
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companies, had higher rates of Omanisation than other sectors. One government official 
participant suggested that the high levels of Omanisation in certain sectors was not only 
because of effective regulatory bodies, but also because the financial, insurance and 
telecommunications sectors provide generous financial incentives, which make these sectors 
more attractive to Omanis. In addition, work security and career development plans are 
provided by these sectors, which helps to attract more citizens (GOI6, 2016). Most 
participants confirm that financial incentives affect individuals’ decisions to choose their 
work opportunity. According to an interviewed government official: 
I think it is all about incentives for all those sectors paying high salaries compared 
to other sectors. Also, the government is aware that those sectors could absorb a 
high number for national employment, and the Omanis will have no problem to 
work in those sectors that have prestige. Furthermore, there is a good foundation in 
those sectors; for example, we have the banking institute (GOI2, 2016). 
 
Figure 7-6: Labour Distribution in the Private Sector 
Source: Ennis & Al-Jamali (2014:13). 
 
Political decisions could underlie the higher rates of Omanisation in some sectors; for 
example, the Banking Institute (which later became the College for Banking and Financial 
Studies) was one of the first specialised colleges that provided higher education opportunities 
for the Omanis. The establishment of this college was associated with orders from the Sultan 
to increase Omanisation in the banking sector over a period of 10 years. The political 
decision came from the top and was implemented immediately, with rational and gradual 
target to increase the ratio of Omani working in the sector. According to an interviewed 
government official: 
There were direct orders from the Sultan to nationalise the employment in the 
banking and the insurance sectors. So those institutions started the Omanisation 
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process using the bottom to top approach. They started with the clerics and 
cashiers all the way up to deputy CEOs and then later to CEOs. However, the 
Sultan was not happy with the bottom-to-top approach, and then ordered the 
opposite approach from top-to-bottom, and that helped those sectors to increase the 
percentage of national employees gradually over five years. Today they have 
achieved around 90% (GOI12, 2016). 
 
Although some participants agreed that various sectors had achieved satisfactory 
levels of Omanisation, there remain negative aspects of employment, such as nepotism. 
According to NCSI (2015:50), 87% of university level students and 65% of jobseekers 
believe that nepotism negatively affects their ability to obtain a job. Furthermore, the 
presence of nepotism could undermine productivity and performance, as implied by a 
government official interviewee: 
The banking, financial sector and the telecommunication companies are better, as 
they have competitiveness procedures to filter who should be recruited and after 
that, each employee has a productivity and performance audit on a yearly basis. 
However, there are many cases where people are promoted because of their 
relationship to influential officials and this is a reflection of the nepotism (GOI8, 
2016). 
 
Many participants suggest that the private sector is not taking responsibility for 
becoming more involved in the education system. This lack of partnership has resulted in a 
gap between labour market demands and graduates’ skills and knowledge (MO1 2016; AI2 
2016; AI3 2016; MO4 2016; GOI4 2016; GOI12 2016; BI8 2016; BI9 2016). Responses also 
show that this gap is not only the result of education system standards, but is also related to 
the absence of practical on-the-job training in higher education (AI2, 2016; JI1, 2016; BI5, 
2016). Some respondents argue that particular trades do not require higher education 
certificates, but require on-job training. However, the monopoly of certain companies over 
private training institutions has a negative effect on the quality of the training. This is 
highlighted by a government official respondent: 
If somebody conducts scientific research to check how much the government paid 
for the training, I’m sure we will find that we had paid a lot of money but the 
outcome was not good. Most of the training centres in Oman are under the 
management of certain companies. If we could guarantee that international training 
centres with a good reputation would come to the country and open branches on 
one condition, that there is no hidden partner with them, then we might get a good 
outcome. In conclusion, I agree with you that we have a lack of human resource 
development (GOI12, 2016). 
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According to the Ministry of Education and the World Bank (2013:153), vocational training 
in Oman is still relatively limited and does not reflect the increased demand for specific 
qualifications in the private sector.  
 
Another factor is that most students study non-scientific subjects, which “reflect a 
serious dysfunction in the education system as a whole” (MOE & WB, 2013:153). Figure 7-7 
illustrates graduate distribution by subject. In comparison, Figure 7-8 shows that expat 
qualification distribution, with around 75% having only a general education certificate or 
merely the ability to read and write.  
 
The outcome of these factors according to a government official respondent (GOI1, 
2016) is the existence of two groups of jobseekers in the labour market. The first group are 
those without skills or qualifications, and the second group is comprised of university 
graduates without the competencies that are required by the labour market. Therefore, there is 
a limited number of semi-skilled or middle level skilled jobseekers, which contributes to 
increased numbers of expats in the country. 
 
 
Figure 7-7: Graduate Distribution by Subject 
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Figure 7-8: Expat Qualification Distribution 
Source: Compiled by the author the data obtained from NCSI (2016d). 
 
Some interviewees suggested that the distortion in the labour market is because of the 
mismanagement by and the overlap between government institutions that are responsible for 
the management of the labour market. For example, a focus group participant from Majlis 
Oman (FMO1, 2016) suggests that there is the problem of overlapping responsibilities 
between various institutions. One example is role of the Ministry of Manpower which is not 
limited to regulations, but is also involved in the daily operations of companies through 
setting the details of projects’ workforce’s requirements. Therefore, instead of just regulating 
the labour market, the Ministry also forces companies to hire Omanis without taking into 
consideration factors such as the timeframe required to train Omanis in order to be up to 
speed with the work requirements. Kuwait’s more flexible approach might provide a lesson 
to Oman on how it could reach its Omanisation targets with clear framework. Additionally, 
the respondent added: 
We need to restructure the entire work market in Oman so we should have a 
regulatory authority working separately from the ministries (FMO1, 2016). 
 
These observations raise another question: if the government identifies the financial 
gap between the public and the private sector as hindering the Omanisation process in the 
private sector, why does it not attempt to address this gap? The answer is proposed by various 
participants that the issue is not about the financial gap but is about the regulatory 
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2016), there is a lack of regulation in the labour market despite the Ministry of Manpower’s 
responsibility to check if companies are fulfilling the Omanisation requirements. He argues 
that the authorities fail to provide any incentive to encourage these companies to provide 
adequate training for new recruits. In contrast, the central bank has forced the financial 
institutions not only to fulfil the Omanisation requirements, but also to provide a career plan 
for new recruits including training. This type of policy has proven to be effective in 
increasing Omanis participation in the financial sector. Furthermore, according to a 
participant from the private sector (BI7, 2016):  
If there is serious political support, the government could start to work with the 
biggest companies in the country, and enforce legislation that limits executive 
management positions in these enterprises to citizens. Over time that should help 
the recruitment and the expansion of the Omanisation percentage in these 
companies. …. The main problem in Oman is that the decision makers themselves 
have no trust in the citizens’ capabilities and with the continuous existence of such 
a mind-set, I do not think we will be able to expand the Omanisation process in the 
private sector (BI7, 2016). 
 
A further obstacle to the Omanisation process raised by the participants was the 
competition from expat workers. The main argument regarding the competition is based on 
the perception that expat workers do not mind working long hours, they accept lower wages, 
and tolerate poorer working conditions and more physically demanding jobs. Furthermore, 
participants argue that many private companies are owned by expats, who are not willing to 
recruit Omanis as this would involve paying higher wages. Indeed, they appear to prefer to 
recruit their own nationals for various reasons, but mostly to hide commercial secrets from 
national workers. One government official respondent made the following observation: 
The Omanis are exposed to unfair competition from the foreign expats; for 
example, the foreign expats have no social commitments; their living standards 
might be lower as you could see ten foreign expats living in a one-bedroom 
apartment and therefore an expat could work for longer hours, as they have no 
commitments to a family. In comparison, the Omanis have social responsibilities, 
as you know we are a social community. Also, the living standard is a critical 
issue, as well as to take care of the family, so the Omani jobseeker would not 
accept a salary less than OMR300 but the foreign immigrant would accept 
OMR150 for the same job (GOI4, 2016). 
 
7.3.2 Rentier	Mentality	
According to NCSI (2015:29), 89% of jobseekers believe that the government is responsible 
for providing them with appropriate opportunities. Other results show that in 2013, 59% of 
higher education students believed the government was responsible for providing work 
opportunities, but by 2015 81% of university level students believed this. This clearly 
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indicates the existence of rentier mentality among citizens seeking jobs in Oman. In addition, 
most participants agree that the government has used recruitment in the public sector to 
achieve stability, which is a feature of the rentier state. For example, an interviewed Majlis 
Oman member suggests that there is over-staffing in government departments, and gives an 
example below: 
In the last report for the World Bank, a comparison could be drawn between the 
education system in Finland with the education system in Oman. In Finland, there 
are only 1,000 administrative staff employed their education system, while in 
Oman we have 20,000 administrative staff, not teachers just administration staff 
(MO8, 2016). 
Another interviewed government official participant adds: 
The other issue is about incentives. We all know that you should do well to be 
rewarded, but this is not the case in Oman. You do not need to work hard, you do 
not need to suffer, you do not have to be highly skilled, you do not have to be 
creative, and you do not need to publish papers to be rewarded, because you only 
need to be close to the authority to be rewarded. At the time, this is the mindset of 
the entire society. In fact, all government employment policies are enhancing the 
rentier mentality, and could create a serious problem in the future. This has 
affected the productivity among the young Omani employees (GOI5, 2016). 
 
According to an UNCTAD report (2014:27), the situation in Oman can be described 
as a dilemma whereby the labour market has both a shortage and a surplus. The shortage is 
increasing, because employment opportunities in the private sector are growing much faster 
than suitably qualified Omanis. The surplus is the direct result of citizens’ preferences to work 
in the public sector, which has reached maximum levels of employment. In addition, most 
Omanis in the private sector consider their job only temporary as they plan to move to the 
public sector immediately if a vacancy occurs. One worrying fact in this report is: 
There is a general expectation that the Government will continue to provide 
employment opportunities for its nationals. Recent increases in public sector jobs 
in response to concerns about social unrest, particularly among the youth, have 
reinforced such expectations (UNCTAD 2014:27).  
 
Oman’s dependency on oil export revenues could have a serious impact in the near 
future due to low oil prices necessitating the imposition of austerity measures, including cut 
backs in public sector employment. This could fuel social tensions, as according to NCSI 
(2015:12), 60% of university level students are not satisfied with the government’s 
performance regarding workforce policies. 
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7.3.3 Expatriate	Competition		
According to NCSI (2015:35), 76% of students at university level and 76% of jobseekers 
believe that competition from expat workers affects their chances of finding work. In this 
context, the participants highlighted the financial gap between the cost of recruiting citizens 
and expats rather than the quality or the level of skills between the two groups. Some 
participants argued that Omani graduates are well qualified to work in the private sector. 
According to an interviewed government official, many have proven themselves to be able to 
hold CEO positions in international companies. The concept that “Omanis are not well 
qualified to work in the private sector” has benefited expats, thus Oman needs a national plan 
to solve this problem. He adds: 
The government will need to fight with the monopolists and the expat lobbies who 
will definitely fight back, as such things will affect their profits (GOI2, 2016). 
 
In contrast, other participants believe that it is not unfair competition imposed by 
expats, but the issue is related to rentier mentality. In this context, one participant from the 
private sector (BI8, 2016) argued that the rentier mentality means everybody in society 
believes that the government is responsible for education, training and recruitment. 




This section provides an overview of the labour market structure in Oman. It demonstrates 
that there are a number of chronic structural problems, such as the Omanisation strategy 
implementation, rentier mentality and expat competition. Several participants highlighted the 
rentier mentality, which curtails the desire of nationals to work in the private sector. This is 
exacerbated by the financial rewards in the public and private sectors. In addition, there is a 
gap in the qualification distribution of expats in the private sector, which could mean that the 
government would be able to replace expats with nationals. However, according to some 
participants, this action requires taking political decisions. The evidence highlights that parts 
of the private sector, such as banking and telecommunications, have achieved high levels of 
Omanisation as a result of positive political decisions. The monopoly in some private sector 
companies has created unfair competition from the expats over Omanis, according to some 
participants’ observations. 
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Various reports and studies have identified problems in the labour market in Oman. 
One of these is the World Bank Report, which was conducted at the request of the Omani 
government, that concludes: 
Optimum Omanisation strategy would be based on recognition of the fundamental 
need to raise Omani productivity and developing an efficient labour market. It 
would rest on the following six pillars: (1) raising the quality of basic education 
and improving, particularly through on-the-job training, the work skills of Omanis; 
(2) fostering realistic expectations and competitive attitudes among young Omanis; 
(3) eliminating present sources of Omani unearned income (rent); (4) eliminating 
present labour market imperfections and avoiding the creation of new ones; (5) 
unifying the labour market by working overtime towards the elimination of 
public/private and Omani/expatriate remuneration differentials between people 
having comparable education, training, skills and experience; and (6) eliminating 
any implicit subsidisation of expatriate employment by ensuring that the employer 
or the expatriate employee pays the full marginal external costs to Oman of the 
expatriate's residence in Oman (The WB 1994:101). 
Similarly, a Chatham House report (Ennis & Al-Jamali, 2014:18) concludes that:  
The main obstacles to economic reform inOman are the embedded structural 
conditions requiring wholesale changes. At present, the country is mired in a self-
perpetuating feedback loop, returning to old patterns and nursing status quo 
expectations. … The post-2011 employment environment has been one of ad hoc 
fixes in response to discontent. There is little doubt that these were only temporary 
fixes, which ultimately undermined efforts aimed at resolving labour market 
challenges.  
 
The distortion in the labour market and the limited Omani participation hinders the 
expansion of the private sector. This can be attributed as a direct result of inefficient 
government institutions, as well as the lack of political well to implement and to force the 
corrections required. Human resource development needs to be connected to the development 
of the overall economy.  
Economic diversification could result in the expansion of economic activities, but 
cannot be achieved without R&D, which requires the creation of an environment that 
encourages innovation. Therefore, the following section analyses R&D in Oman as a tool by 
which to achieve economic diversification. 
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7.4 Research	and	Development	in	Oman	
The first indication of Oman’s desire to create a knowledge-based economy25 was its 
inclusion in Vision 2020 launched in 1995 (MONE, 1995:229). The transformation of the oil-
based dependent economy to a knowledge-based economy was one of the nine pillars in the 
plan. However, it took 10 years to create a government body responsible for science, 
technology and innovation policy. The Research Council (TRC) was established in 2005 to 
work as a focal point between different stakeholders in the government. Many participants 
confirm that the government created the TRC, which has the responsibility for the creation 
and implementation of an R&D strategy for the country. According to the TRC (TRC, 2015), 
investing in R&D is not about targeting specific research projects, but more about enhancing 
human resource education and training in order to be able to undertake R&D. In this context, 




Most of participants acknowledge the importance of R&D in economic development. Many 
indicate that achieving R&D requires an effective education system, as discussed in previous 
sections; however, some participants highlight that the lack of R&D in Oman might not be 
attributed to the quality of education, but is related to decision makers’ lack of belief in the 
importance of R&D. According to one interviewed government official: 
I do not think the government believes in research and development. We also have 
a very limited number of researchers in Oman. Also, even in the current industrial 
sector, you do not see companies trying to apply R&D methods to minimise costs 
for example or to achieve an optimal and sufficient use of raw materials. If we did 
not invest more in research and development, we would always stay just a user for 
the technology (GOI13, 2016). 
Furthermore, an interviewed academic adds: 
The government officials do not understand yet the importance of R&D as a tool 
for sustainable development and economic diversification (AI3, 2016). 
Meanwhile, another government official interviewee indicates that the main obstacle 
regarding R&D is the lack of political well on behalf of top-level government officials:  
There is no champion or a single person who could take a decision to make such 
things happen immediately without hesitation. The other problem that the Minister 
responsible for financial affairs is a person who does not understand the economic 
                                                
25 The knowledge economy is when the economy is heavily based on the production, distribution and use of 
information and communications technology (Čerić 2001:182). The theory suggests that increasing investment 
in R&D would create an economy able to generate knowledge that can be used to create wealth for the nation. 
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aspects, and the only thing he looks at whether this is too costly, and there is no 
direct income from it (GOI4, 2016). 
 
According to MONE (2012:123), R&D activities are still at an early stage in Oman, 
as a result of a lack of an R&D infrastructure in the country. Government funding for R&D 
was around 0.17% of GDP, but according to UNESCO recommendations, funding should not 
be less than 1% of GDP. In this context, according to an interviewed Majlis Oman member, 
the TRC faces several challenges, such as a lack of clear transformation planning, the 
proposals are not supported by a clear legal framework, and it receives limited funding 
(MO2, 2016). 
 
Additionally, some participants comment that belief in the usefulness of R&D 
requires a social transformation in the mindset of Omani citizens. According to an 
interviewed academic: 
You can bring the water to the horse, but you cannot make it drink. Let’s hope with 
time this will change. To achieve such things, we need to adopt the following 
reforms: 
• Enhancing education quality; 
• The creation of research institutes; 
• Creating more incentives for the people who are working in research and 
development; and 
• Legal reform (AI2, 2016). 
 
7.4.2 Utilisation	of	R&D	
A government official highlights that although the government provides generous financial 
incentives to private sector technology companies, it does not set conditions that encourage 
knowledge transformation (GOI5 2016). This observation could support the findings about 
decision makers’ lack of belief in the importance of R&D. According to another interviewed 
government official (GOI13, 2016), a World Bank report mentions that Oman has invented 
many technologies used in enhanced oil recovery. However, the government receives no 
royalties, although international companies such as Shell benefit from these inventions. 
According to the UNCTAD report (2014:11): 
PDO dominates the oil and gas sector and has a robust R&D infrastructure. It has 
been developing advanced technology for enhanced oil and gas recovery. So far, 
such technology seems to have been used only by Shell for its own operations 
worldwide. There are few, if any, spin-off businesses emerging from this 
innovative endeavour. Contacts and joint work between PDO and universities and 
other R&D structures seem to be limited. More generally, PDO appears to function 
as a kind of isolated island within the Omani innovation system.  
  172 
 
Some participants argue that the limited confidence in R&D might be related to cost 
and benefit analysis. According to one interviewed government official, decision makers 
believe that investment should be an intangible asset that should have an immediate return, 
whereas R&D takes longer to return profits (GOI4, 2016). This observation is supported by 
evidence, as the government invests around 0.17% of GDP in R&D, which contradicts 
published strategies that aim to transform the oil-based economy to become a knowledge-
based economy. This contradiction between government strategies and reality could be 
attributed to ineffective institutional performance and a lack of appropriate governance.   
 
However, even if the government becomes involved in a large-scale R&D project, it 
might not be able to maximise the benefits. One interviewed government official provides an 
example as follows: 
There is a clear example of the lack of appreciation of scientific research that could 
be the glass point project in the oilfields. When the company offered to set up their 
pilot project, the company value was around USD500,000. At that time, the 
government did not invest in that company, but Shell did, and they bought 35% of 
company shares after the successful pilot project. The massive savings on the 
enhanced oil recovery technique increased the company’s value and it reached 1 
billion dollars. At that stage, only the government had the vision to invest in that 
company (GOI4, 2016). 
 
Some participants highlight the lack of coordination between different government 
bodies regarding R&D. According to an interviewed Majlis Oman member: 
There is no coordination between the Ministry of Higher Education and the other 
stakeholders in the country to check what problems they are facing, so the Ministry 
of Education should announce their PhD research scholarship according to those 
requirements (MO4, 2016). 
In contrast, other participants argue that Oman needs practical R&D that focuses more on 
solving the problems and challenges facing different industries. According to an interviewed 
government official (GOI2, 2016), most R&D projects do not target economic applications. 
Thus, research institutions should conduct practical R&D in relation to the problems 
currently facing the economy; for example, how to increase fish farm productivity, because 
this might persuade the Cabinet to invest more money into R&D. There are many practical 
fields that require R&D; for example, natural resources, such as chromite, which is currently 
exported as a raw material. The interviewee adds: 
There is a gap between researchers and decision makers. We have a very clear 
example in the agriculture sector where Oman was famous for their dried limes. 
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Actually, it has been known all over the world as the Omani lime, but this fruit tree 
was affected with a particular kind of disease, which resulted in the extermination 
of the Omani lime tree, as the government could not cure the affected trees and the 
only solution was to cut them down (GOI2, 2016). 
 
7.4.3 R&D	Summary	
The main observation from the responses suggests that R&D in Oman is in its infancy, which 
could be attributed to various reasons. The first relates to decision makers’ lack of belief in 
the importance of R&D. The second reason is the cost and benefit approach applied by 
decision makers, which looks for an instant return on investment. In addition, many 
participants indicated that current R&D applications in Oman are not related to the practical 
challenges faced by the economy. Finally, the lack of coordination between government 
institutions is another obstacle.  
 
These findings support reports ordered by the government to evaluate the R&D 
environment; for example, UNCTAD (2014:10) reports that there is limited information 
related to innovation systems that are described as cursory and piecemeal, and weakened by 
critical problems as they are seriously fragmented. In addition, there appears to be a lack of 
cooperation between academic institutions and business organisations, as well a lack of 
coordination between academic institutions, other than at a personal level. Also, research 
institutions are relatively small, and it would be difficult to expand R&D activities because of 
the salaries’ structure. Finally, in the current environment, innovation projects do not result in 
outcomes that can be industrialised. The UNCTAD report (2014:ix) also highlights lack of 
coordination between R&D programmemes, and their applications within the business sector:  
Apparently, none of the programmemes includes mechanisms to involve the 
business sector in their design phase to maximise innovation performance and 
impact. This feature may be explained by the reluctance of the Government to 
directly support the business sector’s R&D. However, such hesitation may result in 
losing the economic relevance of the programmemes, as well as the opportunity for 
applications of their results. To some extent, this is compensated for by the 
Academic Innovation Programmeme, which is working towards commercialising 
15 research outcomes within the next two years. Universities are free to pursue the 
commercialisation of their research output by linking with the Innovation Hub.  
	
One of the main challenges facing the transformation of the current oil-based economy 
to a knowledge-based economy is the separation and integration of innovation within national 
strategy planning and operational decision-making. Furthermore, the UNCTAD report 
(2014:xii) explains that: 
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Overall funding support to research and innovation remains quite small when 
compared with funding by the government for other items, such as the road 
infrastructure. Implementation of policy measures seems relatively slow, possibly 
due to a series of factors, such as a lack of capacity in concerned government 
bodies, a cautious approach in selecting projects or delivering funds, cumbersome 
bureaucratic procedures, and the political and social culture of consensus-building.  
 
7.5 Conclusion	
Oil export revenues have helped the government to invest heavily in physical infrastructure, 
such as schools, hospitals and roads. However, despite high levels of investment in the 
education infrastructure, the strategy has not improved the quality of education although 
human resource development is one of the main drivers to achieve economic diversification. 
The findings of this chapter indicate chronic structural problems in the education system. 
Some challenges are related to teachers’ qualifications in general education, and the lack of 
financial incentives offered to teachers. Other problems are related to higher education, 
where because of poor general education outcomes, institutes are affected by low academic 
standards. Finally, because of a lack of consistency in the strategy, education outcomes do 
not meet the demands of the labour market in terms of skills and qualifications. Therefore, 
Omani employment in the private sector has not achieved the growth rate forecast by the 
FYDPs and Vision 2020. The findings also indicate insufficient coordination between 
different government entities and a lack of clarity in terms of responsibilities are further 
contributory factors to the weak quality of education in Oman.  
In terms of Omanisation, the study reveals that some companies in the private sector 
have achieved high levels, which is attributed to three main factors. The first is related to 
political decision making and a political will to change the labour structure in specific 
sectors, such as banking. The second factor relates to availability of relevant training 
opportunities, and the final factor is concerned with monopolistic practices in specific 
sectors. However, various government publications identify other factors, such as those 
related to financial incentives (NCSI, 2016a). 
 
This chapter also discusses findings related to the effect of rentier mentality, which 
negatively affects individuals’ motivations to seek work opportunities in the private sector. 
Most participants and various published reports confirm that employment in the public sector 
is the preferred choice for young Omanis. This is not only about the financial gap between 
employment in the private and the public sectors, but also relates to perceptions of status in 
the public sector and security of employment. However, the government has attempted to 
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minimise these gaps in order to encourage young Omanis to perceive the private sector as an 
attractive option. Nevertheless, the data regarding Omanisation clearly indicates these 
policies have met with limited success. The other factor that appears to hinder greater 
employment of citizens in the private sector is attributed by the participants to competition 
posed by expat workers, because expats accept lower wages, tolerate poor working 
conditions and long working hours, and are not subject to demands of their families, as 
experienced by Omanis. 
 
The chapter also analyses the role of R&D as a vehicle by which to achieve 
sustainable economic performance. The findings indicate that R&D is limited because of a 
lack of belief by decision makers on its importance. Some participants suggested that 
achieving high levels of R&D requires improving educational quality. R&D management is 
another issue highlighted in these findings, as although the TRC is the main body responsible 
for research and development, it does not coordinate its efforts with other R&D entities, such 
as the PDO. 
 
In summary, this chapter concludes that the lack of human resource development could be an 
obstacle to achieving economic diversification. The next chapter analyses institutional quality 
as an obstacle to achieving economic diversification in Oman.  















Chapter 8 Institutional Quality and the Political and Social Factors 
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8.1 Introduction		
This chapter analyses institutional quality as well as the political and social factors as two 
elements that hinder the state’s ability to achieve sustainable economic development. The 
focus on institutional quality is because, as demonstrated in Chapters Three and Four, the 
literature concludes that it is one of the characteristics of the resource curse. In this context, 
most of the literature highlights that the lack of institutional quality is one of the main 
channels that hinders the state’s ability to diversify the economy from its dependence on 
natural resources and achieve sustainable development (see Appendix 1). In this thesis, 
institutional quality is considered to be an umbrella that includes the rule of law, government 
regulations and services and government performance.  
 
Similarly, the literature suggests that political factors are another channel of the resource 
curse. However, this chapter analyses not only the political factors but also adds a new 
dimension that is related to the structure of society and its impact in oil-dependent states. The 
political factors are analysed primarily through the impact of corruption which under its 
wider umbrella includes crony capitalism and rent seeking. Furthermore, this thesis considers 
that FDI inflows in the oil dependent states are primarily influenced by political decisions. In 
fact, recent research, such as Poelhekke and van der Ploeg (2013), argues that natural 
resource dependency decrease FDI inflows into non-natural resource related economic 
activities. Considering FDI as a matter of political decisions provided the researcher with the 
opportunity to analyse the reasons behind the limited inflows into the Omani economy. 
 
The first section of the chapter analyses the institutional quality in Oman and its 
impact on the economic diversification policies. The section discusses different factors that 
affect institutional quality, such as rentier mentality, nepotism (wasta) in the bureaucracy, 
consistent strategies and their implementation, policy management, accountability and 
governance, individuals’ performances, the overlapping of responsibilities between different 
government departments and the lack of job descriptions in the public-sector. The third 
section analyses the political factors which are clustered around corruption which under its 
umbrella covers rent-seeking and crony capitalism. The section also identifies the rules of 
crony capitalism in Oman, FDI inflows and the use of subsidies. The last section is the 
conclusion. 
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8.2 Institutional	Quality	
The broader definition of the public sector focuses on taking the responsibility for providing 
various public goods, such as national security, healthcare, education, and social services and 
the state’s regulatory responsibility (Lienert, 2009:5). However, in Oman the state is the main 
driver of the economy and the largest employer, as well as the main stakeholder in some of 
the service and utility companies such as electricity and water desalination facilities. 
 
Concerns around the importance of institutional quality in Oman can be traced back to 
the first FYDP (1976-1981) in which the government announced a series of pillars for the 
development programmeme among which was the enhancement of the institutional quality 
(TDC, 1976). This pillar has been included in each subsequent FYDP (TDC, 1976, 1981, 
1986, 1991, MONE, 1997, 2001, 2006; FAERC, 2011) and is also included the state’s Basic 
Law (TOG, 1996) and Vision 2020 (MONE, 1995). However, although the physical 
infrastructure has been successfully rolled out across the country, as early as 1994 the World 
Bank (1994) highlighted issues with institutional quality that undermined the government 
performance, including:  
• There are serious deficiencies in the education and health quality.  
• A lack of inadequate legal framework governing the business environment. 
• The business environment suffers from monopoly and monopolistic private trading.  
• Subsidies had encouraged the emergence of wasteful behaviour.  
• Public spending on defence and national security was amongst the highest in the 
world; it accounted for about three-quarters of government investment expenditure 
and was three times the level of spending on education and seven times the level on 
health. 
 
Studies that assess the resource curse impact on institutional performance (Alonso & 
Garcimartín, 2013; Apergis & Payne, 2014; Hamilton & Ruta, 2006; Hvidt, 2011; Selim & 
Zaki, 2016) highlight a wide range of challenges facing institutional performance. The 
challenges include: a lack of accountability; an absence of audit procedures; an absence of 
transparency; a lack of job descriptions either for the institution or for the employees; an 
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absence of Key Performance Indicators (KPIs);26 and a lack of coordination between the 
different government entities which creates an overlap in responsibilities. 
The participants were asked to provide their views regarding the institutional quality 
in Oman and if the current institutional structure is one of the factors that hinders the 
government’s ability to diversify the economy away from its oil dependency. Eighty seven 
percent of the participants agree that Oman suffers from poor institutional quality. 
Furthermore, they indicated that the institutions in Oman are facing different challenges, 
some of which are related to the set-up of the administration, while others are related to its 
performance, productivity and the lack of proper accountability measures. Similarly, the 
participants provided examples of the deficiencies of the government performance. For 
example, some participants highlighted the increase in the income distribution gap which 
resulted in more welfare-dependent families (see Figure 8-1). They also highlighted the 
quality of education and the limited employment opportunities for the citizens (see Chapter 
Seven for more details) as other indicators of a weak government performance.  
 
 
Figure 8-1:Social Welfare Beneficiaries, 2006-2015 
Source: Compiled by the author from data obtained from NCSI (2016:447-448).  
 
Other participants highlighted a further indicator of weak institutional performance 
which is related to the efficient use of the infrastructure. As one interviewed government 
official (GOI10, 2016) indicated, most of the diversification efforts are not fit for purpose. 
                                                
26 KPIs are performance measurement tools that help to evaluate how well units, projects or individuals are 
performing compared to organizations’ strategic goals and objectives. They are considered to be critical cross-
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For example, the government has invested massively in the development of the seaports but 
they are not utilised efficiently. Furthermore, encouraging foreign investors by providing 
them with cheap gas is not sustainable because as exports of gas on long-term contracts at a 
massively discounted price left the country facing a domestic gas shortage. Likewise, oil and 
gas related industries are usually capital but not labour intensive, thus they only employ a 
limited number of Omanis and have a minimum level of knowledge transfer. One company, 
which is in partnership with the Sultan’s Special Advisor for External Liaison, is getting the 
gas for USD0.38 per British thermal units (BTU) which is lower than the market price. There 
is no added value in this project and other similar projects for the country. According to 
Vision 2020, natural gas should account for 10% of GDP in 2020 but at present this is 
unlikely to be achieved (MONE, 1995). As shown in Figure 8-2 Oman suffers from a 
significant deficit in gas supplies which will increase further unless new sources of gas are 
found. Hence, the government has started to tackle this problem by signing a new contract for 
gas exploration with BP and is entering bilateral negotiations to build a new gas pipeline with 
Iran.  
 
Figure 8-2: Base Case for Balance of Demand and Supply 
Source: BMI Research, (2013) 
 
The participants argued that being able to draft short-term and long-term plans 
requires implementation guidelines. One of the most repeated examples was Vision 2020, 
which was the country’s main development plan but has achieved little, although it is only a 
few years from completion. According to an interviewed Majlis Oman member (MO9, 2016), 
there is now a gap between the development planning institutions and the execution 
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Figure 3-11 Base C se Balanc  of Demand and (Firm+Potential) Supply 
 
Overall Energy Balance  
Based on the demand and supply data as given above, figure 3.13 presents the resulting gas 
deficit. The corresponding supply data have been added to show the deficit in perspective. 
Under all the abov  assumptions, and with ut any remedial measures, the deficit would soon 
become significant (more than 7 and 14 MM m3/d in 2010 and 2011 respectively). Some 
confirmation of this picture is found in the current reduction of LNG exports from the plant 
capacity to below GSA levels.   
Continuing use of the firm production forecast beyond the immediate future was felt to be 
overly conservative. That is why for the period after 2013, firm plus potential supply outlook 
might be a better basis for planning. Nevertheless, looking past 2013, the supply / demand 
gap widens dramatically, due to the increased gas demand of the planned EOR projects and 
the decline in supply. The deficit becomes around 18 MM m3/d by 2015 and will almost equal 
the produced amount of gas in some 15 years time.  
The base case uses a set of assumptions, which can be debated, and which are in 
combination conservative. On the other hand it is not a ‘worst case’, because meeting the 
supply targets will remain challenging, demand increases continue to be discussed in the 
country, and remedial measures to reduce the potential deficit significantly are not easily at 
hand. In conclusion: the exact timing and level of the deficit in the short term may be 
uncertain, but the risk of a very sizeable deficit is real. 
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institutions. Previously, planning was the responsibility of one minister who was at the same 
time the Minister of Financial Affairs. In other words, there was good communication 
between the departments. However, the structure was changed in 2012, which created a 
conflict between the Supreme Council for Planning and the Ministry of Finance. According 
to an interviewed government official (GOI15, 2016), the Supreme Council for Planning has 
inherited most of the dismantled Ministry of Economic Affairs duties regarding economic 
planning. However, there is no single economist in that body. In this context, the following 
sub-sections analyse the factors that affect the institutional performance in Oman through the 
lenses of: 1) management, implementation and consistency; 2) overlapping responsibilities; 
and 3) accountability/governance. 
 
8.2.1 Management,	Implementation	and	Consistency	of	the	Strategic	Plans	
One of the issues highlighted by the participants around institutional quality was how funds 
were invested. According to interviewed participant from the private sector (BI4, 2016), the 
government invested in infrastructure without taking into consideration the maintenance 
costs. In addition, the government did not take serious action to cap the expenditure in the 
infrastructure. For example, in each FYDP they could fix the percentage of the annual budget 
allocated towards infrastructure development, which should not be exceeded. In fact, the 
infrastructure project cost can be linked to the legal framework that protects the local 
companies and gives them the priority in the projects which is conditional on the availability 
of proper governance.  
 
According to Said (2014), the Shura Council discussions with the tender board 
chairman in 2014 revealed some of the major challenges that face the planning and execution 
of public projects in Oman. For example, some Shura Council members indicated: lack of 
proper regulation; lack of proper planning; loop holes in the tendering process; and 
oligopolistic practises which resulted in a situation where only about 30 companies were 
being awarded around 82 percent of the projects. Furthermore, the tender board chairman 
announced that: 
The main challenges the Tender Board faced was that authorities do not follow 
procedures as laid down by the articles in the law. 
Consequently, as demonstrated in Chapter Six, local oligopolies companies increase the cost 
of the projects, which is exacerbated by the absence of international competition. 
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One of the main issues related to the FYDPs is the process of evaluation and revision 
in relation to the FYDPs and Vision 2020. Most participants highlighted that there was an 
absence of measurable achievement indicators and a lack of periodic evaluation, which meant 
that implementation was poor. Without continuous evaluation of the strategies economic 
diversification is difficult to achieve.  
 
Furthermore, according to a government official focus group participant (FGO3, 
2016), many strategies have been drafted, including a logistics strategy, a tourism strategy, an 
education strategy and a health strategy. However, the strategies are merely pieces of paper 
without an action plan. The requirements for any action plan, such as its structure, its human 
resource requirements and its legislation, do not exist. Thus, according to an interviewed 
government official: 
Even the five-year development plan revisions were not drafted according to the 
economic norms but according to the political norm so it was politically guided. 
We are very good at playing with the numbers and drafting public speeches. But 
we do not have a single government official who can differentiate between a 
productive economy and a rentier economy (GOI5, 2016). 
 
In addition, although strategies have been developed, there is a lack of an overall 
roadmap which leads to mismanagement. For example, according to an interviewed academic 
(BI7, 2016), in 2014 the government transferred the commercial containers’ handling 
facilities from the main seaport of Qaboos to Sohar. The transformation came as a surprise to 
the business community as there was no prior indication of the plan. Transferring the 
facilities resulted in lowering the capacity from 110,000 containers per month to less than 
33,000 per month due to constraints at Sohar port. Consequently, companies started to use 
Dubai ports for their imports. Another example of mismanagement is Duqm port in which the 
government invested around OMR2bn. The port was completed in 2011, unfortunately 
without any container handling facilities (MO8, 2016). According to Al Harthy (2017) “The 
port’s container terminal is currently under construction and will be commissioned in the 
course of 2019”. 
 
Furthermore, the mismanagement had a negative effect on the success of some 
government policies to expand the private sector through privatisation. According to an 
interviewed government official (GOI6, 2016), there are more than 100 government owned 
companies, most of which are loss-making. Unfortunately, the government has not attempted 
to understand the reason behind the limited success and low productivity in these companies, 
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whether it is because of mismanagement or due to the business model. Privatisation could be 
a solution, because when a company adopts private sector norms it has better governance. 
However, even privatisation in Oman has its own problems. According to an interviewed 
government official (GOI13, 2016), the government started to privatise one of the electricity 
companies by targeting the sale of a 61% stake to a foreign strategic partner. However, the 
strategic partner takes loans from local banks reducing credit availability for local companies 
and provides no knowledge transformation or innovation. Another example was provided by 
interviewed government official: 
The mismanagement of the government projects is why some projects are very 
expensive. For example, the capital city sewage system was associated with many 
problems from the outset. Another example is the water supply project to mountain 
cities which was contracted to a company that could not complete it. The project 
was then handed to another company. Such practise is not limited to those 
examples and that is clear evidence of a lack of proper planning (GOI3, 2016). 
 
In contrast, other participants highlighted the individualistic decision-making style in 
the country as a factor affecting the lack of consistency in the implementation of the 
development strategies. For example, ministers in Oman often stay in their positions for more 
than 15 years. However, when the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial 
Affairs, Qais Al-Zawawi27 whose team was responsible for drafting Vision 2020, was killed 
in a car accident in September 1995, the position was left vacant. Consequently, Vision 2020 
lost its champion, which negatively affected the plan’s continuity and the consistency of its 
implementation. According to an interviewed government official (GOI9, 2016), the 
individualism in the decision-making style can be identified when a new minister is 
nominated, as in the first few months he drafts new strategies and projects and cancels the 
previous ones. This is not only financially expensive but also hinders the performance of the 
economy. This was highlighted by an interviewed government official: 
Duqm project was the idea of the previous Minister responsible for Finance who 
vacated his seat in 2011. Right now, the government invested more than USD2bn 
in that project but because there is no longer a champion the entire project is at 
risk. We need to shift from individualistic planning to establishment planning 
otherwise the entire state is in danger (GOI7, 2016). 
 
Most participants highlighted the absence of consistency and continuity on the lack of 
development in the non-oil sectors. Since 1976, the government initiated development plans 
                                                
27 According to TNA (1981:35), Qais Al-Zawawi was one of a group referred to as ‘The Omani Mafia’. He 
became Minister of Foreign Affairs in 1973 and Vice-Chairman of the National Development Council in 1974. 
In 1982 he become the Deputy Prime Minister for Economic and Financial Affairs (Zawawigroup, 2017). 
  184 
targeting the non-oil sectors with little success. In particular, the government emphasised the 
importance of the agricultural, fisheries, manufacturing and tourism sectors. However, the 
sectors contribution to GDP is still lower than plan. Several interviewees (MO1, 2016; GOI4, 
2016; GOI8, 2016; BI6, 2016) believe that the limited growth can be attributed to the 
bureaucracy and weak government efficiency, which has resulted in a long chain of steps to 
secure the necessary permits. For example, securing a tourism permit requires having land, 
which requires a permit from the Ministry of Housing in coordination with the Ministry of 
Local Municipalities. Additionally, the business also requires labour permits from the 
Ministry of Manpower. One of the repeated examples provided by the participants was the 
dismantling of agriculture marketing agency, which curtailed growth in the sector. The 
agency was responsible for collecting products directly from the farmers, and for the 
standardisation of agricultural products. Furthermore, each farmer was aware of which crop 
should be grown. The government tried to justify their decision by saying that the agency was 
not making a profit. According to an interviewed government official: 
The agriculture marketing agency might not be making a profit because of 




One of the roles of the government is to provide a suitable business environment through 
proper regulations. As demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven, the existence of independent 
regulatory bodies for the financial institutions and for the oil and gas operations has increased 
the Omanisation levels in those sectors, as well as performance and efficiency. Against this 
background, the participants were asked which government institution they believed was 
primarily responsible for the implementation of the economic diversification strategy. 
Significantly, answers included the Ministry of Finance, the Supreme Council for Planning, 
and the Financial Affairs and the Energy Resource Council. Logically, the Ministry of 
Financial Affairs should be the government entity that is responsible for issues related to the 
budget and the allocation of funds. The Supreme Council for Planning does not contain a unit 
for economic policies, while the Financial Affairs and Energy Resource Council is 
responsible for the strategy for issues related to finance and the oil and gas contracts. 
Arguably, the complexity of the overall government structure leads to an overlapping of 
responsibilities. Table 8-1 shows 22 directorates in the Royal Court that have overlapping 
responsibilities with other ministries. Many participants (MO2, 2016; FGO2, 2016; GOI12, 
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2016) claim that the role of the Royal Court means unlimited financial and political support 
for the projects.  
 
Table 8-1: Overlapping Responsibilities between the Royal Court and Ministries 
Royal Court Departments Ministry 
The Office of the Conservation of the Environment. 
The Office of the Environmental Affairs and the Arabian Oryx. 
The Office of the Objects Protected Wildlife. 
The National Field Research Centre for Environmental Conservation. 
Ministry of the Environment 
The Office of Medical Services. 
The Directorate of Therapeutic Services 
The Directorate of Complementary, Chinese Medicine Clinic, Traditional 
Medicine Clinic Medicine. 
The Directorate of Medical Services. 
Ministry of Health 
Directorate General of One Million Palm Trees Cultivation. Ministry of Agriculture & Fisheries 
The Office of Sultan Qaboos’s Special Advisor for Cultural Affairs. 
Sultan Qaboos Centre for Islamic Culture. 
Director of the Omani Society for Fine Arts. 
Director of the Society Photographic. 
Director of the Lute Hobbies Society. 
Ministry of Heritage and Culture 
Director of Curriculum & Educational Supervision 
Director of Islamic Science Institute. 
Sultan Qaboos College for Teaching Arabic to Non-native Speakers. 
Ministry of Higher Education 
Ministry of Education 
The Education Council 




Ministry of Regional Municipalities 
Source: Compiled by the author from various participants’ remarks.  
 
Furthermore, there is no clear process for communications between the entities and 
the Cabinet (GOI3, 2016). Indeed, most participants highlighted the lack of communication 
between different government institutions, even when they are chaired by individuals who are 
members of other committees and councils. The lack of communication has a severe impact 
on performance, as well as increasing the cost of the projects. An interviewed Majlis Oman 
member provided the following example: 
The Ministry of Commerce decided to create a new industrial zone which might be 
transferred to a free zone in the future near the new highway to Saudi Arabia. The 
Ministry of Housing allocated the land. When the Ministry of Commerce started to 
put together the blueprint for the project, they were contacted by the Ministry of 
Oil and Gas asking them to stop their operations as the land was allocated for a 
future oilfield. The question raised here Is: do we talk about one government or 
different governments? How come three ministers in the same cabinet were doing 
overlapping projects? (MO2, 2016). 
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According to an interviewed government official (GOI12, 2016), the overlap between 
the different government entities is the direct result of the lack of independent regulatory 
bodies. For example, the banking sector is regulated by the Central Bank, the oil and gas 
sector is regulated by Ministry of Oil and Gas, and the telecommunication sector is regulated 
by the Telecommunication Regulation Authority. However, the other economic sectors are 
not regulated by a single entity but each part is regulated by a different entity; for example, 
the Ministry of Manpower regulates aspects that are already regulated by the police or by the 
Ministry of Commerce. Such conflicts in the regulatory structure are harmful for the business 
environment. The lack of coordination between government institutions has a further 
negative impact related to benefit maximisation. For example, according to an interviewed 
government official: 
The overlapping in the duties is not limited to the business permits; it can also be 
seen in the road construction projects. For example, Muscat Municipality contracts 
some roads, as do the Ministry of Regional Municipalities and the Ministry of 
Transport and Communication. Sometimes all three keep passing the responsibility 
to the others. Add to that, there are no standard specifications for the road projects 
across all of those government bodies (GOI15, 2016). 
In this context, Salim Alismaili28 stated (reported in Muscatdaily, 2017): 
The more you have government entities in there, the more you are crowding the 
economy and you’re squeezing the private sector. Every time that we think of a 
new initiative, there is either a government company that is supposed to run the 
things, or a general organisation or a public authority, an independent authority, 
doing whatever the private sector has already been doing. This environment is 
encouraging bribe taking which hurts investment into Oman and does not help to 
encourage the FDI inflow to the country.  
 
Indeed, overlapping responsibilities have been clearly identified in different 
government plans, such as the FYDPs and Vision 2020. Furthermore, in 2012 the Ministry of 
Civil Service held a symposium to discuss the mechanism and the tools that the government 
could use to enhance its performance. Among the recommendations was the restructuring of 
government institutions to overcome responsibility overlap (Alshabiba, 2012). However, 
almost five years since the recommendations were made none have been implemented. In 
fact, in 2015 the Ministry of Civil Service held a seminar entitled ‘Developing Public 
Organizations’ Vision and Mission’, which focused on the enhancing public sector 
performance and efficiency (Timesofoman, 2015). 
                                                
28 Dr Alismaili is a minister in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. His unit is responsible for promoting business 
opportunities in Oman and attracting FDI. He is also the founder of International Research Foundation. His talk 
was at the 46th International Federation of Training & Development Organisation conference (Muscatdaily, 
2017). 
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According to an interviewed academic (AI2, 2016), between 1970 and 1996 Oman 
had strong governance as the Sultan was young and took care of daily operations and used to 
monitor all the ministries. This helped the country to achieve better development outcomes 
than the neighbouring countries given Oman’s limited resources. To sustain such 
development, the government institutions duties should have been limited to regulatory field. 
However, now there is no segregation between the regulator and the policy maker, adding to 
the overlapping of responsibilities. 
8.2.3 Accountability/Governance		
As demonstrated in Chapter Six, one of the main obstacles to economic diversification is the 
lack of consistency and implementation process in relation to planning. For example, in 
response to oil price cycles, Oman initiates austerity measures during downturns but then 
resumes its previous expenditure behaviour when prices rebound. This highlights a lack of 
consistency in policy implementation and also reflects a lack of efficiency in the institutional 
performance. According to an interviewed Majlis Oman member (MO2, 2016), one question 
raised after each low oil price cycle is: why didn’t the government learn from the previous 
low oil prices crisis? The answer provided by several participants, for example, an 
interviewed Majlis Oman member (MO5, 2016), was the lack of accountability. The lack of 
accountability is not limited to the implementation of strategies, but is also related to each 
FYDP, which did not achieve most of the crucial targets, including human resource 
development, the expansion of the private sector and increasing Omani employment in the 
private sector. Similarly, an interviewed government official (GOI15, 2016) indicated that the 
reason behind the limited implementation of counter measures to offset low oil prices can be 
attributed to the management of financial resources and the funding priorities for certain 
sectors. It can also be attributed to the absence of a clear guidelines for the strategies that 
include a lack of return on investment measures. However, an interviewed government 
official (GOI15, 2016) argues that the lack of consistency and the strategy implementation is 
not only due to those factors:  
It is very clear that we have a lack of real development planning. Because no one 
been questioned why he did not achieve the goals of each FYDP (GOI6, 2016). 
	
In contrast, all the participants highlighted that when it comes to the top-level 
decision makers, it is not always about the lack of accountability. According to an 
interviewed government official (GOI10, 2016), many government officials do not take the 
initiative because they are afraid of the accountability. To avoid accountability, they create a 
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committee, including representatives from different government institutions, which leads to 
longer delays in the process and, in many cases, nothing much will be achieved.  
	
Most participants believe that the political structure in which the Sultan is the Prime 
Minister, as well as many other key posts, adds to the issue of accountability. Because 
ministers are connected directly to the Sultan means that it is not possible to criticise their 
performance as it could be interpreted as criticising the Sultan; 
if you criticise the government it will be understood that you are criticising the 
Sultan (FPS4, 2016).  
In fact, most participants stress the important of having a CEO29 to resolve this dilemma. The 
CEO should have a clear mandate, KPIs and a timeframe, if the goals are not achieved, then 
he should be replaced by somebody else (GOI2, 2016; MO2, 2016; MO8, 2016; GOI12, 
2016). Furthermore, one focus group participant from the private sector (FPS1, 2016) 
indicated that the decision-making process means a decision of a particular minister can be 
overruled when he receive orders from somewhere else. The following example was provided 
by a Majlis Oman member participant in a focus group:  
The government decided to export liquid gas for a very cheap price. At the time the 
liquefied gas price in the international market was around USD10/BTU. However, 
the government decided to sell it for USD1/BTU. Additionally, government 
recently signed a contract with BP to extract the gas per the contract the 
government is committed purchase the gas for USD5/BTU for 20 years, but at 
present the liquid gas price in the international market is around USD1.7-
USD2/BTU. We do not know who is responsible for this decision. This would 
create a huge financial burden in the government for the next 20 years (FMO1, 
2016). 
 
One tool established by the government to create check and balance measures was the 
SAI.30 The SAI has been given the legal support to perform its duties, including the right to 
coordinate with the public prosecution to establish legal procedures in the cases where it 
uncovers criminal activities (SAI, 2017). However, the SAI cannot publish its findings to the 
public, as it needs to report any irregularities to the relevant minister. Accordingly, the 
minister has the right to act on or ignore the SAI report. Thus, even if the SAI uncovers 
criminal activities it does not mean that action will be taken against those involved. For 
example: 
                                                
29 The participants use the concept CEO to refer to the importance of the separation of the role of the Sultan and 
Prime Minister, with the CEO being the Prime Minister. 
30 The SAI was changed to an independent unit in 1999 working directly under the Sultan. Furthermore, the SAI 
was given greater powers in 2011 that included administration audit, as a result of public demands.  
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The CEO of one of the government owned companies had been jailed in a bribery 
case recently. The same person was nominated to be a CEO in another government 
owned company responsible for more than OMR1.6bn worth of projects (GOI3, 
2016). 
According to an interviewed Majlis Oman member: 
The Cabinet could use some governance. If a company that is listed in the stock 
market faces management problems, then the entire board of directors is 
responsible for the mismanagement. However, unfortunately, what we have in the 
Cabinet that if a minister mismanages his ministry then the responsibility is his 
alone. in fact, the entire cabinet in reality are partners in the mismanagement 
(MO5, 2016). 
 
One policy the government adopted towards expanding the private sector was 
privatisation, which started with the electricity, water and telecom companies. According to 
an interviewed government official (GOI14, 2016), the government decided to privatise its 
share in the telecommunication company in 1996 to reduce current expenditure at a time of 
low oil prices. The telecommunication company had high operating costs, when compared to 
BT, especially in relation to salaries. The comparison also revealed a lack of efficiency and 
governance in the company. Listing the company on the stock market meant it started 
working to market norms and gradually reached a good level of efficiency. The lack of 
efficiency and governance are also present in all government owned companies and probably 
the government itself. Problems such as lack of governance, of transparency and of 
accountability and KPIs add to the lack of accountability.  
 
Furthermore, an interviewed Majlis Oman member (MO8, 2016) added that the lack 
of transparency shielded the government from any kind of social accountability. Social 
accountability is usually achieved through two channels: the first is through public 
representation in parliament; and the other is through criticism in the media or social media. 
For example, two Saudi Arabia ministers lost their positions as result of the public protests in 
the social media over their performance (AlSharekh, 2016; The Economist, 2014). However, 
the situation in Oman is different; for example, if a government official has social status, then 
he can be protected socially from any direct criticism. Furthermore, criticising the Ministry of 
Higher Education for example will be considered as personal criticism of the Minister.  In 
this context, an interviewed government official (GOI3, 2016) believes that the lack of 
transparency, especially in relation to the announcement of the plans, helps the government 
avoid accountability if the goals are not met. Additionally, the state-owned media never 
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criticises projects and always try to show the positive rather than the negative aspects. It is 
also the case with the results from SAI.  
I believe publishing the audit results would be the first step towards institutional 
reform (GOI3, 2016). 
 
Another interviewed government official (GOI3, 2016) indicated that the misuse of 
political power is apparent in the second LNG train project. The government was aware of 
the limited gas supplies in the country and pursued the establishment of the second LNG 
train. However, this project was not based on a viability study and is working at less than 
60% of its capacity and some of those involved in the project are being prosecuted for 
bribery.  
From the previous example, the government is not willing to use the power of law 
against those who misuse the trust (GOI3, 2016). 
In fact, in accordance with Article 51 of the Basic Statute of the State (TOG, 1996), the 
Prime Minister and Deputy Prime Minister are responsible for the supervision and evaluation 
of the ministers’ performance and the fulfilment of their duties. Furthermore, Article 52 
(TOG, 1996) indicates that the Council of Ministers’ members are responsible collectively to 
the Sultan. The Article also highlights: “Each of them is individually accountable to His 
Majesty the Sultan for the manner in which he performs his duties and exercises his authority 
in his respective Ministry or unit” (TOG, 1996). Additionally, Article 53 (TOG, 1996) 
provides a clear legal framework for countering conflict of interest and corruption by 
assuring: 
Members of the Council of Ministers shall not combine their ministerial office 
with chairmanship of or membership to a board of directors of any public joint-
stock company. The Government units which they are in charge of or supervise 
shall not deal with any company or establishment in which they have a direct or 
indirect interest. They shall always, by their conduct, pursue the interests of the 
Country and work in furtherance of the public benefit. They shall not exploit their 
official positions in any manner whatsoever whether for their own benefit or for 
the benefit of those with whom they have a special relation. 
 
In summary, the lack of accountability measures results in an overlap of 
responsibilities, which affects government performance negatively. According to an 
interviewed participant from the private sector (BI6, 2016), this is, in part, because of the 
concentration of the powers in the hands of the Sultan, which means that there is no single 
champion to implement policies and overcome challenges. The cabinet operates with every 
minister working individually creating government in silos. Thus, there is no coordination 
and communication between the different ministries. Furthermore, the absence of a job 
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description for top level government positions, such as ministers and undersecretaries, makes 
it very difficult to measure their performance and ultimately can result in a lack of 
productivity. According to an interviewed Majlis Oman member: 
if you do not have accountability and follow up so that official needs to produce 
certain achievement in a specific timeframe otherwise he should be replaced. 
Unfortunately, it is not the case as we have ministers holding their positions for the 
30 years (MO4, 2016). 
8.3 Social	Factors	
As demonstrated in Chapters Six and Seven, employment is one of the main challenges the 
government has faced over the last 20 years. In 2011 and as a result of the social unrest the 
government opened up 50,000 new work opportunities in the public sector. The new 
recruitment did not reflect a shortage of employees but was a clear representation for the 
rentier structure in the country. The policy helped restore social stability, although it could 
only be a temporary solution. The need for the measures reflected the neglect of important 
social factors in the development strategies including the impact of youth unemployment. 
According to a government official participant in focus group (FMO1, 2016), Oman could 
benefit from copying other countries’ development planning strategies, such as Singapore 
and Malaysia, that have achieved significant sustainable social and economic development in 
less than 40 years. However, achieving sustainable social and economic development needs 




Beblawi (1987:385) distinguishes between conventional economic behaviour which is based 
on the ‘work-reward’ causation, and rentier mentality where the wealth, income, and rewards 
are not the result of production, but are a consequence of being citizen in a rentier state. In an 
oil rentier state the government is the recipient of the oil export revenues which it then 
distributes to the population. This creates a distorted economic structure, which includes a 
bloated and over-staffed public sector, with weak effectiveness and low productivity. In an 
unusual statement by a top-level Omani official, the Minister responsible for Foreign Affairs 
described the government as “corpulent and that led to the creation of unproductive and 
inefficient government which is not able to provide adequate services to the public” 
(AlJahwari, 2013). This statement can be related to the rentier structure of the state in which 
the government is the main employer. The overstaffing creates what can be described as 
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‘disguised employment’.31 According to one government official participant in focus group 
(FGO1, 2016), the optimum world model for efficiency is one public-sector employ per 100 
of the population. However, in Oman the ratio is five per 100. Thus, according to an 
interviewed academic: 
We have inflation in the public sector employment (AI2, 2016).  
Figure 8-3 shows that employment in the public sector is higher than in the private sector. 
Indeed, in 2009 and 2010 when new employment in the public sector was curtailed and the 




Figure 8-3: Omani Employment in the Public and Private Sectors 
Source: Compiled by the author using data obtained from NCSI (2016:93-94) 
*: Does not include defence, police and security employees. 
 
Thus, according to MONE (1995:15), even though the public sector has been in 
continuous development since 1970, the civil service faces critical challenges that include 
deteriorating performance and productivity, too many employees, an increase in negative 
bureaucracy and a rigidity in the legal framework and government procedures. 
 
Most participants believed that the limited productivity in the public-sector can be 
attributed to the rentier mentality as the government uses public sector employment to gain 
political acceptance. This situation has created one of the biggest challenges in achieving 
                                                
31 According to Komijani and Mohebi 2013:315): “Disguised unemployment exists where part of the labour 
force is either left jobless or is working in a redundantly and people do not have productive full-time 
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high levels of productivity in the public sector. Among the factors undermining productivity 
is the lack of governance, as highlighted by an interviewed government official (GOI9 2016). 
Furthermore, according to another interviewed government official (GOI1, 2016), the lack of 
an evaluation system based on clear standards by which to evaluate an employee's 
performance also undermines productivity. An effective evaluation system rewards the 
productive employee and allows managers to sanction employees who are not fulfilling their 
responsibilities. Furthermore, the ‘law of diminishing returns’ means if the position requires 
five employees but they are not performing effectively, then recruiting more employees will 
not solve the problem but will probably create another ineffective employee. 
Furthermore, most of the participants believe that rentier mentality also creates 
challenges related to the lack of accountability and the lack of the discipline.  
 
8.3.2 The	Social	Structure	in	Oman	
The second social factor is related to the social structure in Oman. Some of the 
participants (FNGO1, 2016; FGO3, 2016) believe that institutions in Oman do not suffer 
from financial corruption but instead from administrative corruption which is connected to 
the social structure. According to an interviewed government official (GOI8, 2016), 
administrative corruption is seen through weak bureaucracy and the lack of check and 
balance measures which results in weak performance in government institutions and distorts 
the business environment. Thus, an interviewed participant from the private sector states: 
There are no KPIs to audit the performance of the employees. That is why a 
process which should be done in a day might not be completed in a week or more. 
The processes still depend on the employee mind-set. For example, if a company 
requires a permit for 10 foreign expats then they will submit a request for 20 
because they know that they might need to negotiate with the Ministry of 
Manpower employees (BI4, 2016). 
Furthermore, Dr Salim Al Ismaili, CEO of the Sultanate of Oman Public Authority for 
Investment Promotion and Export, states: 
I’m sure for most visitors who come over here, they love it and they would like to 
stay here and even invest in Oman, before they go into the jungle of the 
bureaucracy that we have created. Sometimes you feel that it has been done on 
purpose so those people in public office can make private benefit (Muscatdaily, 
2017). 
	
The administrative corruption is exacerbated by the lack of clear job descriptions, 
KPIs, and a clear mandate, which results in the creation of a weak or ‘negative’ bureaucracy 
and leads to a deterioration in the quality of the government institutions. The weak 
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bureaucracy means the time required to finish is lengthened considerably: a job that requires 
half an hour might take up to one week because of the lack of accountability. This is also the 
case with government projects; the lack of efficiency leads to changing requirements and 
delays which result in an increase in the project price (JI3, 2016). Most participants believed 
that the lack of accountability had created an unhealthy work environment in the public 
sector. Thus, an interviewed Omani academic states: 
Each official could do whatever he wants as he knows that nobody is going to 
question his performance or the outcome. Without accountability, the country will 
not be able to correct its path. For example, the government was aware that they 
will need a certain number of teachers in the next 10 years. However, the Minister 
of Higher Education decided to transform all the education colleges into vocational 
training colleges. Right now, there is a need for more than 20,000 teachers and 
nobody can say from where we could meet such demand (AI1, 2016). 
	
Additionally, some participants highlighted the importance of the selection criteria for 
those appointed to a decision-making position. As the appointment can affect the productivity 
in that department it is important to put the right person in the right place. However, the 
social environment in Oman has a negative impact on the selection process because of 
nepotism (GOI5, 2016). Thus, the tribal structure in Oman can be blamed for the existence of 
nepotism, which impacts on the selection bias in some government positions. In this context, 
an interviewed government official stated:   
In the development process, you need 10% of the efforts for the planning and 90% 
for the implementation so what we have are good plans but we still have very bad 
implementation. Most of the people who are responsible for the implementation do 
not have the required knowledge to fulfil the job (GOI1, 2016). 
Thus, several participants believed that nepotism and the consequent appointment bias is an 
obstacle to increasing the efficiency of government institutions. According to an interviewed 
government official (GOI8, 2016), nomination for top-level government positions is not 
based on competencies but is based on personnel relations, which in some cases has resulted 
in corruption as in the Oman Oil Company.32  
	
8.3.3 Individual	Performance		
One of the main issues highlighted by different participants was what they described as the 
‘Superman phenomena’. According to the participants (MO1, 2016; MO2, 2016; GOI6, 
                                                
32 As a result of the 2011 social unrest the Sultan ordered the authorities to increase their grip on corrupt 
practices. Since 2011, 20 top level government officials and businessman been convicted for accepting bribes, 
abuse of office and money laundering. The main cases were related to oil industry (Reuters, 2014). 
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2016; GOI8, 2016; GOI9, 2016), the Superman phenomena, which is not limited to Oman but 
is a common practice in all GCC countries, occurs when a government official is nominated 
for more than 15 other positions alongside his normal duties. For example, a Minister of 
Finance could at the same time be the head of board of directors in three government-owned 
companies, the chairperson in various ministerial committees, the chairperson on executive 
committees, and be on a number of board of directors in government-owned or private sector 
companies. The participants questioned the ability of one person to manage those duties 
effectively; thereby, undermining the performance of the institutions affected. In this respect, 
an interviewed government official stated:  
We have the supreme committee of financial resources as it contains (anonymise) 
and (anonymise) so it is the strongest committee overall. The other committees 
have almost the same ministers. So if ministers agree in one committee about 
something it will be the same agreement in others. So where is the innovation or 
what those people could provide as a new ideas (GOI8, 2016). 
 
Furthermore, several participants indicated that the leadership and administrative style 
in the country could be behind the lack of quality in institutional performance. The 
individualistic style of management exacerbates the overlapping responsibilities between 
different government institutions as demonstrated in Chapter Six and in Chapter Seven. 
According to an interviewed participant from the private sector (BI5, 2016), the other issue is 
that most ministers believe that the ministry is their personal territory. As a result, a new 
minister will not continue the same policies but will create his own administration and 
projects. Thus, an interviewed Omani academic states:  
Unfortunately, there is no accountability in Oman, otherwise those who are 
practising such behaviour should be questioned (AI3, 2016). 
 
Furthermore, according to several participants (MO5, 2016; GOI9, 2016), the 
individualistic style of management creates a gap in trust between the decision-makers and 
the executive level in the public sector which results in low productivity in the sector.  
 
Moreover, certain high-level government officials feel insecure about employing 
competent personnel to work with them, as this approach might jeopardise their own position. 
The individualistic management style means they are able to employ an incompetent person 
to safeguard their own position (MO7, 2016).  
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Furthermore, despite research by Omanis and NGOs, such as the Omani Economic 
Association, in relation to economic reform, the government still contracts international 
consultants to provide solutions for the problems at a high cost. Such studies, which might 
have little relevance to the situation in Oman, can be a copy of a similar study that they 
undertook for a different country (GOI8, 2016). According to an interviewed government 
official: 
We know that other country had been through a similar situation, why do not we 
check how did they solve that problem and learn from them. Instead of keeping 
contracting with the same companies such as McKinsey asking them for the advice 
(GOI12, 2016). 
 
Lower down the ladder, individual performance is negatively affected in terms of 
quality and efficiency by the limited training for government employees. Figure 8-4 shows 
the training programmes available for civil servants. Sixty-nine percent of the training 
programmes are directed to issues related to education, which is focused primarily on 
Ministry of Education and Ministry of Higher Education employees. Only 17% of the 
training programmes are related to administration. The lack of adequate administration-
related training results in lowering the efficiency and the quality of the output, undermining 
the quality of institutional performance. In addition, only 5% of the training programmes are 
related to clerical training and only 3% to IT-related training despite the government’s 
attempts to move to a knowledge-based economy. 
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Figure 8-4: Civil Service Employee Training by Category 
Source: Compiled by the author with data obtained from MOSS (2014:417). 




Turning now to the political factors, the participants were asked to provide their views about 
the existence of corruption (which under its umbrella contains crony capitalism and rent-
seeking)33 in Oman and if such practices could affect moves towards economic 
diversification. Ninety eight percent of the participants believe that crony capitalism, rent-
seeking and corruption exist in Oman. In fact, the focus group discussion was fruitful in 
identifying such practices as the transparent debate provided me with a deeper understanding 
and different perspective on the issue. Most participants highlighted that symptoms of crony 
capitalism are present in Oman, although it is nearly impossible to prove (as highlighted in 
the literature), as most large companies are owned by a government official or relative, 
creating the conditions for conflicts of interest. The long-serving powerful government 
officials own companies that provide them with the means to control the private sector. Thus, 
some participants argue that development in the GCC is: 
                                                
33 Crony capitalism, rent-seeking, and corruption are usually referred in Arabic by one word ‘فساد’ (fasad). 
However, using the word can trigger discomfort for the interviewees, therefore I used the term ‘راسمالیة المحاسیب’ 











Education Administrative	training	 IT	training	 Clerical	training* Unspecified		training	
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A model of development based on the use corruption (MO2, 2016; FGO2, 2016; 
GOI12, 2016).  
 
8.4.1 Roots	of	Crony	Capitalism	in	Oman	
There is limited literature regarding the existence of crony capitalism in Oman. 
However, comprehensive research in the British archive has provided this thesis with 
sufficient information to understand its root causes and development in Oman. According to 
documents in the TNA (1974), in 1970 the Sultan was searching for internal and external 
recognition. The internal recognition was achieved through the nomination of the tribal 
leaders and traders who had links to other regional governments to the Cabinet. The 
recognition was cemented by providing generous contracts to individuals who had 
relationships with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, Libya, the UK and the USA. In addition, diplomatic 
contacts saw the Omani government recognised by the Arab League and the UN. However, 
the search of legitimacy resulted in those individuals becoming “close to obtaining a degree 
of control over a large sector of the Omani economy”, according to TNA (1974:14). 
Moreover, TNA (1974:14) argues that the new group were “fixers par excellence, apparently 
in the political as well as the commercial sphere and it seems to be their ability to fix things at 
short notice which has impressed the sultan personally”. Indeed, the individuals were 
described as a ‘Mafia’ in the British documents (TNA, 1974:14). The Sultan appreciated the 
help provided by the individuals and he encouraged them to become involved in the state 
building projects.  
 
Furthermore, the documents argue that the influence of the ‘The Omani Mafia’ was 
not limited to financial rewards for facilitating the involvement of international companies, 
which increased the prices of the projects, but also they tended to force complicated projects 
onto incapable companies (TNA, 1974:45). This approach not only increased the cost of the 
project massively but undermined the quality of the work, leading to the award of further 
contracts for maintenance. In fact, the behaviour of the cronies provided them with the 
opportunity to monopolise the market, whether by representing international companies or by 
creating local companies specialising in the supply of the services and products required by 
the government projects. Being close to the Sultan gave them access to the information about 
the government's projects, enabling them to maximise their benefits; “it was virtually 
impossible for anyone to obtain a large contract unless they dealt through them” (TNA, 
1974:18). Importantly, one interviewed government official (GOI5, 2016) argued that even if 
the families control the private sector they are not corrupt.  
  199 
 
Part of the reason behind the creation of the business elite was the political desire to 
create a strong private sector, which could work in partnership with international companies 
on the infrastructure projects. The Sultan thought it would be better to have a local partner 
with the international companies to access knowledge transfers and thus be able to work 
independently on similar projects in the future. This argument might have been valid if the 
companies had not misused their political affiliation to secure projects in Oman. For example, 
according to an interviewed government official (GOI4, 2016), there are companies which 
dominate the gas sector and are able to force government decisions in their favour. They can 
override any decision to raise gas prices and consequently obtain gas more cheaply than in 
the international market. Conflicts of interest can be established by looking at the owners of 
the companies and their official titles (see Appendices 4, and 5). The same applies to other 
natural resources such as mining.  
 
Similarly, the influence of crony capitalism was not limited to securing projects but 
furthermore they were able to provide “virtually a monopoly of civil work and the defence 
side” (TNA 1974:16), which meant the construction projects would be given to a particular 
company without any tendering process. Additionally, the documents highlight His Highness 
Sayyid Thuwaini’s34 views regarding financial affairs mismanagement in the country as he 
described the control of the tender board by Qais Alzawawi27 “who now also controls the 
country’s finances” (TNA, 1981a:24) to the extent that the tender board was only responsible 
for the projects costing less than OMR1 million. This allowed over-pricing of some projects; 
for example, “the cost of the road from Mutrah to Muscat has now risen from OMR4m to 
OMR17m. CCC is the contractor and in this Qais has a large interest” (TNA, 1981a:24). 
Accordingly, companies could maximise their profits and the funds received by the 
facilitator, thereby undermining government finances and its ability to diversify the economy.  
 
The TNA material identifies the individuals who controlled much of the business 
environment in Oman at the time, and argues that “a small group of senior ministers and 
advisers around the Sultan continued to take too much of the financial cake” (TNA 1981:1). 
As expected, the same individuals are now the owners of the biggest companies in the 
                                                
34 Until his death in 2010 he was a Special Representative of the Sultan and was listed next to the Sultan in 
official line-ups. When the Sultan was absent, he chaired meetings of the cabinet or the specialized councils. He 
was the President of the Tender Board and a key member of the Financial Affairs Council (Allen & Rigsbee II, 
2014:190). 
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country, the majority of which were created jointly, often with financial institutions such as 
banks and insurance companies that provide them financial support.35 According to an 
interviewed government official (GOI12, 2016), the cronies who control the market also 
control the banking system; for example, (anonymise) controls the National Bank of Oman, 
(anonymise) controls the Arab Bank of Oman; (anonymise) controlled the Oman 
International Bank until he sold it recently to the HSBC but still owns large share in it. 
Control of the banking system enables access to finance, providing an advantage over 
competitors or newcomers, as can be seen from Appendix 5 only one major shareholder in 
the Omani banks has no affiliation to political position. Furthermore, (anonymise), 
(anonymise) and (anonymise) are members of the Financial Affairs and Energy Resource 
Council which reports directly to the Sultan. All three have investments in energy intensive 
projects and obtain the gas for their projects at a discounted price. In addition, (anonymise) 
and (anonymise) used to control the communication sector as one represented Siemens and 
the other Eriksson. Undoubtedly, as sleeping partners, they get a percentage of the profits in 
return for their ability to influence the government. 
	
8.4.2 The	Impact	of	Crony	Capitalism	on	the	Economy		
This section provides examples of the impact of crony capitalism on the economy. There is 
no clear distinction between the private and the public sector in Oman. For example, there are 
influential traders who are at the same time hold government positions, including in the 
Cabinet. Thus, crony capitalism practices in Oman include monopolistic and oligopolistic 
practices through the abuse of high office, the use of influence to create obstacles against any 
legal reforms that could affect their interests and the ability to change government focus to 
projects that maximise the benefits for the crony capitalists. According to an interviewed 
government official (GOI13, 2016), some officials work against reforms, such as of the 
taxation system. For example,36 a particular minister could request a ban on certain economic 
activities in a particular strategic location. Then, the same minister approaches the Sultan to 
request a royal exemption that will allow him to establish a business which he banned in the 
location. According to a government official: 
                                                
35 See, Appendix 4: Table compiled by the author summarising top business groups (family owned companies) 
in Oman. Appendix 5: Table compiled by the author summarising the Major shareholders (Non-Government 
Funds) in the Omani Banks.  
36 Some participants provided an example on condition they were off-the-record. A former Minister of Trade 
and Commerce obtained a Royal order to ban crusher plants in the northern province of Musandam, after which 
he was granted the sole right to establish a crusher plant in that region.    
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A newspapers published a photo of a private seaport that exports crusher products. 
That crusher is owned by a minister and there is no check for the quantities being 
exported from that site. This sector is not regulated; also, it is not controlled by a 
strong institution. That had allowed the opportunist to gain from such situation. In 
my opinion, there is a loophole in the system and that loophole was left 
unregulated precisely to be used by the rent-seekers (GOI6, 2016).  
	
The other example of crony capitalism highlighted by the participants was the 
oilfields’ chemical supplies contracts, which are worth around USD800m per year. The 10 
biggest contracts were given to companies owned by government officials who are 
responsible for the tendering and contracting process. The local companies benefit is low at 
between 5% and 10% per contract and there is no knowledge transfer to the country (JI3, 
2016). In addition, the Minister of Health stated that 85% of the medical supplies in the 
country are delivered by a single supplier who is also responsible for the distribution (MO2, 
2016).  
 
Furthermore, an interviewed Majlis Oman member (MO2, 2016) highlighted that the 
legal framework does not help to restrain such practices. For example, the anti-monopoly law 
was amended in 2011 but is still not active. Similarly, an anti-conflict of interest law was 
formulated in 1983 but never implemented (AlMukhaini, 2013). An interviewed Majlis 
Oman member (MO5, 2016) argues that the existence of powerful cronies, such as 
(anonymise) and (anonymise) who are responsible for economic planning but also directly or 
indirectly represent more than 70 international companies (see Appendix 3), highlights a pure 
conflict of interest. These individuals have created obstacles to any legal reform that would 
counter their behaviours. In addition, the influential individuals know how to by-pass the 
system, making it very difficult for anyone to enter the market (BI5, 2016).  
Moreover, according to MO1 (2016), MO7 (2016), GOI1 (2016), GOI13 (2016) and 
GOI14 (2016), rent-seeking in the country is not limited to individuals but has been expanded 
to the private sector. 
The biggest capital cronyism is the private sector. The system was designed to 
maintain their positions and their control over the market (GOI9, 2016).  
In fact, even the few members of the business elite who do not hold any official position have 
built bridges with the decision-makers, to the extent they can function as if they are above the 
law (MO1 ,2016; MO7 ,2016; GOI1 ,2016; GOI13,201; and GOI14 ,2016).  
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In the last 45 years, the government has supported the oligopolistic practices in the 
private sector, by giving support to less than 10 family companies which control the market. 
According to a focus group participant from the private sector: 
The small and medium enterprises could not have any sort of financial facilities as 
the banks are not willing to lend them the necessary money to start their business 
without heavy guarantees. If those young comers do not manage to sustain their 
projects, then they would be jailed because they could not pay back the loans 
Clearly there is no protection for the small and medium enterprises in Oman. On 
the other hand, those big family companies which own their own banks or at least 
have large shares in banks, so the financial facilities are not a question and 
definitely there will be protected if they could not pay back the loans which they 
owe (FPS2, 2016). 
Most participants believe that the private sector is dominated by a small group of families. 
This control by a handful of individuals is not possible without certain arrangements among 
them. The families have a mutual understanding about splitting the market, and in what kind 
of products each family specialises. When the participants were asked about their views 
regarding the monopoly activities in the private sector most of them indicated that the top 10 
business elites in Oman have worked together for the last 45 years (see Appendix 3). 
According to an interviewed government official: 
For sure they are coordinating with each other so I will take this project and you 
could take the next project. Or by bidding against each other but in reality they 
exaggerate their bids to make it easier for a particular company to win the tender. It 
is a kind of conglomerate (GOI7, 2016). 
 
 
An interviewed government official (GOI5, 2016) provided a different perspective. 
He acknowledges that even if some of the political elite use their influence to obtain business 
or obstruct competition, the problem in Oman might be due to security concerns. He argues 
that the security services used to place obstacles against any development that would increase 
the number of expats or to open the market to international investors. However, most 
participants acknowledged that the monopolistic and oligopolistic practices in the country 
were one of the main reasons behind the social unrest in 2011. According to an interviewed 
government official (GOI5, 2016), the political elite were aware of the government’s 
intentions to invest in the northern cities. They gained control of land prior to the 
announcement of the projects, and then started to sell or rent it. This approach created the 
social unrest in the northern cities. In fact, the practice provides a clear example of crony 
capitalists’ opportunistic behaviour rather than security concerns being behind the limited 
expansion of the private sector. According to an interviewed journalist: 
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The main obstacles to achieve economic diversification in Oman is the existence of 
the crony capitalism and the oligopoly practiced in the private sector (JI3, 2016) . 
 
One of the questions directed to the participants was: Despite the generous subsidies 
and financial schemes provided by the government in the period 1976 to 1995 targeting the 
agriculture sector, there was a contraction in the sector’s share of GDP. What are the 
reasons behind that? The answer provided by most participants was that most of the funds 
were acquired by certain members of the political elite and were not used to create a self-
sustaining agricultural sector. Instead, the funds were used to establish recreational farms; i.e. 
the funds were directed to government officials rather than genuine farmers. A further 
problem with the sector was the amount of debt accrued at the Agriculture and Fisheries 
Bank threatened its existence, with the result that it was merged with the Development Bank. 
According to an interviewed journalist (BI5, 2016), the limited development of the 
agricultural and fishery sector could be attributed to the mismanagement of financial 
resources, the lack of clear strategies with a clear mandate and clear guidelines, most projects 
were not based on proper viability studies and the existence of crony capitalism practices. 
 
Furthermore, according to several participants (FGO3, 2016; FNGO2, 2016; FJ3, 
2016), the mismanagement of financial resources was not limited to the agriculture and 
fisheries sector. It was replicated in the 1990s in the industrial sector. Some of the political 
elite and their associates benefited from government support through cheap credit to gain 
access to easy money but the outcome was the closure of many factories in a short period 
because of the lack of viability studies. The main reason to establish those factories was to 
benefit from the easy credit facilities provided by the government. Similarly, the government 
initiative to enhance the tourism sector saw crony capitalism in action. Many people started 
to transform buildings which were not built as hotels into hotels in order to benefit from the 
generous incentives being provided by the government. According to an interviewed 
government official: 
The economic diversification process became the victim of the opportunists. What 
happened prior to 2011 was an exaggeration and misuse of the position by many of 




Although FDI inflows are a normal part of business practice, this study argues that in the case 
of Oman they should be considered to be a matter of politics as they are linked to the practice 
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of crony capitalism.37 The participants were asked about their views regarding the weak FDI 
inflows to the non-hydrocarbon tradable sectors (see Figure 8-5). Most comments indicated 
that the business environment in the country does not encourage competition from the 
international market. The legal framework acts as a deterrent to easy access to the Omani 
market under the justification that the private sector is still pre-mature, and allowing 
international companies to enter the market will have a negative effect on the local 
companies. An interviewed government official (GOI15, 2016) highlighted that it is also a 
matter of access to the government. A foreign investor with good access would be able to 
obtain the required permits quickly. For example, (anonymise) managed to obtain the land 
and to be in partnership with the government in a particular project by using his close 
relationship with the Sultan. As an interviewed government official put it:  
Unfortunately, if you are an investor you need to have somebody influential to 
partner with if you want to make your life easy. Without a gatekeeper, it will be 
very difficult to access the market (GOI14, 2016). 
 
 
Figure 8-5:FDI by Industry (Relative Share %) 
Source: Compiled by the author with data obtained from (NCSI, 2016e) 
A further issue for FDI was that several participants implied that the negative 
bureaucracy diminished willingness of investors to establish new business in the country. In 
this context, the assets ownership laws were highlighted by interviewed government official: 
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If I have a private land and I would like to use that land for a business entity the 
law will not allow me to do so this can be in the benefit of the industry. Oman is 
not business friendly it is very complicated to do business in Oman. Another 
report, Doing Business in Oman also highlighted similar issues (GOI14, 2016).  
 
Although a stable exchange rate and access to cheap gas might encourage foreign 
investment, investors are unable to access the market without having a partnership with one 
of the rent-seekers. For example, Omani oligarchs dominate the gas-related industrial sector 
through their influence on the government. However, the government could encourage 
independent international investors to establish gas-related industries without the intervention 
of that group. This would allow the government to maximise revenue by selling its share at a 
later stage in the stock market. According to interviewed government official:  
The cheap energy prices might be the only competitive element in Oman that we 
could use it to encourage foreign investors. As the other requirements are not as 
competitive such as the high salaries for the local employees, the lack of human 
resource development and the lack of work ethic which is a phenomenon that used 
to be in the public sector but right now has infected the private sector as well 
(GOI1, 2016). 
 
In fact, crony capitalism and oligopolistic practices have been identified by a number 
of government publications. For example, the fifth FYDP highlighted that rent-seeking and 
anti-competitive behaviours were among the challenges facing private sector development 
and FDI inflows (MONE, 1996:259-265). The fifth FYDP was important because it covered 
the first stage of Vision 2020. As such it sent a signal that the destructive practices of some of 
the business elite must be minimised to establish healthy sustainable development. However, 
according to the participants, little has been achieved in this regard. Similarly, Figure 8-6 
shows the results of the World Bank’s ‘Doing Business Indicators’ (World Bank Group, 
2017), which highlight that between 2010 and 2016 there were improvements in terms of the 
‘starting a business’ and ‘getting electricity’ indices but no improvement in the other indices 
such as ‘enforcing contracts’, ‘protecting minority investors’, and ‘resolving insolvency’. 
Such findings are a clear indication that the legal reforms to create healthy business 
environment still lag international norms. According to an interviewed Majlis Oman member 
(MO5, 2016), it is common knowledge that if you want to access the Omani market you need 
to have a partnership with one of those individuals. Similar conclusions were also reached by 
Allen and Rigsbee II (2014), Skeet (1992) and Valeri, 2009).  





This chapter analyses the institutional quality and the social and political factors that impact 
on the state’s ability to achieve economic diversification. Through the analysis of the 
participants’ statements in the semi-structured interviews and the focus group discussion and 
the secondary data it is clear there is a serious problem in relation to the institutional quality 
in Oman. Although the government has been aware of the importance of improving 
institutional quality in its medium-term and long-term strategies, it has faced several 
challenges. Some challenges are related to the quality of the administration, while others are 
related to the decision-making structure in the country. The quality of the administration 
depends on implementing check and balance measures and the availability of performance 
and efficiency measurement tools. Without these, the lack of accountability and the absence 
of adequate audit procedures have a negative impact on the institutional performance and 
efficiency. Furthermore, the absence of KPIs and of an effective evaluation system has a 
similar negative effect. One of the main challenges Oman might face if oil prices continue to 
be weak for a long period will be financing the overstaffed public sector, as well as absorbing 
the growth in youth entrants into the labour market. Furthermore, it will be also difficult to 
maintain the infrastructure with the same level of lavish spending. Indeed, without proper 
economic diversification Oman could face a devastating future.  
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The lack of consistency and the absence of the periodic independent evaluation for the 
economic development strategies has resulted in the poor utilisation of oil revenues. The lack 
of consistency can be attributed to the overlapping responsibilities among the government 
institutions. Additionally, the growth rate in some of the main economic sectors, such as 
agriculture and fisheries, is much lower than the Vision 2020 forecast, which can be 
attributed to mismanagement and the lack of a champion who can drive the strategies. 
Furthermore, the lack of effective governance had a negative effect on economic 
development procedures as was evident in the analysis of the privatisation process. 
Moreover, the current decision-making structure in the country with the Sultan as the Prime 
Minister shields the Cabinet from criticism over their performance or the efficiency of the 
government bodies that they manage. Additionally, even though corruption and conflicts of 
interest are targeted in the Basic Law of the State, the implementing institutions are not able 
to perform their duties because of the administration structure in the country. 
 
One of the factors that has a negative effect on the institutional performance is 
individual competencies. The public sector faces critical challenges including overstaffing, 
the lack of adequate training and the concentration of duties in particular individual’s hands. 
Furthermore, the absence of performance indicators and the lack of job descriptions have a 
negative impact on the administration performance overall. 
 
Additionally, the chapter identifies the roots of the crony capitalism in Oman, which 
was related to the regime’s willingness to gain recognition by supporting certain individuals 
who were capable of coordinating with officials in other countries. In return those cronies 
used their close alliance with the Sultan to secure financial gains. The financial gains have 
been achieved through winning government contracts (with little or no competition) or by 
representing international companies in exchange of a percentage of the profits. The 
monopolistic and oligopolistic practices have created an unhealthy business environment in 
the country which curtails FDI inflows. Furthermore, the cronies shield themselves from 
competition by generating obstacles against any legal reforms that could undermine their 
position. 
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9.1 Introduction		
The concluding chapter presents an overview of the research that focuses on the factors that 
hinder Oman's ability to achieve economic diversification. The analysis of the empirical 
evidence led to the conclusion that four factors (economic factors, institutional quality, 
human resource development and political/social factors) have negatively affected the 
economic diversification process in Oman. However, the economic factors and the human 
resource development do have negative effect on the economic diversification, though the 
institutional quality and the political and social factors clearly negatively impacted the 
economic factors and the human resource development, which, in turn, led to unsuccessful 
economic diversification. 
 
This chapter includes four main sections, in addition to the short introduction. The 
first section presents an overall summary of the research and the key findings. A discussion 
on the contribution of the study follows. Then, the third section acknowledges the research 
limitations and the final section offers directions for future research. 
 
9.2 Research	Overview	and	the	Main	Findings	
The objective of the research was to identify and examine the factors that hinder Oman's 
ability to achieve sustainable economic diversification. These factors where provided by the 
literature on the resource curse theory, and this dissertation tests these hypotheses in the case 
of Oman. The factors were divided into four broad categories: the economic factors; human 
resource development; institutional quality and social and political factors. Furthermore, the 
research sought to identify which factor had bigger impact on the economy diversification 
process and how each factor interacted with other factors. 
 
This study started with an introductory chapter that provided the research background, 
the gaps within the literature, the theoretical foundation of the research, and the research’s 
significance. The literature on resource curse theory does not offer adequate explanations for 
the resource dependence/abundance impact on economic diversification plans in a particular 
state. Nevertheless, the theory provides a diagnostic analysis for the symptoms of the 
resource curse. 
 
Chapter Two provides background information about the case study of Oman and the 
context of this study. The chapter opens with a brief introduction, before Section Two gives 
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an overview of the Omani economy with detailed information about the structure of the 
government’s revenue, oil exports as a share of the total exports, the oil sector’s linkage with 
other economic activities, strategic development plans, economic challenges and the Dutch 
disease symptoms in the Omani economy. This background is followed by an overview on 
human resource development and provides detailed information about the demographic 
structure, organisation and challenges of the labour market and the links between the 
education system output and labour market demand. The next section highlights the 
institutional structure and quality in Oman by providing overview on governance, and 
governance and audit bodies, as well as Oman's ranking in the international governance 
quality indicators. 
 
Chapter Three reviews the literature that concentrates on resource curse theory. The 
review highlights the major gaps in knowledge that deserve further research. The gaps 
include a lack of research concerning the four channels of the resource curse that could 
hinder the state’s ability to achieve economic diversification. The second gap is the absence 
of analysis of the resource curse impact in a single country case study. Additionally, resource 
curse theory predicts that the abundance/dependence of natural resources will result in 
limited economic growth. Hence, this research provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
resource curse channels’ impact in a single case study. 
 
Moreover, the literature review highlights that the resource curse theory does not 
suggest strategic policies to overcome the problems associated with dependence on natural 
resource exports. Rather it provides a set of symptoms by which the state can be considered 
to be affected by the resource curse. Therefore, most studies analyse a single-channel of the 
resource curse; for example, Corden (1984), Matsen and Torvik (2005), Pegg (2010), Smith 
(2014) and Usui (1997) study the resource curse using the Dutch disease model to clarify the 
causes of the resource curse, while other scholars (e.g. Hertog, 2010a; Moore, 2002; 
Springborg, 2013) use the rentier state model.  
 
The comprehensive review of the literature reveals that most studies focusing on the 
resource curse channels concentrated more on the economic channel, which includes the 
Dutch disease, crowding out effect, state intervention in economic activities and the limited 
growth of the non-oil tradable sectors. Other studies focus on institutional quality as the main 
channel of the resource curse. A few studies give attention to the human resource 
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development and the political and social factors. As is demonstrated in Chapter Three there 
are only a very limited number of studies that test for more than one resource curse channel.  
The second section in Chapter Three narrows the focus by reviewing the literature on 
the natural resource impact in the GCC states. The review finds that many researchers 
(Callen, et al., 2014; Espinoza, 2012; Fasano, 2003; Peterson, 2009; Saif, 2009) argue that 
GDP growth is positively correlated with oil income and oil exports. However, other 
researchers (e.g. Basedau & Lay, 2009; Ross, Kaiser & Mazaheri, 2011) posit that a high 
dependency on oil exports results in unsustainable and distorted economic growth, in part, 
because hydrocarbons are a depleting resources.  
 
Furthermore, the chapter reviews the literature regarding rentier state theory in 
relation to the GCC and economic diversification. One observation regarding studies on the 
GCC is that most are based on quantitative methods using data provided by the governments 
which could result in a biased conclusion. Furthermore, the review highlights that studies 
using the Dutch disease model ignore the fact that the currencies in all GCC countries are 
pegged. The last section in the chapter provides an overview on the literature concerning 
resource curse in Oman. 
 
Chapter Four presents the theoretical and conceptual framework of the research. The 
chapter starts with a brief introduction that posits that the availability of natural resource 
income cannot be considered only as a dichotomy of a curse or a blessing. According to 
Stevens, Lahn and Kooroshy (2015), the exploitation of natural resource provides low-
income countries with the means to create sustainable development. However, the outcome is 
conditional on effective economic management, such as achieved by Norway and Botswana. 
The chapter is divided into two main sections. The first section provides an overview on the 
resource curse theory and its four channels. It also addresses how the thesis overcomes the 
critiques of resource curse theory through differentiating between resource dependency and 
resource abundance. The thesis argues that GCC states are resource dependent, while the 
likes of Australia, Botswana, Canada and Norway are resource abundant states. Furthermore, 
the chapter outlines various measures of economic performance and economic 
diversification. The second section narrows the focus to how the thesis addresses the resource 
curse channels.  
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Chapter Five justifies the selection of qualitative case study, the case selection, data 
collection, the methods for the analysis and the discussion process. Moreover, the chapter 
presents the ethical concerns of the study and the limitations and difficulties associated with 
the fieldwork. Overall, to underscore the accuracy and rigour of the research, the 
triangulation method is used. For example, data was collected from three sources, semi-
structured interviews, focus group discussions and official documents. Furthermore, the 
selection of interviewees was also triangulated using two parallel snowball selection 
methods. 
 
Chapters Six, Seven and Eight analyse the data in relation to the four channels of the 
resource curse theory. Chapter Six analyses the economic factors impacting on the economic 
diversification process. The chapter is divided into eight main sections. The introductory 
section is followed by an in-depth analysis of the Omani economic structure, including a 
discussion of the diversification of government revenues, economic performance indicators 
and the economy diversification puzzle. The third section assesses the Dutch disease 
symptoms in the Omani economy, such as labour force crowding out, non-oil tradable sector 
performance and exchange rate appreciation. The following sections analyse economic factor 
channels such oil price instability, the role of the government in the economy, private sector 
performance and clandestine trade.  
 
One of the main conclusions of the chapter is that the Dutch disease hypotheses is not 
relevant to the Omani economy. The crowding out of the labour force from the tradable 
sectors to oil sector does not match the case in Oman where the workforce moved not to the 
oil sector but to a vastly expanded public sector. The second hypothesis of the Dutch disease 
is the slow growth of the non-oil tradable sectors is not reflected in Oman because before the 
oil export revenues start to flow there was very limited industrial activity. The third 
hypothesis of an overvalued currency does not occur in Oman, as the currency is pegged to 
the US dollar. 
 
Furthermore, the analysis reveals that oil price volatility was an influential factor 
blocking economic diversification, although, logically, it should work as a driver to increase 
the efforts to diversify the economy away from its oil dependency. The chapter also analyses 
government intervention in the economy, which started in 1970 with the new regime’s 
attempt to establish a modern state structure. To develop the private sector the government 
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provided top level officials with the financial means to establish their own companies. Over 
time these officials were transformed into crony capitalists by using their political power and 
financial resources to create an oligopolistic environment which has curtailed the expansion 
of the sector. The chapter’s main conclusion is that economic channel in blocking economic 
diversification in Oman does not match the resource curse hypotheses. The economic factors 
can be considered as intervening variable as they are influenced by institutional inefficiency 
and the social and political factors. 
 
Chapter Seven presents the empirical findings regarding the human resource 
development as one of the resource curse channels. The chapter contains a brief introduction 
followed by four main sections. Section Two provides a comprehensive analysis of the 
human resource development in Oman by looking at education quality and education policy 
sustainability. Resource curse theory predicts that oil-dependent states will not be able to 
expand citizens’ participation in the private sector. Therefore, Section Three assesses labour 
market supply and demand and provides clarification on the existence of the labour market 
supply and demand gap. The reasons behind the citizens’ limited participation in the private 
sector is attributed to the Omanisation strategy and competition from expatriates. Section 
Four is set against the background of the Omani government’s awareness of the importance 
of economic diversification to a knowledge-based economy. Consequently, the section 
assesses the reasons behind the limited development in R&D.  
 
Human resource development has been one pillar in each FYDP, as well as Vision 
2020. Although the horizontal education distribution philosophy provided a basic education 
for most citizens in a short period, the approach had a negative effect on the quality of 
education. The low-quality output of the education system is attributed to poor teacher 
training, the lack of financial incentives for teachers and a lack of consistency in education 
strategies. In addition, the distortion in the labour market can be attributed to the lack of 
qualifications and skills among Omanis and to competition from better qualified migrants 
who are less costly to employ and tolerate poor working condition. 
 
Additionally, the education system in Oman suffers from chronic structural problems 
which is attributed to the inefficient coordination between different government entities and 
the lack of clarity in responsibilities towards different aspects of the system. In 1980, the 
Omani government established a strategy to replace the migrant workers with Omanis. 
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However, the strategy has not been successful as the government is still the main employer of 
Omanis, with few involved in the private sector. Limited Omani participation in the private 
sector can be attributed to two reasons. The first is related to political decision-making and 
the absence of strict policies to impose reforms in the labour market. The second reason is 
related to the limited training opportunities and the financial incentives gap between the 
public and private sectors. The chapter also analyses the role of R&D as a vehicle by which 
to achieve a diversified economy. The findings indicate that the limited role of R&D is 
because of the lack of conviction among the decision-makers about its importance. As is 
demonstrated, the quality of the educational system output also undermines the successful 
utilisation of R&D. The chapter concludes that human resource development is an obstacle to 
achieving economic diversification in Oman. However, it was affected by institutional quality 
and the political and social factors. 
 
Chapter Eight is the final empirical chapter and analyses institutional quality and the 
social and political factors as obstacles towards economic diversification. The chapter is 
divided into six sections, the first of which is the introduction. The second section analyses 
the institutional quality in terms of the management, implementation and consistency of 
economic diversification strategies. It also assesses the issues that affect institutional 
performance and efficiency, such as overlapping responsibilities and the lack of 
accountability and governance. The third section provides the analysis of the social factors 
including rentier mentality, nepotism and bureaucracy and individual performance. The 
fourth section analyses the political aspects including crony capitalism, rent-seeking and 
corruption. The section discusses the roots of crony capitalism in Oman and analyses its 
impact on the economy. Furthermore, the thesis argues that FDI inflows in oil-dependent 
states are not a result of normal business practice but are influenced by the political 
willingness to open the market to international investors. This is analysed in the fifth section. 
 
One of the main conclusions of Chapter Eight is that Oman suffers from inefficient 
institutions. The lack of institutional quality is attributed to the absence of accountability and 
adequate audit processes, of key performance indicators and of an effective evaluation 
system. However, the importance of enhancing institutional quality was stressed repeatedly in 
each FYDP, although the plans themselves also suffer from a lack of performance and 
efficiency measurement tools. This contributed to the limited achievement of some of the 
critical goals in the FYDPs and Vision Oman 2020, and, in turn, the failure of economic 
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diversification strategies. Furthermore, the lack of governance is attributed to the decision-
making structure in the country as the Sultan is also the prime minister which makes it very 
difficult to impose any governance measures. Additionally, any criticism of the performance 
of the Cabinet is taken as criticism of the Sultan. In fact, although there is a very clear anti-
corruption and conflict of interest legal framework, the implementing institutions are not 
effective because of the administration structure. According to rentier state theory, 
overstaffing in the public sector is a channel of indirect wealth distribution. However, this 
policy has a negative impact on institutional performance and efficiency.  
 
The social impediments to economic diversification are rentier mentality, nepotism, 
bureaucracy and individuals’ performances, all of which lead to the creation of an 
unproductive and inefficient public sector. In addition, the chapter identifies the role of crony 
capitalism in Oman and its impact on economic performance. Providing a limited number of 
individuals with political power and financial resources enabled them to gain control of most 
of the economic activities in the country. This situation has created an unhealthy business 
environment which has curtailed FDI inflows. Indeed, this thesis argues that crony capitalism 
has had a negative impact on economic activities for two reasons. The first is related to the 
legal protection the cronies created in order to protect their positions from international 
competition. The second is related to their ability to monopolise the business environment to 
their benefit and build obstacles to any local competition. This environment has not assisted 
the expansion of the private sector and indirectly hinders economic diversification efforts. 
 
In summary, this thesis identifies four main factors that hinder the state’s ability to 
diversify the economy from its natural resource dependency. Most scholars identify 
economic factors as the main channel of the resource curse. However, this thesis 
demonstrates that in the Omani case, economic factors are negatively affected by the 
institutional quality and the political and social factors. This is the same case for human 
resource development. The thesis identifies the reasons behind institutional inefficiency, 
which is clearly linked to the lack of human resource development and to the economic 
activities in the country. Furthermore, the thesis identifies crony capitalism’s impact on the 
economic performance and that the unhealthy business environment has severely curtailed 
private sector expansion including FDI inflows.  
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9.3 Research	Contributions	and	Significance	
This thesis seeks to fill a wide gap in the literature in relation to resource dependency in the 
single country case of Oman. Accordingly, the contributions of this thesis are as follows. 
 
As is demonstrated in Chapter Three, most studies that analyse the resource curse 
channels are comparative, and are based on a set of different countries. For example, 
Gylfason (2001) studies human capital development in 65 resource-rich countries, Atkinson 
and Hamilton (2003) assess the genuine saving rate in 103 countries, Gylfason and Zoege 
(2006) investigate savings and investment in 85 countries, Bornhorst et al. (2008) study the 
physical policy in 30 hydrocarbon-producing countries, Apergis et al. (2014) research the 
agricultural value added in MENA countries, and Bhattacharyya and Collier (2014) assess 
public capital in 45 developed and developing countries. Therefore, the main contribution of 
the thesis is to provide fresh analysis on the resource curse impact in a single country study 
that has been overlooked. Furthermore, the thesis provides a new dimension to the theory as 
it argues that resource dependency must not be categorised as only a curse or only a blessing. 
 
Most scholars who measure natural resource dependency and abundance focus on the 
natural resource share of the GDP or share of total exports. For example, Sachs and Warner 
(1995) and Boschini et al. (2013) use primary exports as a percentage of GDP, Ross (2006), 
Auty (2007) and Collier and Hoeffler (2009) use the percentage of natural resource export 
revenues as a percentage of GDP, Gylfason (2001) and Gylfason and Zoege (2006) measure 
the share of natural capital in national wealth and Dietz et al. (2007) and Daniele (2011) use 
the share of mineral exports in total exports. Therefore, another contribution of the thesis is to 
include different factors rather just using one measure to test the reasons behind limited 
economic diversification. 
 
Furthermore, the methodology used is another contribution to the literature as no 
previous study had used qualitative methodology to test the resource curse impact in a single 
case study. In addition, although this thesis analyses the resource curse impact in Oman, 
similarities with other GCC countries could inform those countries about the possible causes 
behind their limited economic diversification efforts. 
 
As demonstrated in Appendix 1, most studies analyse the resource curse impacts 
through one particular channel. For example, Apergis et al. (2014), Karl (2005) and Sachs 
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and Warner (1995, 2001) test the resource curse impact by analysing the economic 
performance. Blanco and Grier (2012), Daniele (2001) and Stijns (2005) analyse the resource 
curse impact through human resource development. Mehlum, Moene and Torvik (2006), 
Ploeg (2007) and Torvik (2009) assess institutional quality as a channel of the resource curse, 
while Collier and Hoeffler (1998), Lam and Wantchekon (2003) and Ross (1999) test the 
political factors. In this context, the research examines for the first time the relationship 
between four different factors—economic performance, institutional quality, political and 
social factors, and human resource development. Furthermore, the thesis examines the impact 
of the political and social factors on the FDI decision-making as it argues that FDI inflows to 
an oil-dependent state are politically rather than institutionally or economically motivated. 
 
Most studies which assess the economic channels do so through the Dutch disease 
model. However, the model does not fit the political and economic development in the GCC 
states after the discovery of oil. Therefore, the thesis argues that the Dutch disease model is 
not applicable to the GCC states and instead proposes a new conception termed ‘the GCC 
disease’. 
 
Furthermore, most studies use GDP growth as an economic performance measure. 
However, the analysis confirms that using GDP growth as an indicator of economic 
performance and development is not suitable in the case of Oman. Over the past 45 years 
GDP has grown strongly, but this growth is because of the increase in oil export volumes and 
the increase in international oil prices. Therefore, this thesis overcomes the debate regarding 
the economic performance measures by using economic diversification as a proxy for 
economic performance measure. 
 
The political economy of Oman has generally been ignored by scholars. Allen and 
Rigsbee II (2014), Rabi (2011), Reilly (2014), Skeet (1992), Takriti (2013) and Valeri (2009) 
do investigate crony capitalism through their analyses of the economic structure. However, 
this thesis provides for the first time an analysis of the roots of crony capitalism in Oman and 
its impact on the economic diversification process. 
 
9.4 Research	Limitations		
During the research, there were several critical challenges, the biggest of which was 
conducting the fieldwork in Oman on aspects perceived as sensitive. However, I managed to 
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conduct 41 semi-structured interviews and held two focus discussions (out of three initially 
planned). Nevertheless, the participants insisted on anonymising their identities, especially 
because they revealed sensitive information that was not available to the public. Indeed, I was 
unable to use some of the material because it was not possible to triangulate it with the 
secondary data. 
 
Another important challenge was related to the availability of secondary data to 
triangulate the findings of the fieldwork. It is important to mention that, because of the 
political system in Oman, most data regarding energy production contracts, SGWF 
transactions and investments, court cases against corrupt officials, and SOCs financial 
statements, for example, are confidential. However, some of the participants provided the 
researcher with the requested data. 
 
Furthermore, it was difficult to access accurate and reliable statistics data. For 
example, the available data between 1970 and 1980 regarding the non-oil manufacturing 
sector included hydrocarbon activities such as oil refining. Furthermore, in 2000, the 
government started to export LNG, which is also classified under non-oil manufacturing 
activities. In some cases, even though the data is available, requesting access can trigger 
discomfort, especially if the data is sensitive such as an individual’s shareholding in a listed 
company or unemployment statistics. In addition, the e-government websites, which 
supposedly provide easy access to information, can led to a dead end when searching for a 
comprehensive list of royal decrees because they don’t have them online. 
 
9.5 Further	Research	
Given the similarities between the political, economic and social structure in Oman and the 
other GCC states, this study can be the base for several other research projects. The most 
immediate one is applying the same framework to study the unsuccessful economic 
diversification attempts in the other GCC states. The framework can also be used to study the 
four channels of the resource curse theory in the other GCC states. This would produce a 
comprehensive picture of the impact of the regions’ political systems and economic structure. 
Such research would be useful, particularly in relation to regime sustainability. Furthermore, 
the framework of this thesis could also help in embarking on an international comparative 
project; for example, the natural resource impact on Scandinavia, Sub-Saharan Africa, and 
Latin America in comparison to the GCC. 
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Appendix 1: The Resource Curse: Its Causes and Effects 
Focus Authors Conclusions 
Economic 
performance 
(Boschini et al., 2007) 
The type of resource determines the type of 
negative impact of the resource curse. 
(Bornhorst et al., 2008) 
Hydrocarbon revenues have negative 
relationship with non-hydrocarbon revenues. 
(Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; 
Dietz, Neumayer, & Soysa, 
2007) 
Economic dependency on natural resources 
could lead to a low rate of genuine savings. 
(Thorvaldur Gylfason & Zoega, 
2006; Stevens & Dietsche, 2008) 
Economic dependency on natural resources has 
an adverse impact on savings and investment 
growth, which could slow the development of 
the financial system. 
(Corden & Neary, 1982; Corden, 
1984; Limi, 2007; Gylfason, 
2001; Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 
2004; Pegg, 2010) 
Dutch disease is the most prominent economic 
channel for the natural resource curse, which 
leads to poor economic performance. 
(Boos and Holm-Müller, 2012) 
The factors that lead to the resource curse also 
have an adverse effect on genuine savings. 
(Apergis et al., 2014) 
Negative growth in the agriculture value added 
is associated with the natural resources rent 
dependency. 
(Sachs & Warner, 1995, 2001) 
Natural resource dependence is negatively 
correlated with economic growth. Institutions 
do not play a significant causal role in the 
resource curse outcome.  
(Davis & Tilton, 2005) (Frankel, 
2010)  
Natural resource price volatility reduces 
economic growth. 
(Karl, 2005) 
Oil-dependent countries economic 
performance is worse than resource-poor 
economies because high dependency on oil 
export revenues has a negative effect on 
property rights and increases the power of 




Natural resource abundance has a positive 
impact on the state’s ability to invest in the 
human capital. 
(Papyrakis & Gerlagh, 2007) Natural resource abundance could lead to 
lower levels of investment in education.  
(Daniele, 2011) 
Human resource development is positively 
correlated with natural resource abundance. 
However, it is negatively correlated with 
natural resource dependence. 
(Gylfason, 2010) 
Natural resource abundance could have 
negative effects on education.  
(Blanco and Grier, 2012) Natural resource dependency has adverse 





(Apergis and Payne, 2014) 
Better institutional quality reduces the 
unfavourable effect of oil reserves on the 
performance of the real economy. 
(Brunnschweiler, 2008) Institutional quality does not have a significant 
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role on the negative effects of natural resource 
dependency. 
(Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 
2006, Mavrotas, Murshed, & 
Torres, 2011)  
Institutional quality could determine if the 
resource revenues will bring curse or blessing. 
(Bhattacharyya and Hodler, 
2014) 
Institutional quality determines the success of 
financial sector development. 
(Torvik, 2009) Good governance and effective institutions can 
be the only way to avoid the resource curse. 
(Sarmidi, Hook, Law, & Jafari, 
2014) 
If the state manages to reform its institutions 
and improve their performance, then it is able 
to avoid the negative effects of resource 
dependency. 
(Ploeg, 2007) 
The state can prevent the resource curse if they 
have strong institutions and a well-developed 
financial system alongside an open market for 
international trade. 
(Karl, 1997) 
Rent-seeking behaviours constrain the state's 
ability to reform its institutions. 
(Mehlum, Moene, & Torvik, 
2006) 
Good governance and effective institutions are 
the only way to avoid the resource curse. 
(Isham et al., 2002) 
Some agriculture crops such as coffee, cocoa 
and bananas could have a similar effect to oil 
dependency on economic performance. 
However, the only way to avoid the resource 
curse is the implementation of good policies 
through efficient institutions. 
institutional quality 
and human 
development (Bulte et al., 2005)   
Resource dependency leads to low levels of 
human resource development, weak 
institutions, promotes autocratic governments 














(Collier and Hoeffler, 1998) 
Natural resource dependency raises the 
probability of civil war. In addition, it hinders 
any positive economic development. 
(Ross, 1999) 
Resource-dependent states implement low tax 
rates which decreases the level of political 
accountability. 
(Lam and Wantchekon, 2003) 
Corruption, rent-seeking, and income 
inequalities are the most prominent effects of 
the political channel of the natural resource 
curse. 
(Sala-i-Martin and Subramanian, 
2003) 
Oil export revenue dependency could be the 
main cause of conflict between the 
stakeholders at the national level such as the 
political elite, local tribes and the overall 
society. It also leads to institutional quality 
deterioration. 
(Arezki and Brückner, 2011) 
High dependency on oil revenues increases 
political risk and corruption, especially if the 
state has a monopoly over oil production 
activities. 
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Focus Authors Conclusions 
(Arezkia and Gylfasonb, 2011) 
If the state is democratic, then natural resource 
dependency is not associated with high levels 
of corruption. 
Source: Compiled by the author. 
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 إیضاحات
احلكومة مبكرا لرضورة البحث عن مصادر لتنویع هتدف هذه اRراسة ايل حتليل 3سـباب اليت وقفت عائقا امام سلطنة عامن للوصول ايل التنویع 3قتصادي عىل الرمغ من انتباه 
النظریة(عوامل اقتصادیة، ضعف اRخل،حيث سـتحاول هذه اRراسة حتليل العوائق  من منطلق نظریة لعنة املوارد ،وذf من خالل حتليل عدد من العوامل اليت تنبثق من ت^ 
qاذا اكن التنویع 3قتصادي يف السلطنة قد تأثر سلبا بواحد او اكرث من تأهيل املوارد البرشیة،ضعف كفاءة املؤسسات احلكومية،عوامل اج Åعية وسـياسـية) يف سبيل حتدید ف
 ت^ العوامل.
 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the economic diversification obstacles through the 
lenses of the resource curse the. My work will concentrate in Oman as a case study and will 
cover four main channels of the resource curse mainly economic factors, human resource 
development, institutional quality and political and social factors. To be able to do so I used 
qualitative methodology the data was collected through semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussion the findings will be triangulated with the secondary data from the 
government of Oman publication and the World Bank, IMF and other international 
organizations publications. 
 
qدها عيل ذf املورد تشري نظریة لعنة املوارد ايل ان اRول اليت تعمتد يف اقتصادها عيل مورد وحيد لن تمتكن من الوصول ايل التنویع 3قتصادي ،حيث ان اع ریة لعنة املوارد:نظ
ت العامة وتبعات تتعلق بضعف كفاءة تأهيل املوارد البرشیة ايل جانب سـترتتب عليه تبعات اقتصادیة من قبيل املرض الهولندي،وتبعات مؤسساتية من قبيل ضعف كفاءة املؤسسا
 معاêة ت^ اRول من تبعات اجqعية وسـياسـية.
The resource curse theory main argument is that oil –dependent/abundant states will not be 
able to diversify their economies as a result of the influence of one of the four factors: 
economic factors, human resource development, institutional quality and political and social 
factors. 
 
دفقات املالية تعود هذه التسمية ايل ما عاêه 3قتصاد الهولندي عقب تدفق مكيات كبرية من النفط يف بدایة السـبعينات من القرن املايض ،حيث أدت الت نظریة املرض الهولندي:
حر¢ا من القدرة عيل منافسة السلع املسـتوردة اليت  الكبرية ايل رفع سعر رصف اجلûر الهولندي امام العمالت 3خرى مما  رفع قمية املنتجات الهولندیة غري النفطية ،3مر اóي
اف القوى العام© يف ت^ القطاعات اصبحت ذات قمية اقل ،ومبرور الوقت أدى ذf إيل إهنيار العدید من القطاعات 3نتاجية غري النفطية يف هولندا كام أدى أیضاً إىل إسـتزن 
 .لتتجه للعمل يف قطاع النفط نظرا للعوائد املرتفعه 
The concept of Dutch disease refers to the situation in Netherlands after the discovery of 
massive amounts of natural gas. The massive inflow of foreign currency had resulted in 
increasing the currency exchange rate which resulted in decreasing the non-hydrocarbon 
exports competition in the international market. The increased importance of the natural 
resource activities in the economy have resulted in crowding out of the workforce from the 
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other non-hydrocodone economic sectors to the hydrocarbon sector which had negative effect 
on those sectors. 
 
احلكوميني. وميكن أن  هو مصطلح یصف 3قتصاد اóي یعمتد فيه النجاح يف األعامل التجاریة عىل العالقات القویة بني القامئني عىل العمل التجاري واملسـئولني رأساملية احملاسيب:
وتتشلك هذه  .نونية أو املنح احلكومية أو التخفيضات الرضیبية اخلاصة أو غريها من أشاكل تدخل اRو∏ يف توجيه الشـئون 3قتصادیةیتسم ∂حملا∂ة فÅ یتعلق بتوزیع التصارحي القا
 .الظاهرة نتيجة اندماج املال مع السلطة
Crony capitalism is an economic term referring to the business environment in which the 
successful of any business activity is condition the availability of strong relationship between 
the decision-makers and the business elite. It can be summarised as the unhealthy 
environment being created through the mixture of political power and business activities. 
 
 عوامل اقتصادیة (المرض الھولندي/ تذبذ اسعار النفط /دخول الحكومة بالمشاریع التجاریة ،....)
 ضعف  وكذf و3سامك الزراعة قطاع عوائد منو تراجع نفرس ؟وكيف الهولندي ∂ملرض يسمي مما العامين 3قتصاد یعاين هل .1
 ؟ الصناعات منو
 3قتصادي؟ التنویع حتقيق عيل السلطنة قدرة أمام عائقا اكن النفط أسعار تذبذب إن القول ميكن هل نظرك و»ة من .2
يشري بعض املهمتني إىل أن مزامحة احلكومة للقطاع اخلاص يف بعض املشاریع التجاریة  أدت إيل إضعاف القطاع اخلاص.هل من  .3
 تعليق ؟
 ملاذا مل یتوسع القطاع اخلاص رمغ اRمع احلكويم املقدم À؟ .4
قامت السلطنة بربط سعر رصف الر’ل ∂Rوالر 3مرييك العتبارات اقتصادیة .هل نسـتطيع القول ان المنو البطئ نسبيا  .5
 للصادرات العامنية غري النفطية یعزى ولو بشلك جزيئ اىل املسـتوى املرتفع لسعر رصف العم© الوطنية ؟
Economic factors (Dutch disease, oil price volatility, government intervention in the 
business activities…) 
1- In your opinion, what are the symptoms of the Dutch disease in the Omani economy? Would 
you please highlight your opinion regarding the limited growth on the non-oil tradable 
sectors. 
2- In your opinion to what extent have the oil price volatility affected the economic 
diversification plans. 
3- Despite the generous financial facilities being provided by the government to the private 
sector though the government still involved in some of the projects that in other countries 
been done by the private sector. Any comments? 
4- What are the reasons behind the limited private sector expansion? 
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5- The Dutch disease model presumed that natural resources exports would result in the 
currency appreciation. In your opinion to what extent such situation has affected the 
government efforts towards the economy diversification? 
 
 ضعف تأھیل الموارد البشریة
 خرجيي إمتالك حول احلدیث من الكثري هناf أن جند السلطنة يف البرشیة املوارد تطوير يف الكبري 3ست⁄ر من الرمغ عىل .1
 وجود ايل ادت اليت 3سـباب يه ؟وما الطرح هذا مع تتفق الراهن.هل الوضع يف 3قتصاد یتطلهبا اليت املهارات والتدریب التعلمي قطاع
 نظرك؟ و»ة من العمل سوق ومتطلبات التعلميية العملية خمرجات بني الفجوة هذه مثل
 حلكومية؟ا املؤسسات خمتلف يف القيادات من الثاين الصف تأهيل يف احلكومة جنحت هل .2
 حيث عامنيني قبل من شغلها ميكن قد وظيفية ومسـتو’ت قطاعات يف تعمل 3جانب من كبريه نسـبة هناf ان املتابع یالحظ .3
 وراء العائق هو وما نظرك و»ة من الطرح هذا مع تتفق هل ذf. وراء العوامل أمه أحد تكون قد املسـترتة التجارة أن املتابعني بعض یثري
 السلطنة؟ يف الوافدة العام∏ إحالل عىل اخلاص طاعالق قدرة عدم
 حيث العلمي البحث عيل انفاقا 3قل اRول بني السلطنة أن إىل اËتصة اRولية املؤسسات قبل من املعدة 3حصائيات تشري .4
  ؟ ياتهسلب  يه وما املؤرش؟ هذا دالالت يه ما نظرك و»ة القويم.من اRخل اجاميل من ٪٠.١٣ النسـبة تتجاوز ال
 بنسـبة 3تصاالت قطاع یلية )٪٩٢( بلغت بنسـبة السلطنه يف تعمني نسـبة أعيل البنوك قطاع حقق فقد 3حصائيات حبسب .5
 حتقق مل حني يف غريها دون القطاعات هذه يف التعمني جناح تفسري نسـتطيع .كيف )٪٧٨( بنسـبة والغاز النفط رشاكت قطاع یليه )٪٩٠(
  املرتفعه؟ النسب ذات القطاعات ∂يق
Human resource development 
1- Despite the intense investment in the education system specially in the human resource 
development in general though number of national and international publications 
identified the low quality of the education system outcome. Without the reasons behind 
that in your opinion and what could be the reasons behind the gap in the qualification 
requested by the world market and education system outcome. 
2- “We have leadership problem” do you agree with that statement and if you agree what are 
the reasons behind that. 
3- According to the published data those high percentage of experts working in the private 
sector holding qualifications that could be matched with the citizens however the citizen’s 
participation in the private sector is very limited. In your opinion, what are the reasons 
behind that. 
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4- According to the published data the Omani government expenditure on research and 
development among the lowest internationally (0.13%)/GDP. In your opinion, what are 
the reasons behind that and what are they expected negative effects of such situation. 
5- According to published data some economies sectors had achieved high levels of 
Omanisation for example:  banking sector (92%), communication (90%), oil and gas 
(78%). In your opinion, what are the reasons behind the successful Omanisation in those 
sectors. 
 
 ضعف كفاءة المؤسسات
 عىل 3مر هذا ینطبق هل وخدماهتا احلكومية املؤسسات جودة سوء من تعاين النفط عىل املعمتدة اRول فان النظر’ت حبسب .1
 ذf؟ عيل مؤرشات مثة السلطنة؟وهل
 حيث ضئيال یعترب ریع من احلكومة حتصˆ ما أن جيد السلطنة يف اخلام املواد من الصادرات حبجم املتعلقة لالحصائيات املتابع .2
 احلالية للسـياسات املطلوبة التعدیالت يه ما نظرك و»ة من ؟ ٢٠١٢ العام يف ر’ل مالیني ٩ حوايل املثال سبيل عيل حتصيˆ مت ما بلغ
  ؟ الطبيعية الرثوات من 3سـتفادة بتعظمي واملتعلقة
 هذه الغاء مسببات يه ما م.٢٠٠٠ العام يف الهيئة ت^ إلغاء مت أنه إال الزراعي للتسویق هيئة بإسـتحداث احلكومة قامت .3
 ؟ نظرك و»ة من القرار لهذا و3جيابية السلبية اآل¸ر يه ؟ما املؤسسة
 اجلانب. هذا حول تعليق من .هلحكومية مؤسسات دةع بني اإلختصاصات يف تشابه وجود املتابع یالحظ .4
Institutional quality 
1- According to the resource curse theory oil dependent states will suffer from inefficient 
institutions. In your opinion, do you think we have such situation in Oman? if yes is there any 
indicators. 
2- According to the published data the mining sector participation in the government revenues 
was around 9 million OMR in 2012. In your opinion, what are the reasons behind the limited 
participation of the sector and the government revenues. 
3- According to the government publications the agriculture and fisheries sector have been 
provided with a generous financial support however those sectors participation on the GDP is 
much lower than the government target. Could you please highlight in this issue? 
4- According to the fifth FYDP the overlap between the different government institutions duties 
is one of the major challenges to enhance the institutional performance. Can you please 
comment on this? 
 
 عوامل سیاسیة واجتماعیة
  245 
 من الرمغ وعيل )١٩٧٣،١٩٨٠،١٩٨٦،٢٠٠١،٢٠٠٨( النفط أسعار إخنفاض من موجات عارصت وأن للسلطنة سـبق .1
fو∏ العامة املوازنة حتقيق أمام اليوم نقف ذûوقفت اليت 3سـباب يه ما نظرك و»ة ؟من مايل لعجز ل  ً  ت^ من لالسـتفادة عائقا
 التجارب؟
 أن تسـتطيع اقتصادیة تكتالت الوقت مبرور فهيا  شلكتت  ما غالبا الریعي النظام ذات ∂لنفط الغنية اRول فإن اRراسات حبسب .2
 مؤرشات؟ من السلطنة؟هل يف الظاهرة هذه ملثل مالمح مثة القامئ.هل الوضع من إسـتفادهتم من حتد أن شأهنا من  قرارات أیه عيل تؤثر
 صادي؟3قت التنویع حتقيق يف السلطنة قدرة عيل سليب تأثري لها اكن فهل الظاهرة هذه وجود حال ويف
حققت بعض اRول الغنية ∂لنفط تقدما نوعيا فÅ یتعلق بتنویع مصادر اRخل (الرنوجي،بتسواê،كندا) حيث تشري اRراسات إيل  .3
أن السبب الرئييس يف ذf یعود إيل وجود نظام حماسـبة فعال. إيل أي درجة ميكن القول أن أحد عوائق التنویع 3قتصادي يف السلطنة 
 الرقابة ؟وهل من أمث© عيل ذf؟ یعود ايل غياب
 تقدمي خالل من 3جنيب 3ست⁄ر تشجيع عىل احلكومة معلت كام 3ست⁄ري ∂ملناخ یتعلق فÅ طيبة بسمعة السلطنة تمتتع .4
 للسلطنة نيب3ج  3ست⁄ر تدفقات ضعف ايل اRراسات من العدید تشري ذf من الرمغ وعيل الرضیبية، اكالعفاءات احلوافز من العدید
 نظرك؟ و»ة من ذf وراء 3سـباب يه مفا . النفطية غري القطاعات يف
 اخلطط مجيع إحتوت وfó 3قتصادیة التحد’ت جحم إىل مبكراً  إنتهبت احلكومة أن نالحظ امخلسـية اخلطط قراءة خالل من .5
 احلرضي) التطوير ، اخلاص القطاع دور تعزيز البرشي، نرصالع  بتطوير 3هqم 3قتصادي، التنویع اساسـية( حماور أربعة عيل امخلسـية
 اخللل؟ یقع اين ؟ اخلطط ت^ حتقيق يف احلكومة جنحت مدى أي إىل نظرك وجة .من
 هل نظرك و»ة .من النفط عيل 3عqد من للتخلص احلكومة اعمتدهتا اليت 3سرتاتيجيات إحدي ٢٠٢٠ عامن خطة تعترب  .6
 ؟ 3سـباب يه ما (ال) بــ 3جابة حال 3سرتاتيجية؟ويف لت^ املوضوعة هداف3 حتقيق احلكومة تسـتطيع
Political and social factors 
1- The government had faces many oil price downfalls (1973,1980,1986,2001.2008) though 
in each oil price crisis the government was working to overcome the deficit through 
borrowing money from the international market. In your opinion, what are the reasons 
behind this situation and why the government did not learn from the previous experience? 
2- According to the published studies the monopolistic and oligopoly practice are one of the 
main observations in a rentier state. In your opinion is there any indicator of such 
phenomena in Oman? If yes to what extent such environment can hinders the state ability 
to achieve economic diversification? 
3- Many scholars argue that the reasons behind the successful economic diversification in 
natural resource abundant states such as Norway, Botswana, and Canada is the existence 
of a proper accountability system. In your opinion to what extent was the lack of 
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accountability one of the reasons behind that successful economic diversification in 
Oman? Any examples. 
4- Despite the government efforts to encourage the foreign direct investment inflow by 
inducing tax exemptions though according to the government publications there are very 
limited foreign direct investment inflow in the non-oil tradable sectors. What are the 
reasons behind that in your opinion? 
5- By reading multi publications of FYDPs that can be seen that economic diversification 
was one of the main goals of those plans however the hydrocarbon sector still represents 
the biggest share in the government revenues. What are the reasons behind that in your 
opinion and what went wrong? 
6- Vision Oman 2020 was one of the long-term strategies to achieve economic 
diversification. In your opinion given the remaining time in the vision did the government 
achieve the goals of the strategy? If no what are the reasons behind that? 
 
 إستبیان
 منو عىل سليب أثر À اكن . الكبرية املالية التدفقات يف متثلت آ¸ر من À اكن وما النفط اكتشاف أن ترى هل نظرك و»ة من .1
   ال) (نعم/ األسامك. و الزراعة قطاعي
ً  عىل ذf ینطبق وهل .2       ال) النفطية(نعم/ غري الصناعات عىل أیضا
 اىل الطبيعي الغاز عوائد نسـبة ورفع ٪٩ نسبته ما تشلك لتصبح النفط عيل املوازنة إعqد تقليص اىل ٢٠٢٠ عامن رؤیة هتدف .3
 املرجوة 3هداف حتقيق يف اخلطة هذه جناح تتوقع .هل٪٨١ نسـبة ايل لتصل النفطية غري القطاعات من العوائد وز’دة ٪١٠
 ال). (نعم/
 هو: ذf يف  السبب أن القول ميكن هل (ال) ب 3جابة حا∏ يف .4
 )       اخلطة.( تطبيق مدى ملراجعة نظام وجود عدم
 )       ( املؤسيس. ∂لعمل وليس ∂ألشخاص اخلطة ارتباط
 )       ( العامنيي. 3قتصاد وضع مع یتوافق مبا اخلطة اعداد یمت مل
 التعلمي قطاع خمرجات متت^ هل نظرك و»ة .من مسـتدام إقتصاد حتقيق يف العنارص أمه من واحد البرشي ∂لعنرص 3هqم یعد .5
 ال). / (نعم  3جنبية العام∏ إلحالل تؤهلها اليت املهارات والتدریب
 هل نظرك و»ة من العامة. املؤسسات كفاءة ضعف من تعاين النفطية 3قتصاد’ت ذات اRول أغلب أن إيل اRراسات تشري .6
  الظاهره؟(نعم/ال) هذه من السلطنة يف املؤسسات تعاين
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 خاص قطاع عنه نتج مما احلكويم. 3نفاق عىل كبري بشلك یعمتد السلطنة يف اخلاص القطاع إن ترى هل نظرك و»ة من .7
 .(نعم/ال). اRويل السوق يف املنافسة عىل قادر غري ضعيف
 اخلاص.(نعم/ال) القطاع إضعاف اىل ادى 3ست⁄رات بعض يف اRخول خالل من اخلاص للقطاع احلكومة مزامحة أن ترى وهل .8
 وصفه كنمي ما متارس اقتصادیة خنب وجود يف تمتثل الریعية، 3قتصاد’ت مع ترتافق ظاهرة وجود إىل اRراسات بعض تشري .9
  (نعم/ال) السلطنة؟ يف وجود الظاهرة هذه ملثل هل نظرك و»ة من الق©، بإحتاكر
 ملثل هل نظرك و»ة احملاسيب.من برأساملية يسمى ما ظاهرة من تعاين اRول ذات أن اىل النظر’ت تشري السـياق ذات يف .10
  (نعم/ال) السلطنة؟ يف وجود الظاهرة هذه
 نتيجة اقتصادي تنوع حتقيق عيل قادرة تكون لن وحيد مورد عيل اقتصادها یعمتد اليت اRول إنف املوارد وفرة نظریة حبسب .11
 العامل ويكون )١( الرمق عىل تأثراً  األكرث العامل حيصل حبيث برتتيهبا التكرم يرA . التالية العوامل من  أكرث أو بواحد لتأثرها
 نظرك. و»ة من )٤( الرمق تأثرياً  األقل
 )      ( اقتصادیة عوامل
 )      (  البرشیة املوارد تأهيل ضعف
 )      ( املؤسسات كفاءة ضعف




1- In your opinion “the oil export her negative effect on the growth of non-oil tradable 
sectors (Yes/No) 
2- Was it also the same case with the non-oil non-tradable sectors? (Yes/No) 
3- According to Vision Oman 2020 the oil exports share of the GDP should be 9% the 
liquid gas revenues 10% and the non-hydrocarbon to increase to 81%. In your 
opinion, you think such goals are achievable? (Yes/No) 
4- If your answer is No, in your opinion will be that attributed to: 
a. The accountability and periodic evaluation. 
b. The Vision is related to individuals not institutions. 
c. The Vision did not reflect the reality of economic structure. 
5- Human resource development is considered as the cornerstone of sustainable 
economic development. In your opinion, do you think the current educational system 
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outcome are occupied with the qualification and training that make them able to 
compete with expat? (Yes/No) 
6- The institutional quality is one of the measures in which the state can avoid the 
resource curse trap. In your opinion, do we have efficient institutions? (Yes/No) 
7- The private sector is highly dependent on the government expenditure which make it 
very weak and not able to compete in the international market. do agree with the 
statement? (Yes/No) 
8-  The government involvement in some of the private sector projects had negative 
effect on the private sector expansion. Do you agree with the statement? (Yes/No) 
9- One of the resource curse channels is the existence of oligopoly and monopolistic 
business environment. In your opinion, do we have such phenomena in Oman? 
(Yes/No) 
10- Accordingly such phenomena is associated with the crony capitalism. In your opinion, 
the existence of crony capitalism had severe effect on the economic diversification? 
(Yes/No) 
11- According to the resource curse theory natural resource -dependent states would not 
be able to create a diversified economy as a result of the effects of one or more of the 
following reasons. Could you please mark the reason which you believe have the 
most effect with number (1) the second (2) the third (3) and the fourth (4): 
a. economic factors (    ) 
b. human resource development (    ) 
c. institutional quality (    ) 
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School of Government and International Affairs 
جامعة دورهم–كلية الدراسات احلكومية والعالقات الدولية   
منظور نظرية نقمة املوارد :سلطنة عمان كحالة بحثية ""عوائق التنويع االقتصادي في الدول الغنية بالثروات ،   
	
Obstacles to Economic Diversification in Resource Dependent Countries 
through the lens of the Resource Curse Theory: A Case Study of Oman” 
 
 
في جامعة دورهم البريطانية، ويتعهد الباحث باحلفاظ على سرية املعلومات متت إجازة هذا املشروع البحثي من قبل جلنة أخالقيات البحث العلمي 
 حيث لن تستخدم إال ألغراض البحث العلمي.
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The discussion will take approximately two hours and will be based on the topic 
guide, but it is designed to be flexible so as to meet your needs. The discussion will 
be recorded, subject to your permission. Recordings of discussion will be deleted 
after transcription. Even if you have decided to take part, you are still free to cease 
your participation at any time and to have research data/information relating to you 
withdrawn without giving any reason before 31 June 2016. 
 
The UK Data Protection Act 1998 will apply to all information gathered within the 
interviews and held on password-locked computer files and locked cabinets within 
Durham University. No data will be accessed by anyone other than me; and 
anonymity of the material will be protected by using false names. No data will be 
able to be linked back to any individual taking part in the interview. You may 
withdraw your data from the project before 31June 2017. All recordings of data on 
audio-equipment will be deleted after transcription. If you ask me to withdraw your 
data at any time before 31 June 2017 I will remove all traces of it from the records. 
 
 
I will produce a final report summarizing the main findings, which will be sent to you 
upon your request. I also plan to disseminate the research findings through 
publication and conferences in both English and Arabic. If you have any questions or 




The Al-Qasimi Building 
 Elvet Hill Rd-Durham-DH1 3TU-United Kingdom 
Alkhatab.alhinai@durham.ac.uk 
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If this study has harmed, you in any way or if you wish to make a complaint about the 
conduct of the study you can contact Durham University using the details below for 
further advice and information: 
Dr Christopher Davidson, Senior Lecturer in Political Economy 
Durham University 
School of Government & International Affairs 
The Al-Qasimi Building 
 Elvet Hill Rd 
 Durham 
 DH1 3TU 
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 إیضاحات
بكرا لرضورة البحث عن مصادر لتنویع هتدف هذه اRراسة ايل حتليل 3سـباب اليت وقفت عائقا امام سلطنة عامن للوصول ايل التنویع 3قتصادي عىل الرمغ من انتباه احلكومة م 
صادیة، ضعف هذه اRراسة حتليل العوائق  من منطلق نظریة لعنة املوارد ،وذf من خالل حتليل عدد من العوامل اليت تنبثق من ت^ النظریة(عوامل اقتاRخل،حيث سـتحاول 
 السلطنة قد تأثر سلبا بواحد او اكرث من تأهيل املوارد البرشیة،ضعف كفاءة املؤسسات احلكومية،عوامل اجqعية وسـياسـية) يف سبيل حتدید فÅ اذا اكن التنویع 3قتصادي يف
 ت^ العوامل.
 
The main aim of this thesis is to analyse the economic diversification obstacles through the 
lenses of the resource curse the. My work will concentrate in Oman as a case study and will 
cover four main channels of the resource curse mainly economic factors, human resource 
development, institutional quality and political and social factors. To be able to do so I used 
qualitative methodology the data was collected through semi-structured interviews and focus 
group discussion the findings will be triangulated with the secondary data from the 
government of Oman publication and the World Bank, IMF and other international 
organizations publications. 
 
تعمتد يف اقتصادها عيل مورد وحيد لن تمتكن من الوصول ايل التنویع 3قتصادي ،حيث ان اعqدها عيل ذf املورد  تشري نظریة لعنة املوارد ايل ان اRول اليت نظریة لعنة املوارد:
جانب أهيل املوارد البرشیة ايل سـترتتب عليه تبعات اقتصادیة من قبيل املرض الهولندي،وتبعات مؤسساتية من قبيل ضعف كفاءة املؤسسات العامة وتبعات تتعلق بضعف كفاءة ت
 معاêة ت^ اRول من تبعات اجqعية وسـياسـية.
The resource curse theory main argument is that oil –dependent/abundant states will not be 
able to diversify their economies as a result of the influence of one of the four factors: 
economic factors, human resource development, institutional quality and political and social 
factors. 
 
دفقات املالية تعود هذه التسمية ايل ما عاêه 3قتصاد الهولندي عقب تدفق مكيات كبرية من النفط يف بدایة السـبعينات من القرن املايض ،حيث أدت الت نظریة املرض الهولندي:
ة السلع املسـتوردة اليت عر رصف اجلûر الهولندي امام العمالت 3خرى مما  رفع قمية املنتجات الهولندیة غري النفطية ،3مر اóي حر¢ا من القدرة عيل منافسالكبرية ايل رفع س
دى أیضاً إىل إسـتزناف القوى العام© يف ت^ القطاعات اصبحت ذات قمية اقل ،ومبرور الوقت أدى ذf إيل إهنيار العدید من القطاعات 3نتاجية غري النفطية يف هولندا كام أ
 .لتتجه للعمل يف قطاع النفط نظرا للعوائد املرتفعه 
The concept of Dutch disease refers to the situation in Netherlands after the discovery of 
massive amounts of natural gas. The massive inflow of foreign currency had resulted in 
increasing the currency exchange rate which resulted in decreasing the non-hydrocarbon 
exports competition in the international market. The increased importance of the natural 
resource activities in the economy have resulted in crowding out of the workforce from the 
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other non-hydrocodone economic sectors to the hydrocarbon sector which had negative effect 
on those sectors. 
 
القامئني عىل العمل التجاري واملسـئولني احلكوميني. وميكن أن هو مصطلح یصف 3قتصاد اóي یعمتد فيه النجاح يف األعامل التجاریة عىل العالقات القویة بني  رأساملية احملاسيب:
Rیتعلق بتوزیع التصارحي القانونية أو املنح احلكومية أو التخفيضات الرضیبية اخلاصة أو غريها من أشاكل تدخل ا Åوتتشلك هذه  .و∏ يف توجيه الشـئون 3قتصادیةیتسم ∂حملا∂ة ف
 .السلطةالظاهرة نتيجة اندماج املال مع 
Crony capitalism is an economic term referring to the business environment in which the 
successful of any business activity is condition the availability of strong relationship between 
the decision-makers and the business elite. It can be summarised as the unhealthy 
environment being created through the mixture of political power and business activities. 
 
تھدف ھذه الحلقة النقاشیة للتحاور حول األسباب التي اضعفت قدرة الحكومة العمانیة في الوصول الي اقتصاد متنوع بعیدا 
 خالل مناقشة المحاور التالیة وتحدید التاثیرات المنبثقة من كل محور.عن االعتماد علي النفط ، وذلك من 
This group discussion aims to identify the impact of each of the following factors on Oman’s 
ability to achieve economic diversification. 
 
 
 النفط /دخول الحكومة بالمشاریع التجاریة ،....)عوامل اقتصادیة (المرض الھولندي/ تذبذ اسعار (1)
Economic factors (Dutch disease, oil price volatility, government intervention in the business 
activities…) 
 
 ضعف تأھیل الموارد البشریة(2)
Human resource development 
 
 





 عوامل سیاسیة واجتماعیة(4)
Political and social factors 
 




 منو عىل سليب أثر À اكن . الكبرية املالية التدفقات يف متثلت آ¸ر من À اكن وما النفط اكتشاف أن ترى هل نظرك و»ة من .1
   ال) (نعم/ األسامك. و الزراعة قطاعي
ً  عىل ذf ینطبق وهل .2       ال) النفطية(نعم/ غري الصناعات عىل أیضا
 اىل الطبيعي الغاز عوائد نسـبة ورفع ٪٩ نسبته ما تشلك لتصبح النفط عيل املوازنة إعqد تقليص اىل ٢٠٢٠ عامن رؤیة هتدف .3
 املرجوة 3هداف حتقيق يف خلطةا هذه جناح تتوقع .هل٪٨١ نسـبة ايل لتصل النفطية غري القطاعات من العوائد وز’دة ٪١٠
 ال). (نعم/
 هو: ذf يف  السبب أن القول ميكن هل (ال) ب 3جابة حا∏ يف .4
i. اخلطة.( تطبيق مدى ملراجعة نظام وجود عدم       ( 
ii. املؤسيس. ∂لعمل وليس ∂ألشخاص اخلطة ارتباط )       ( 
iii. العامنيي. 3قتصاد وضع مع یتوافق مبا اخلطة اعداد یمت مل )       ( 
 التعلمي قطاع خمرجات متت^ هل نظرك و»ة .من مسـتدام إقتصاد حتقيق يف العنارص أمه من واحد البرشي ∂لعنرص 3هqم یعد .5
 ال). / (نعم  3جنبية العام∏ إلحالل تؤهلها اليت املهارات والتدریب
 هل نظرك و»ة من العامة. املؤسسات كفاءة ضعف من تعاين النفطية 3قتصاد’ت ذات اRول أغلب أن إيل اRراسات تشري .6
  الظاهره؟(نعم/ال) هذه من السلطنة يف املؤسسات تعاين
 خاص قطاع عنه نتج مما احلكويم. 3نفاق عىل كبري بشلك یعمتد السلطنة يف اخلاص القطاع إن ترى هل نظرك و»ة من .7
 .(نعم/ال). اRويل السوق يف املنافسة عىل قادر غري ضعيف
 اخلاص.(نعم/ال) القطاع إضعاف اىل ادى 3ست⁄رات بعض يف اRخول خالل من اخلاص للقطاع احلكومة مزامحة أن ترى وهل .8
 وصفه ميكن ما متارس اقتصادیة خنب وجود يف تمتثل الریعية، 3قتصاد’ت مع ترتافق ظاهرة وجود إىل اRراسات بعض تشري .9
  (نعم/ال) السلطنة؟ يف وجود الظاهرة هذه ملثل هل نظرك و»ة من الق©، بإحتاكر
 ملثل هل نظرك و»ة احملاسيب.من برأساملية يسمى ما ظاهرة من تعاين اRول ذات أن اىل النظر’ت تشري السـياق ذات يف .10
  (نعم/ال) السلطنة؟ يف وجود الظاهرة هذه
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 نتيجة اقتصادي تنوع حتقيق عيل قادرة نتكو لن وحيد مورد عيل اقتصادها یعمتد اليت اRول فإن املوارد وفرة نظریة حبسب .11
 العامل ويكون )١( الرمق عىل تأثراً  األكرث العامل حيصل حبيث برتتيهبا التكرم يرA . التالية العوامل من  أكرث أو بواحد لتأثرها
 نظرك. و»ة من )٤( الرمق تأثرياً  األقل
 )      ( اقتصادیة عوامل
 )      (  البرشیة املوارد تأهيل ضعف
 )      ( املؤسسات كفاءة ضعف




1. In your opinion “the oil export her negative effect on the growth of non-oil tradable 
sectors (Yes/No) 
2. Was it also the same case with the non-oil non-tradable sectors? (Yes/No) 
3. According to Vision Oman 2020 the oil exports share of the GDP should be 9% the 
liquid gas revenues 10% and the non-hydrocarbon to increase to 81%. In your 
opinion, you think such goals are achievable? (Yes/No) 
4. If your answer is No, in your opinion will be that attributed to : 
a. The accountability and periodic evaluation. 
b. The Vision is related to individuals not institutions. 
c. The Vision did not reflect the reality of economic structure. 
5. Human resource development is considered as the cornerstone of sustainable 
economic development. In your opinion, do you think the current educational system 
outcome are occupied with the qualification and training that make them able to 
compete with expat? (Yes/No) 
6. The institutional quality is one of the measures in which the state can avoid the 
resource curse trap. In your opinion, do we have efficient institutions? (Yes/No) 
7. The private sector is highly dependent on the government expenditure which make it 
very weak and not able to compete in the international market. do agree with the 
statement? (Yes/No) 
8.  The government involvement in some of the private sector projects had negative 
effect on the private sector expansion. Do you agree with the statement? (Yes/No) 
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9. One of the resource curse channels is the existence of oligopoly and monopolistic 
business environment. In your opinion, do we have such phenomena in Oman? 
(Yes/No) 
10. Accordingly such phenomena is associated with the crony capitalism. In your opinion, 
the existence of crony capitalism had severe effect on the economic diversification? 
(Yes/No) 
11. According to the resource curse theory natural resource-dependent states would not be 
able to create a diversified economy as a result of the effects of one or more of the 
following reasons. Could you please mark the reason which you believe have the 
most effect with number (1) the second (2) the third (3) and the fourth (4): 
a. economic factors (    ) 
b. human resource development (    ) 
c. institutional quality (    ) 
d. political and social factors (   ) 
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Appendix 4: Top Family Owned Business Groups in Oman*  
Holding 































Minister of Agriculture and 
Fisheries 1979-1986 






Secretary General of the 
Tender Board 1996-2001 
Minister of Manpower 
2001-2008 
 
          
Al Hashar 
Group 
The late Saeed Al Hashar 
Undersecretary in the 
Royal Court 1988-2008 
 
          
Al Hassan 
Group 
Hassan Ali Salman 
Senior Vice President, 
Central Bank of 
Oman1983-1995 
         
Al Jarwani 
Group 
Mahmood Al Jarwani 
CEO of the Public 
Authority for Stores and 
Food Reserve 1983-1988 
CEO of Muscat security 
Market 1988-1999 




Minister of Agriculture and 
fisheries 2001-2011 
          
Assarain 
Group 
Said Salim Minister of the 
Royal Court 1974-1984          
Jawad A 
Sultan Group 
Jawad A Sultan 










Contract officer in PDO 
1974-1982 
Businessman  
         
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Mohamed & Ahmed 
Alkhonji 
Businessmen 




Mohsin Haider Darwish 





The Sultan's maternal uncle 
(Mother side) 
Minister of Social Affairs 
and Labour 1983-1990 
State Advisor1990 -present 
         
OHI 
Maqbool Hamid 
Undersecretary in the 
Royal Court 1974 
Undersecretary of Work 
force 1979-1982 




Special Advisor for 
External Liaison to His 
Majesty Sultan Qaboos bin 
Said 1975- present 






Secretary General of the 
Supreme Committee for 
Urban Development1986-
1995 
Minister of Development 
1995-1998 
         





Undersecretary in the 
Royal Court1990-2005 




Minister of Royal Court          
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Minister of Oil and Gas 
1974-1997 
         
STS LLC 
Salim Hassan Macki (was 
holding the following 
duties in different periods  
Director General of Oil and 
Minerals (Ministry of Oil 
and Gas) 
Member of the board of 
directors in Oman oil 
company 
The Chairman of Oman 
India Fertilizer Company 
(represents Oman) 
the Representative of the 
Government of Oman on 
the Caspian Pipeline 
Consortium (CPC) 
         
Tawoos LLC 
His Highness Sayyid 
Shabib Al Said 




          
Technique 
LLC 
The late Faher Al-Said 
The Sultan's maternal uncle 
(Father side) 
Minister of defence 1973-
1996 
         
Towell &Co 
Maqbool Sultan 
Minister of Commerce and 
Industry 1991-2011 
         
Yahya Yahya Nasib           
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Holding Governor of Central Bank 




Deputy Prime Minister for 
Economic and Financial 
Affairs1974-1995 




Minister of Commerce 
1974-1983 
Advisor to HM Sultan 
Qaboos bin Said for 
Economic Planning Affairs 
1983-present 
         
Source: Compiled by author from (MOCS, 2014),companies websites, and other online material. The companies list is based on various participants remarks and   (Findouter, 
2017) classification. 
*: in alphabetical order
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Appendix 5: Non-Government Shareholders of more than 3% in Omani Banks  
Bank Muscat 
Major shareholders Affiliated with 




The Sultan's maternal uncle 
Minister of Social Affairs and Labour 
1983-1990 
State Advisor1990-present 
Oman Arab Bank 
Major shareholders Affiliated with 
Oman International 
Development & Investment 
(Ominvest) (51%) 
Mohammed Alzubair 
Minister of Commerce 1974-1983  
Advisor to HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said 
for Economic Planning Affairs 1983-
present  
 
National Bank of Oman 
Major shareholders Affiliated with 
Suhail Bahwan Group 
(Holdings) L.L.C(14.7%) 
Suhail Bahwan (Businessman) 
 
HSBC Oman 
Major shareholders Affiliated with 
Zawawi Group (49%) Omar Alzawawi 
Special Advisor for External Liaison to 
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Dhofar Bank 






Muscat Overseas Co. LLC (16.5%) 
 
Mustahail Ahmed 
The Sultan's maternal uncle 
Minister of Social Affairs  
and Labour 1983-1990 
State Advisor1990-present 
Abdul Hafidh Salim Rajab Al Aujaili (12.2%) Abdulhafidh Al-Aujaili Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries 1979-1986 
Fincorp Investments LLC (6.59%) Mohamed Musa Al-Yousef: Minister 
of Development 1995-1998 Mohamed Musa Al-Yousef (5.54%) 
Abdul Hafidh Salim 
Rajab Al Aujaili 
(18.6%) 
Abdulhafidh Al-Aujaili Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries 1979-1986 
Abdullah Yosif bin 
Alawi (6.22%) 
 






Muscat Overseas Group 
 
Mustahail Ahmed 
The Sultan's maternal uncle 
Minister of Social Affairs  




Major shareholders Affiliated with Affiliated with 
International Finance 
Corp. (9.9%) 
Oman International Development and Investment 
Company SAOG (Ominvest) 
Mohammed Alzubair 
Minister of Commerce 1974-1983  






The Zubair Corp (19.2%) 
Al Anwar Holdings SAOG (9.56%) 
 
Fincorp Investments LLC (23%) 
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Bank Sohar 
Major shareholders Affiliated with Affiliated with Affiliated with 
Oman Investment & 
Finance Co. SAOG 
(15%) 
Ubhar Capital SAOC (7.75%) 
 
Oman International Development and 
Investment Company SAOG 
(“Ominvest” with 36%) 
Mohammed Alzubair 
Minister of Commerce 1974-1983  
Advisor to HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said for Economic Planning 
Affairs 1983-present 
Muscat Overseas Co. LLC (3%) 
 
Mustahail Ahmed 
The Sultan's maternal uncle 
Minister of Social Affairs  
and Labour 1983-1990 
State Advisor1990-present 
Dhofar International Development & 
Investment Holding Co. (45%) 
 
Muscat Overseas Co. LLC (16.5%) 
Mustahail Ahmed 
The Sultan's maternal uncle 
Minister of Social Affairs  
and Labour 1983-1990 
State Advisor1990-present 
Abdul Hafidh Salim Rajab Al Aujaili 
(12.2%) 
Abdulhafidh Al-Aujaili Minister of Agriculture and Fisheries 
1979-1986 
Fincorp Investments LLC (6.59%) Mohamed Musa Al-Yousef Minister of Development 1995-1998 Mohamed Musa Al-Yousef (5.54%) 
Ubhar Capital SAOC 
(7.75%) 
 
Oman International Development and 
Investment Company SAOG (“Ominvest” with 
36%) 
Mohammed Alzubair 
Minister of Commerce 1974-1983  
Advisor to HM Sultan Qaboos bin Said for Economic Planning Affairs 1983-present 
 
 
Source: Compiled by author with data obtained from (SURPERFORMANCE, 2017)
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